

THE KOREAN WAR AND TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS

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ABSTRACT

THE KOREAN WAR AND TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS

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This thesis aims to analyze the relations between Turkey and the United States during the Korean War and asks how Turkey's involvement in the Korean War affected bilateral relations. Therefore, this thesis examined the bilateral relations by relaying on primary sources and applying a theoretical framework. The archival documents shed light on the bilateral relations and bandwagoning theoretical framework helps to understand the war. The various aspects of the close relationship between two sides are presented with the framework of theory. In doing so, the thesis first examined the Turkish-American relations between 1945 and 1950. Then, it focused on the Korean War. After this, it evaluated the involvement of Turkey and the U.S. in the Korean War. Lastly, the thesis examined the impact of the involvement of Turkey in the war on Turkish-American relations. As a result, this thesis argues that the impact of Turkey's involvement in the Korean War on Turkish-

American relations during the Korean War can be explained within the bandwagoning theoretical framework. The impact was most apparent in two domains: security and economy. In the first domain there are four main factors that affected the relations in terms of security which are the Turkish desire for more American military aid, Turkish desire for UN Security Council Membership, the desire to overcome the communist threat, and lastly Turkish desire for NATO membership. In the second domain, the impact is quite observable given the continuity of American economic aid and the increase in American investment in Turkey.

Keywords: Korean War, Turkish-American Relations, Bandwagoning Theory, NATO Membership, Communist Threat.

ÖZ

KORE SAVAŞI VE TÜRK-AMERİKAN İLİŞKİLERİ

Temur, Nur Seda

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı

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Bu tezin amacı; Kore Savaşı sırasında Türkiye ile ABD arasındaki ilişkiyi incelemek ve Türkiye'nin Kore Savaşı'na katılımının ikili ilişkileri nasıl etkilediğini araştırmaktır. Bu nedenle çalışmada birincil kaynaklar temel alınıp teorik bir çerçeve uygulanarak ikili ilişkiler incelenmektedir. Arşiv belgeleri yakın ikili ilişkilere ışık tutarken, peşine takılma teorisi savaşı anlamak için zemin oluşturmaktadır. İki taraf arasındaki yakın ilişkinin yönleri, peşine takılma teorisi kullanılarak incelenmektedir. İnceleme sırasında, tezde öncelikle 1945-1950 arasındaki Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri ele alınarak Kore Savaşı'na odaklanılmıştır. Ardından Türkiye ile ABD'nin Kore Savaşı'na katılımı değerlendirilerek Türkiye'nin Kore Savaşı'na katılımının Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri üzerindeki etkisi incelenmiştir. Sonuç olarak; Türkiye'nin Kore Savaşı'na katılımı ile Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerine etkisinin, peşine takılma teorisi çerçevesinde açıklanabileceği savunulan

bu tezde etki; güvenlik ve ekonomi olmak üzere iki alanda belirginlik göstermektedir. Güvenlik alanında; Amerikan askeri yardımında artış, BM Güvenlik Konseyi Üyeliği, komünist tehdidini yenme isteği ve son olarak NATO üyeliği isteği olmak üzere dört ana faktör vardır. Ekonomik alanda ise Amerikan ekonomik yardımının sürekliliği ve Türkiye'deki Amerikan yatırımında artış olmak üzere iki ana etken oldukça göze çarpmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kore Savaşı, Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri, Peşine Takılma Teorisi, NATO Üyeliği, Komünist Tehdidi

To my precious mother Muazzez TEMUR and my niece Zeynep Defne ŞAHİN...

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

DP	Democratic Party
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
FRUS	Foreign Relations of the United States
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNA	Grand National Assembly
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NKPA	North Korean People's Army
ROK	Republic of Korea
RPP	Republican People's Party
U.S.	United States
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNTCOK	United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
OEEC	Organization for European Economic Cooperation

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1.Scope and Objective

This thesis focuses on the relations between Turkey and the United States (U.S.) during the Korean War and asks how Turkey's involvement in the Korean War affected bilateral relations. In doing so, this study examines the relations and motivations which are security domain and economic domain from the perspective of bandwagoning theory. The research question of this thesis is how Turkish involvement in the Korean War affected Turkish-American relations. There are quite a number of studies on Turkish-American relations. What distinguishes this thesis is the reliance on primary sources and application of a theoretical framework. The archives, as primary sources, provide information about bilateral relations and show in which domains the relations were affected. Hence, the archival documents have a crucial role on finding an answer to how Turkish involvement in the Korean War affected the bilateral relations. The ways in which the close relationship between two states developed and the results of the study are highlighted with the help of the bandwagoning theoretical framework. Hence, this thesis contributes to the literature by drawing evidence from the archival material to disclose the factors that affected bilateral relations especially in the domains of security and economy. The evidence

will be supported with the reasoning of bandwagoning of weak states to powerful states. This work examines the relationship between the U.S. and Turkey following the Second World War and focuses on the transformation of this relationship. This thesis argues that the involvement of Turkey in the Korean War contributed to the formation of a close relationship between Turkey and the U.S. In this relationship, Turkey, the weaker state, was dependent on the rules of the dominant power, the United States. Moreover, it is argued that the close and dependent relationship between these two countries in this period is further shaped by security and military domain.

1.2.Methodology

This thesis is a qualitative case study. In particular , archival research and document analysis was done in order to analyze the relationship between Turkey and the U.S. during the Korean War. Data gathered for this thesis was drawn from both primary and secondary resources. Primary sources included both archival and official documents. Archival documents, were taken primarily from the Military History and Strategic Study Office in the Turkish General Staff (ATASE-Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt), and was used to analyze the economic and military support provided by the U.S. In addition, information related to the progression of the Korean War and the reasons for Turkey's involvement in the war were also gathered from the archival material. Another archive from which data was gathered is the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS). The documents taken from this archive were used in the analysis of U.S. foreign policy and attitudes

towards Turkey during the Korean War and in the years leading up to the end of the Second World War. Relevant documents were also obtained from the archive of Presidency (T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı Devlet Arşivleri) and were used to analyze the views of Turkish officials and Turkish parties on Turkey's involvement in the war. In other words, these documents were used to gain an understanding of the significance of Turkey's involvement from the perspective of Turkish officials. Primary sources also include the official reports of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, which were used to examine the view of the Turkish Assembly regarding Turkey's decision to participate in the war. Finally, the last bunch of primary sources consulted was the official documents of the United Nations. These documents were used mainly for the evaluation of the decision-making process on taking action in the Korean War. All in all, the documents obtained from these archives were used to analyze the reasons for the Turkish and American participation in the Korean War, and the nature of their relations during this period. Secondary sources were also used such as relevant books, articles, academic journals, research papers and newspapers gathered from libraries. Lastly, internet sources, such as online journals, books, newspapers and official websites of ministries, were also utilized as secondary sources.

1.3.The General Structure of the Thesis

This thesis comprises of seven chapters. After this introduction chapter, the second chapter reviews the literature and discusses the bandwagoning theory in detail. The third chapter is subdivided into three subsections—The Yalta Conference

and Straits Question, Turkish Foreign Policy after the Second World War, and the U.S. Foreign Policy after the Second World War—which analyze the relations between Turkey and the United States between 1945 and 1950. The foreign policies of both Turkey and the U.S were examined in this chapter. Moreover, this chapter is quite essential as it provides historical background because without knowledge about past relations, it is difficult to examine present ones.

The fourth chapter focuses on the Korean War itself. In fact, this chapter deals with the factors that caused the war, as well as the historical background of the outbreak of the war and the results of the war. In addition to addressing the historical details of the war, this chapter also investigates the actions taken by states and international organizations and evaluates the attitudes held by states towards the issue.

The fifth chapter focuses on evaluating the involvement of Turkey and the U.S. in the Korean War. There are two subsections in this chapter which deal with the motivations behind the United States' involvement in the Korean War and the motivations behind Turkey's involvement in the Korean War. Under the involvement of Turkey in the war category, two main clusters- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership and finding ally to fight against communist and Soviet threat- of reasons for the involvement of Turkey in the war are discussed. The involvement of both states will be discussed under the framework of bandwagoning theory.

The sixth chapter evaluates the impact of the involvement of Turkey in the Korean War on Turkish-American relations. This chapter discusses the nature of the

relations between Turkey and the U.S. during the Korean War. The impact will be analyzed under two subcategory which are security perception and economic needs. This chapter will be the backbone of this thesis as the main aim of the current work is to use the bandwagoning theoretical framework to analyze the relationship between Turkey and the U.S. during the Korean War, with special attention given to the impact that Turkey's participation in the war had on bilateral relations.

Lastly, the concluding chapter gives a comprehensive overview of the thesis and discusses the major findings of this work. It presents an evaluation of the relationship between Turkey and United States through their motivations to participate in the war. Finally, in this chapter, it is argued that the involvement of Turkey in the Korean War contributed to the formation of a close relationship between Turkey and the U.S. during the Korean War. In addition, their relations can be described within the framework of the bandwagoning theory given military aid, UN Security Council Membership, the desire to defeat the communist threat, and NATO membership under the security perception and economic needs which are increase in American economic aid and American investment in Turkey under economic needs.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Literature Review

This chapter will cover the literature on relations between Turkey and the United States during the Korean War. Numerous academic studies address the relations between Turkey and the U.S. However, only a few of these studies focus on the period during the Korean War from a theoretical perspective. The aim of this thesis is to contribute to this literature by examining the relationship between Turkey and the U.S. through a in-depth analysis of the topic utilizing a theoretical perspective. When all the studies are considered, it could be asserted that they can be categorized under five main topics: studies that focus on a) factors that have an impact on close Turkish- American relations, b) Turkish foreign policy in the Korean War, c) American foreign policy in the Korean War, d) the impact of both Turkish and American Press on policies of both states and lastly, e) Turkish troop successes in the battles.

To start with the studies related with Turkish- American relations, according to the literature, there are also various factors that influence relationship between Turkey and the U.S. during the war. The first group of these factors are key international developments, perspectives of government officials, politics, economy

and military in the policy-making process.¹ These factors are proposed in the book entitled “Turkish-American Relations, 1800-1952: Between the Stars, Stripes and the Crescent”² by Suhnaz Yılmaz. She analyzes not only the relations between Turkey and the U.S., but also the foreign policies of these states between 1800 and 1952. What distinguishes this work from others is the use of archival documents, private papers and manuscript collections for analysis. This book focuses on the factors that impacted Turkish-American relations, namely certain key international developments, the perspectives of government officials, and the place of politics, the economy and military in the policy-making process. Another factor is the geopolitical position,³ which is proposed in the book chapter “Turkey and The United States”⁴ by Stephen Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser. The chapter focuses on a more limited period. Relations from 1945 to the end of the Cold War is discussed. It is highlighted in the chapter that, as time progressed, Turkish-American relations became less strategic and less important through the end of the Cold War, but their relations remained significant. They argued that after the Cold War, Turkish-American Relations became more strategic based on economic and geostrategic concerns. NATO membership⁵ is another factor that affected Turkish-American

¹ Suhnaz Yılmaz, *Turkish American Relations, 1800-1952: Between the Stars, Stripes and the Crescent* (New York: Routledge, 2015).

² Ibid.

³ Stephen F. Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser, "Turkey and The United States," in *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2003).

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971* (Washington, DC: AEI, 1976).

relations. This is highlighted in the book “Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971”⁶ by George Harris. The author discusses the relations between Turkey and the U.S. between the years 1945 and 1971. The work specifically focuses on Turkey’s NATO membership and the U.S. Marshall Aid to Turkey. Indeed, one of the chapters deals specifically with the economic and military aid offered by the U.S. to Turkey. Another factor is the strategic importance of Turkish straits.⁷ For instance, the book “Turkish-American Relations 1947-1964”⁸ by Oral Sander discusses foreign policies of both states. The author specifically focuses on the strategic position of Turkey and the role it played in relations with the U.S. The Baghdad Pact and Cuban Missile Crisis,⁹ are other factors that affected Turkish-American relations. Indeed, “The Turkish-American relationship between 1947 and 2003”¹⁰ by Nasuh Uslu focuses on the relations between Turkey and the U.S. from alliance framework. It focuses on key issues that impacted this relationship, including the Baghdad Pact, Cuban Missile Crisis, the Cyprus Issue and the Opium Issue. Another factor is the Soviet threat.¹¹ For instance, Melvyn P. Leffler’s article, titled “Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War:

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Oral Sander, *Türk –Amerikan İlişkileri (1947-1964)* (İmge, 2016).

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Nasuh Uslu, *The Turkish-American Relationship between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003).

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Melvyn P. Leffler, "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952," *The Journal of American History* 71, no. 4 (1985).

The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952”¹², deals with the relations among Turkey, the U.S. and NATO by emphasizing the Truman Doctrine and Turkey’s membership in NATO. He argues that the U.S. aimed to benefit from the chaos caused by the Soviet threat against the Mediterranean region and the Middle East, and Turkey, in particular. Therefore, the United States’ strategic interests in the region led them to support Turkey and its NATO membership. Turkey’s democratization process¹³ is the last factor that affected Turkish-American relations, according to the literature. For instance, in his thesis entitled “Bringing them together: Turkish-American relations and Turkish democracy, 1945-1950”¹⁴, Barın Kayaoğlu focuses on the impact Turkey’s democratization process had on its relationship with the U.S., and the role this process played in prevention of the expansion of the Soviet Union. In short the studies related with Turkish- American relations focuses on the factors that influence relationship between Turkey and the U.S. during the war. These are key international developments, perspectives of government officials, politics, economy and military in the policy-making process¹⁵, the geopolitical position,¹⁶ NATO membership,¹⁷ strategic importance of Turkish

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Barın Kayaoğlu, *Bringing Them Together: Turkish-American Relations and Turkish Democracy, 1945-1950*, Master's thesis, 2005.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Suhnaz Yılmaz, *Turkish American Relations, 1800-1952: Between the Stars, Stripes and the Crescent* (New York: Routledge, 2015).

¹⁶ Larrabee and Lesser, "Turkey and The United States," in *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty*.

¹⁷ Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971*.

straits,¹⁸ the Baghdad Pact, Cuban Missile Crisis,¹⁹ Soviet threat²⁰ and lastly the Turkey's democratization process.²¹

Related with the literature on Turkish-American relations, there are also studies that focus on specifically the bilateral relations after the Second World War. For instance, the book "Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present and Future"²² which was edited by Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan. This work discusses the relations between Turkey and the U.S. from a historical perspective, from the 19th century to the post-Cold War period. It emphasizes that both states profited from this relationship and were able to collaborate after every conflict. Furthermore, former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, George McGhee, in his book, entitled "U.S.–Turkey–NATO–Middle East"²³, discusses his experiences in Turkey from 1952 to 1953 when he was an ambassador and focuses on the U.S. Foreign Policy and its diplomatic relations with Turkey. He argues that the relationship between Turkey and the Middle East developed with the support of the U.S. Moreover, Ferenc Albert Vali, in

¹⁸ Sander, *Türk –Amerikan İlişkileri (1947-1964.)*

¹⁹ Uslu, *The Turkish-American Relationship between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance.*

²⁰ Leffler, "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952."

²¹ Kayaoğlu, *Bringing Them Together: Turkish-American Relations and Turkish Democracy, 1945-1950.*

²² Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan, *Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present, and Future* (London: Routledge, 2004).

²³ George McGhee, *The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection: How the Truman Doctrine and Turkey's NATO Entry Contained the Soviets* (London: Macmillan, 1990).

his book “Bridge across the Bosphorus”²⁴, analyzes Turkish-American relations by discussing the Turkish Straits issue. Vali claims that the Turkish straits held a strategic and important place in the relationship between Turkey and the U.S. because the relations were shaped by the Turkish policy on the straits. Furthermore, the book “Turkish-American Relations 1947-1964”²⁵ by Oral Sander discusses foreign policies of both states. The author specifically focuses on the strategic position of Turkey and the role it played in relations with the U.S. Moreover, the article by Feridun C. Erkin, titled “Turkey’s Foreign Policy”²⁶, analyses the factors that had an impact Turkish Foreign Policy based on his own experiences. It is argued in the text that Kemalist ideology and humanitarian perspectives play a big role in Turkish foreign policy. Another author that focuses on Turkish Foreign Policy is Ömer Göksel İsyar. In his article entitled “An Analysis of Turkish-American Relations From 1945 to 2004: Initiatives and Reactions in Turkish Foreign Policy”²⁷, he focuses on the relations between Turkey and the U.S. from the second half of 20th century to the beginning of 21st century. İsyar claims that during this period, Turkish-American relations were strengthened as their policies converged. He also analyzed Anti-Americanism and Turkish foreign policy towards American convergence policy. Another Work focusing on anti-Americanism is the

²⁴ Ferenc Albert. Váli, *Bridge across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey* (Ann Arbor (Mich.): UMI, 1971).

²⁵ Oral Sander, *Türk –Amerikan İlişkileri (1947-1964)* (İmge, 2016).

²⁶ Feridun C. Erkin, "Turkey's Foreign Policy," *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science* 24, no. 4 (1952).

²⁷ Ömer Göksel İsyar, "An Analysis of Turkish-American Relations From 1945 to 2004: Initiatives and Reactions in Turkish Foreign Policy," *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations* 4, no. 3 (Fall 2005).

article “The Roots of Anti-Americanism in Turkey 1945-1960” by Tuba Ünlü Bilgiç. The work focuses on anti-Americanism concept between 1945 and 1960, the reasons for anti-Americanism in Turkey and its impact on Turkish-American relations.²⁸ Moreover, in her article entitled “A Review of Turkey's Foreign Policy”²⁹, Yasmin Qureshi also addresses Turkish- American relations. Qureshi discusses Turkish Foreign Policy from the 17th to the 20th century and emphasizes the key issues that impacted the relations between Turkey and the U.S. She starts with a discussion of the Straits Question, then moves on to an evaluation of the First World War, then discusses the membership of Turkey in NATO, and ends with a discussion of the Cyprus issue. All these issues are evaluated in terms of relations between Turkey, the U.S. and Russia.

Regarding the Turkish foreign policy in the Korean War, the studies lay emphasis on three main issues. The first one is the impact of Western-leaning policies of Democratic Party.³⁰ For instance, Furkan Arda, in his thesis titled “Analysis of Turkey-US Relations in 1950-1960”³¹ emphasizes the impact of political change in the Turkish government on Turkish-American relations. This work also analyzes close relations between Turkey and the West. It focuses on the factors that impacted Turkey’s Democratic Party’s (DP) choice to follow Western-leaning policies in

²⁸ Tuba Ünlü Bilgiç, "The Roots of Anti-Americanism in Turkey 1945-1960," Bilig, no. 72 (Winter 2015).

²⁹ Yasmin Qureshi, "A Review of Turkey's Foreign Policy." *Pakistan Horizon* 30, no. 1 (1977).

³⁰ Furkan Arda, *Analysis of Turkey-US Relations in 1950-1960*. Master’s thesis, 2018.

³¹ Ibid.

order to protect the country from the communist threat. This thesis discusses the reasons for this preference and tries to determine whether the political circumstances in Turkey or the miscalculations of political preferences contributed to Turkey's close relations with the western world. The second issue related with Turkish foreign policy is Turkey's neutrality during the Second World War.³² Indeed, Mehmet Sait Cıla, in his thesis, titled "The Relationship Between Turkey and the U.S. After the Second World War (1945-1955)"³³ discusses Turkey's involvement in the western bloc under the direction of the U.S., after the Second World War. He argues that Turkey's neutrality during the Second World War played a crucial role in Turkish foreign policy and led the government to side with the western bloc. The last issue is the reactions of the opposition party to the decision of Turkey to participate in the war.³⁴ This is highlighted by Sedef Bulut, in her article entitled "Power Struggle in the 38th Latitude: Korean War and Its Manifestation in Turkey"³⁵ focuses on the Korean War and Turkey's relations with South Korea. Bulut examines the influence of the Korean War on Turkish Foreign Policy and explores the reactions of the opposition party and the public to the decision to participate in the war. Furthermore, Yüksel Sezgin, in his book entitled "The Impact

³² Mehmet Salih Cıla, *The Relationship Between Turkey and the U.S. After the Second World War*. Master's thesis, 2014.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Sedef Bulut, "Power Struggle in 38th Latitude: Korean War and Reflections in Turkey," *Mavi Atlas* 6, no. 1 (2018).

³⁵ Ibid.

of the involvement of Turkey in Korean War on Turkish Foreign Policy”³⁶, examines the impact of Turkey’s involvement in the war on Turkish Foreign Policy, membership in NATO and the migration policy of Turkey. The factors that led to the participation of Turkey in the Korean War and the importance of the Korean War for Turkey were also examined in the article titled “Korean War and Turkey”³⁷ by Nusret Özselçuk, in “The Korean War (1950-1953): Its General Evaluation in Terms of Turkey and the World”³⁸ by Meliha Yücel and Emine Yılmaz, and in Şinasi Sukan’s edited book “Korean War and Beyond.” To sum up, the studies related with Turkish foreign policy during the war are mostly focused on the impact of Western-leaning policies of Democratic Party,³⁹ Turkey’s neutrality during the Second World War,⁴⁰ and lastly, the reactions of the opposition party to the decision of Turkey to participate in the war.⁴¹

When we move to the American foreign policy, the studies focus on the factors that have an impact on American foreign policy. The first factor is the strategic geopolitical position of Turkey which is proposed by Atmaca.⁴² Ayşe Ömür Atmaca focuses on the factors that affected Turkish-American Relations. In her

³⁶ Yüksel Sezgin, *Kore Savaşı’na Girişimizin Türk Dış Politikası Üzerine Etkileri*, Ankara, 1995.

³⁷ Nusret Özselçuk, "Kore Savaşı Ve Türkiye," *Stratejik Etüdler Bülteni* 85 (1990).

³⁸ Meliha Yücel and Emine Yılmaz, "A General Evaluation of the Korean War (1950-1953), Turkey and the World," *Askeri Tarih Bülteni*, no. 39 (August 1995).

³⁹ Arda, *Analysis of Turkey-US Relations in 1950-1960*.

⁴⁰ Cıla, *The Relationship Between Turkey and the U.S. After the Second World War*.

⁴¹ Bulut, "Power Struggle in 38th Latitude: Korean War and Reflections in Turkey."

⁴² Ayşe Ömür Atmaca, "The Geopolitical Origins of Turkish-American Relations: Revisiting the Cold War Years," *All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace* 3, no. 1 (January 2014).

article titled “The Geopolitical Origins of Turkish-American Relations: Revisiting the Cold War Years”⁴³, she looks at the bilateral relations from the perspective of critical geopolitics. This is discussed by considering the impact of the geography of Turkey on the U.S. Foreign Policy, and the impact of the U.S. foreign and security policies on the alliance between Turkey and the U.S. The second factor is the impact of authorities who attended the war.⁴⁴ In his book titled “The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War”⁴⁵, David Halberstam examines participation of the U.S. in the Korean War and the impact of MacArthur, Truman, Ridgway, Acheson and Almond on the progression of the war. He also discusses the Chinese involvement in the war and the consequences of the war. The third factor is the cooperation between military and bureaucrats which is proposed by Stueck.⁴⁶ Stueck, in his book called “The Road to Confrontation: American Policy toward China and Korea”⁴⁷ examines the U.S. involvement in the Korean War by using official documents and interviews. He examines the cooperation between the military and bureaucrats and the impact of this cooperation on policy development. The last factor is the interaction among the political opinion, ideological conviction and

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ David Halberstam, *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War* (London: Pan, 2009).

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ William Whitney Stueck, *The Road to Confrontation: American Policy toward China and Korea, 1947-1950* (Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Books on Demand, 1997).

⁴⁷ Ibid.

partisan allegiance.⁴⁸ Indeed, in the article titled “Attitudes Toward the Korean War”⁴⁹ by Edward A. Suchman, Rose K. Goldsen, Robin M. Williams, the impact of the participation of the U.S. in the Korean War is examined. They analyze three aspects of the political opinion of the American society—ideological conviction, partisan allegiance and political knowledge—and discuss the interaction among them and their impact on the participation of the U.S. in the Korean War. Apart from the factors, there are also some studies which specifically focuses on American foreign policy in the Korean War. For instance, Tae-Gyun Park, in his article entitled “U.S. Policy Change toward South Korea in the 1940s and the 1950s”⁵⁰, focuses on the U.S. policy towards South Korea between 1940 and 1950. He states that after 1945, the U.S. followed two policies, namely the trusteeship carried out by the State Department and the plan of an executive and administrative governmental agency designed by the U.S. Military Government in Korea. Furthermore, Cumings in his book called “The Korean War: A History”⁵¹ examines the Korean War and its impact on American Foreign Policy. In sum, the factors that affect American foreign policy is another category in the literature related with this study. These factors are the strategic geopolitical position of Turkey,⁵² impact of authorities who attended the

⁴⁸ Suchman, Edward A., Rose K. Goldsen, and Robin M. Williams. "Attitudes Toward the Korean War." *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 17, no. 2 (1953): 171-84.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Tae-Gyun Park, "U.S. Policy Change toward South Korea in the 1940s and the 1950s." *Journal of International and Area Studies* 7, no. 2 (2000).

⁵¹ Bruce Cumings, *The Korean War: A History* (New York: Modern Library, 2011).

⁵² Atmaca, "The Geopolitical Origins of Turkish-American Relations: Revisiting the Cold War Years."

war,⁵³ the cooperation between military and bureaucrats,⁵⁴ and lastly the interaction among the political opinion, ideological conviction and partisan allegiance.⁵⁵

Related with the studies on the impact of both Turkish and American Press on policies of both states, the power of national press on governments decision about policies about the war was discussed in the literature.⁵⁶ For instance, Tülay Gül, in her article titled "The Decision to Send Troops to Korea in National Press",⁵⁷ analyzes the perspective of the national press in relation to the participation of Turkey in the Korean War, after the Second World War. On the other side, Ahmet Emin Yaman, in his article titled "The Reflection of Korean War on Turkish Press",⁵⁸ discusses the Korean War in relation to the Turkish press. He argues that the press played a crucial role in Turkey's decision to join the war and in acquiring the support of Turkish society. Furthermore, Esra İlkay Keloğlu İşler and Serdar Analı, in their article titled "Increasing the Approval of the Public Through Press in the Process of Joining the Korean War,"⁵⁹ emphasize the power of the press to

⁵³ Halberstam, *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War*.

⁵⁴ Stueck, *The Road to Confrontation: American Policy toward China and Korea, 1947-1950*.

⁵⁵ Edward, Goldsen, and Williams. "Attitudes Toward the Korean War."

⁵⁶ Tülay Gül, "Decision of Turkey Sending Soldier to Korean in National Press," *BELGİ*, no. 7 (Winter 2014).; Ahmet Emin Yaman, "Kore Savaşı'nın Türk Kamuoyuna Yansıması," *Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılâp Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi*, no. 37-38 (2005).; Gökhan Durak, "Türk ve Dünya Basınında Kore Savaşı ve Türkiye," *Uluslararası Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi* 36, no. 8 (2015).

⁵⁷ Gül, "Decision of Turkey Sending Soldier to Korean in National Press."

⁵⁸ Yaman, "Kore Savaşı'nın Türk Kamuoyuna Yansıması."

⁵⁹ Esra İlkay Keloğlu İşler and Serdar Analı, "Increasing the Public Approval by Using Media in the Course of the Korean War Process," *Erciyes İletişim Dergisi* 4, no. 2 (2015).

influence the Turkish society's support for joining the Korean War. This work examines the processes surrounding Turkey's participation in the Korean War and highlights the role of press and its influence on the Turkish society. Different from others, Gökhan Durak includes a discussion of the role of the American press in his article titled "Korean War and Turkey in Turkish and World Press."⁶⁰ This article compares the Turkish and American press and concludes that they both reflect the same political view. In sum, the other category in the literature is the impact of national press on political decision of states.

The last category is the studies about Turkish troop successes in the battle. The studies under this category focuses on the successes of Turkish troops in the Kunuri Battle.⁶¹ In this category there are studies on participants from specific regions in Turkey to the war, authors emphasized the contribution of soldiers to the war and their success specifically.⁶² For instance, the article titled "Korean War and Participants from Iğdır"⁶³ by Cengiz Atlı, focuses specifically on the participation of individuals from Iğdır in the Korean War. It discusses the situation of these people and the Korean War in general. Furthermore, Ercan Haytoğlu, in his article "Korean

⁶⁰ Durak, "Türk ve Dünya Basınında Kore Savaşı ve Türkiye."

⁶¹ Yalta, *Kunu-ri Muharebeleri ve Geri çekilmeler: (26. XI. 1950-24.I.1951).*; *Kore'de Türk Muharebeleri.*

⁶² Cengiz Atlı, "Kore Savaşı Ve Kore Savaşına Iğdır'dan Katılanlar," *Trakya Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 16, no. 1.; Ercan Haytoğlu, "Kore Savaşı Ve Denizli Kore Şehitleri ve Gazileri." *Pamukkale Üniversitesi Eğitim Fakültesi Dergisi*, no. 11 (2002).; Özgür Yıldız and Hafize Doğramacı, "An Evaluation on the Korean War in the Light of Muğla-Milas Korea Veterans' Memories," *Journal of History School* 7, no. XVII (March 2014).

⁶³ Atlı, "Kore Savaşı ve Kore Savaşına Iğdır'dan Katılanlar."

War and Veterans and the Martyrs of Korea in Denizli”⁶⁴, focuses specifically on Denizli and discusses the Korean War in general. Haytoğlu explains the reasons for Turkey’s participation in the Korean War, with special emphasis on a specific region, Denizli, in order to explain the soldiers’ situation and their contributions to the war. Unlike the other authors mentioned, Özgür Yıldız and Hafize Doğramacı, in their article called “An Evaluation on Korean War in the Light of Memoirs of Muğla-Milas Korean Veterans”⁶⁵ analyzes the Korean War and its impact on Turkey through interviews with the Korean Veterans from Milas. Moreover, Mehmet Ali Tuğtan compiled different articles from different authors, in his book called “Korean War: Soldiers of the Remote War”⁶⁶ in which he analyzes the causes of the war and Turkey’s participation in the war, and also discusses the psychological impact of the war on the Turkish society. Additionally, some studies specifically focus on the Kunuri Battles. For instance, Bahtiyar Yalta, in his book titled “Kunuri Battles and Retreats (26.11.1950-24.1.1951)”⁶⁷ specifically focuses on the Kunuri Battle and the involvement of Turkey in the war. Similarly, Ali Denizli, in his book entitled “The Heroes of Kunuri in the Korean War”⁶⁸, also examines the Kunuri Battle. He highlights the success of Turkish troops in the battle. Finally, the General Staff

⁶⁴ Haytoğlu, "Kore Savaşı ve Denizli Kore Şehitleri ve Gazileri."

⁶⁵ Yıldız and Doğramacı, "An Evaluation on the Korean War in the Light of Muğla-Milas Korea Veterans' Memories."

⁶⁶ Mehmet Ali Tuğtan, *Kore Savaşı: Uzak Savaşın Askerleri* (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2013).

⁶⁷ Bahtiyar Yalta, *Kunu-ri Muharebeleri Ve Geri çekilmeler: (26. XI. 1950-24.I.1951)* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2005).

⁶⁸ Ali Denizli, *Kore Savaşı'ndaki Kunuri Kahramanları* (Ankara, 2010).

Publication's book, titled "The Battles of the Turkish Armed Forces in the Korean War (1950-1953)"⁶⁹, is a compilation of documents taken from their archives that provide details about the Korean War and the contribution of Turkish soldiers. In short, the last category of the literature is the success stories of Turkish troops in the battle.

In sum, when all the studies are considered, it could be asserted that they are categorized under five main topics: studies that focus on a) factors that have an impact on close Turkish- American relations, b) Turkish foreign policy in the Korean War, c) American foreign policy in the Korean War, d) the impact of both Turkish and American Press on policies of both states and lastly, e) Turkish troop successes in the battles. It can be concluded from these categories that there are various studies on the Korean War, its relation to Turkey and the U.S., and the relations between Turkey and the U.S. The current work aims to extend this body of work by using primary sources to analyze the relationship between Turkey and the U.S. during the Korean War utilizing the bandwagoning theoretical framework.

2.2.Theoretical Framework

The purpose of this section is to discuss the realist theory of Bandwagoning. Due to its emphasis on power and security, bandwagoning theory under structural realism will be used as the theoretical framework of this thesis. Realist theory is based on four main assumptions. These are states are the central legitimate

⁶⁹ *Kore'de Türk Muharebeleri* (Ankara: Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, 2012).

governance, state is the unitary actor, state is the rational actor and lastly security is the main focus for states.⁷⁰ Therefore, at the core of realism, there is state and its security. Structural realism, on the other hand, lays its emphasis on security and distribution of power.⁷¹ Indeed, “the structure of the international system itself- anarchy plus the distribution of capabilities- affects the calculations and choices of decision-makers.”⁷² Hence, capability and anarchy form the international system itself. These two components are especially highlighted by Waltz⁷³. Accordingly, “structural realism attempts to abstract from every attribute of states except their capabilities in order to highlight the impact of anarchy and the distribution of capabilities.”⁷⁴ Thence, within the anarchic world order, states can only act according to their capability and consequently, every state needs to increase its capability through its own efforts. Due to these capabilities states need to act according to established rules and conditions under the anarchic system.⁷⁵ In addition to these, the actions of dominant powers is also highlighted. For instance, “international political structures are defined by the changing fates of great powers. More abstractly, international orders vary according to the number of great

⁷⁰ Paul Viotti, and Mark V. Kauppi, *International Relations Theory*. 5th ed. (Pearson, 2014), 38.

⁷¹ Ibid. 39.

⁷² Ibid. 58

⁷³ Kenneth Neal Waltz, *Theory of International Politics Long Grove* (Illinois, Estados Unidos): Waveland Press, 2010), 125.

⁷⁴ Jack Donnelly, “Realism,” in *Theories of International Relations*, ed. Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, Richard Devetak, Jack Donnelly, Matthew Paterson, Christian Reus-Smit, and Jacqui True, 3rd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2005), 35.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

powers.”⁷⁶ It is remarked that although there is anarchy in the world order, the political structure changes according to the acts of powerful states. When all these descriptions of world order and international system are considered, it can be perceived that the struggle of Turkey to find an ally which can assist Turkey and protect it from threats can be associated with structural realism and specifically bandwagoning. Structural realism lays its emphasis on anarchic world order and struggle for power, whereas, bandwagoning puts emphasis on rising gain and gaining strength. The following part will focus on bandwagoning theory in order to show its relevance to the Turkish participation in the Korean War and its impact on bilateral relations.

In order to analyze the relations between Turkey and the U.S. in the Korean War within the bandwagoning theoretical framework, it is necessary to understand the Bandwagoning Theory, which originates from the idea of an alliance. Stephen Walt affirms that alliances are key to bandwagoning and have a crucial place in international politics.⁷⁷ The bandwagoning concept was popularized by Kenneth Waltz, who contrasted the term with that of balance.⁷⁸ He assumed that the world is anarchic and that there is a hierarchical order. For instance, he defines bandwagoning as one of the international alliance behaviors and declares that the

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation in Southwest Asia: Balancing and Bandwagoning in Cold War Competition,” in *Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 51.

⁷⁸ Kenneth Neal Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* Long Grove (Illinois, Estados Unidos): Waveland Press, 2010), 125.

structure of the anarchic system has an impact on whether a state chooses to balance against or bandwagon with a superpower.⁷⁹ He explains the difference between balancing and bandwagoning by stating that

“bandwagoning is sensible behavior where gains are possible even for the losers and where losing does not place their security in jeopardy. [...] balancing is sensible behavior where the victory of one coalition over another leaves the weaker members of the winning coalition at the mercy of the stronger ones.”⁸⁰

Therefore, in order to maximize power, weaker states band together with stronger ones. This is known as bandwagoning. However, if weaker states want to protect their position in the system, they try to form alliances with other weak states in order to balance the power. Furthermore, the choice to either balance or bandwagon also has implications for the weaker states’ freedom to make their own political decisions. This decision “involves considerable serious commitments and states may want to choose options that are not obvious, which does not bring the unipole deciding their fates if they push the envelope.”⁸¹ Thus, weak countries may decide to bandwagon with superpowers in order to increase their chances of having flexibility in their decision-making processes, especially with regards to their foreign policies.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 126.

⁸¹ William Kang and Jaechun Kim, “Turco-Iranian Alignment: Balancing or Bandwagoning with the US?” *Journal of International and Area Studies* 23, no. 1 (June 2016): 19.

Turning now to the different views on the definition of bandwagoning, Stephen Walt originally defined this term as an alliance between a weak state and the source of danger, i.e., the threatening state. He claims that weak states bandwagon due to security concerns that center on the need to eliminate the threat against them. Like Kenneth Waltz, Walt also treats bandwagoning as the opposite of balancing.⁸² Walt's definition of bandwagoning is the one most commonly used in the literature. Walt amended his definition to emphasize that

“bandwagoning involves unequal exchange; the vulnerable state makes asymmetrical concessions to the dominant power and accepts a subordinate role. [...] Bandwagoning is an accommodation to pressure. [...] Most important of all, bandwagoning suggests a willingness to support or tolerate illegitimate actions by the dominant ally.”⁸³

Therefore, according to Walt, bandwagoning is characterised by an unequal exchange, accommodation to pressure and the willingness of the weaker state to support illegitimate actions taken by the dominant power.

Schweller also defines bandwagoning, but from a conventional perspective. He expresses that “a bandwagon as a candidate, side, or movement that attracts adherents or amasses power by its momentum.”⁸⁴ Hence, this definition emphasizes the power of the dominant state. Indeed, Schweller asserts that powerful states

⁸² Walt, “Alliance Formation in Southwest Asia: Balancing and Bandwagoning in Cold War Competition,” 55.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Randall L. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” *International Security* 19, no. 1 (1994): 81.

attract the attention of the weak states with their strength. Moreover, “the phrase ‘to climb aboard the bandwagon’ implies following a current or fashionable trend or joining the side that appears likely to win. Bandwagoning may be freely chosen, or it can be the result of resignation to an inexorable force.”⁸⁵ Schweller also asserts that weak states attempt to form an alliance with the states that are more likely to win.

Larson, on the other hand, defines bandwagoning in terms of its benefit to weak states and the preservation of authority. He claims that “bandwagoning can help a weak regime retain authority by ending external subversion, undermining domestic rivals, and providing economic assistance and an aura of invincibility by association with the great power’s victories.”⁸⁶ Therefore, by bandwagoning, weak states attempt to overcome their weakness, stand against domestic and external threats and gain economic support. Although bandwagoning has been defined with different perspectives and focal points, all definitions have a common ground in that they view bandwagoning as the alliance between weak and powerful states.

Having discussed the definition of bandwagoning, the reasons for bandwagoning will now be examined. There are mainly nine reasons for bandwagoning which are to raise gains and diminishing losses,⁸⁷ to balance more dangerous domestic or foreign threats,⁸⁸ the presence of weak governmental

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 77.

⁸⁷ Donnelly, “Realism,” 35.

⁸⁸ Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” 77.

institutions and domestic threats,⁸⁹ the profit that leads to a status-quo bias,⁹⁰ to avoid attack and the desire to share in the spoils of victory,⁹¹ wave of the future,⁹² being a weak state⁹³, lack of allies⁹⁴ and the possibility to suppress the threatening power.⁹⁵ The first reason for bandwagoning is that it presents weak states with the possibility of raising their gains and diminishing their losses⁹⁶ Jack Donnelly highlights that “weak states have little choice but to guess right and hope that early alignment with the victor will bring favorable treatment.”⁹⁷ Therefore, weak states need to decide quickly in order to increase their gains and share in the victory of the superpower. Similarly, Schweller states that the “goal of bandwagoning is usually self-extension: to obtain values coveted. [...] Bandwagoning driven by the opportunity for gain.”⁹⁸ This highlights that bandwagoning provides weak states with the opportunity to strengthen themselves and gain desired values. Schweller

⁸⁹ Ibid.; Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 29-31,218.

⁹⁰ Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” 79.

⁹¹ Ibid., 81.

⁹² Robert Jervis, “Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behavior” in *Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland*, by Jack L. Snyder and Robert Jervis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 33.

⁹³ Walt, “Balancing and Bandwagoning,” 173.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Donnelly, “Realism,” 35.

⁹⁷ Ibid.,36.

⁹⁸ Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” 74.

also expresses that the aim of bandwagoning is for weak states to advance their capabilities.

Another reason for bandwagoning is to balance threats. Steven David argues that

Fragile Third World elites often bandwagon with hostile powers to balance more dangerous domestic or foreign threats. [...] Third World leaders form alliances to secure urgently needed economic and military resources to promote domestic goals, respond to external and internal security threats, and consolidate their domestic political positions.⁹⁹

David makes two assumptions about bandwagoning. The first assumption is that it is the Third World states that usually bandwagon to powerful states. The second assumption is that the reason for bandwagoning is to balance the threatening state. By bandwagoning, weak states have the chance to secure military and economic assistance, and move one step closer to their own aims.

Stephen Walt also proposes two reasons for bandwagoning, namely the presence of weak governmental institutions and domestic threats.¹⁰⁰ Walt remarks that weak states usually bandwagon to powerful states because of the lack of effective governmental institutions for organizing economic resources. For instance, when a weak state cannot manage its own government and economy, it bandwagons to a powerful state in order to get assistance in governing and strengthening its own institutions. With regards to domestic threats, Walt claims that “fragile elites often bandwagon with secondary adversaries to counter their principal domestic

⁹⁹ Ibid., 77.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.; Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 218.

threats.”¹⁰¹ Hence, he highlights that in order to prevent domestic threats from gaining ground, weak states prefer to bandwagon to powerful states. Thus, domestic affairs play a crucial role in the bandwagoning of weak states.

In response to Walt, Schweller states that his reasons for bandwagoning neglect the profit factor. Schweller claims that profit is a more prevalent concern than security, and this leads to a status-quo bias.¹⁰² He also asserts that the motivation for weak states to bandwagon to powerful states stems from the possibility of gain and the chance to benefit from the spoils of victory. Hence, the potential profits from the alliance is one of the motivations for bandwagoning. In addition, Schweller expresses that

One of the primary motivations for bandwagoning is to share in the spoils of victory. When profit rather than security drives alliance choices, there is no reason to expect that states will be threatened or cajoled to climb aboard the bandwagon. [...] The bandwagon gains momentum through the promise of rewards.¹⁰³

Following these criticisms, Walt further developed his ideas on the motivations that drive bandwagoning and specified two additional motivations, i.e., the desire to avoid attack and the desire to share in the spoils of victory.¹⁰⁴ Deborah Larson supports both of these reasons.¹⁰⁵ She claims that weak states prefer to align

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 78.

¹⁰² Ibid., 79.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 81.

¹⁰⁵ Deborah Welch Larson, “Bandwagon Images in American Foreign Policy: Myth or Reality?” in *Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland*, by Jack L. Snyder and Robert Jervis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 85.

with the threatening power, in order to eliminate the possibility of an attack and to share in its victory. Avoiding attack is expressed as an appeasement because it leads to peace between the weak and dominant states. According to Walt, “this means appeasing the most dangerous side. [...] The state may align with the stronger coalition because there is safety in numbers and its survival depends on its being on the winning side.”¹⁰⁶ Therefore, for a weak state, being in an alliance with a powerful state ensures its continued safety, survival and development. Regarding his second motivation for bandwagoning, Walt expresses that if the alliance brings victory to the weak state, victory becomes one of the motivations behind bandwagoning. The reason is that weak states are aware of their weakness and the reality that without the support of powerful states, it would be difficult for them to win the war or develop. As such, they try to form an alliance, in this case bandwagon, with powerful states to increase their chances of victory.

In response to these motivations, Schweller states that “Walt correctly points out that states bandwagon both out of fear of being despoiled and out of the desire to despoil others.”¹⁰⁷ Schweller sees the bandwagoning issue in terms of the self-interest of weak states, whereby weak states prefer to bandwagon to powerful states to serve their own interests. In addition, he further claims that one of the motivations for the bandwagoning of weak states to powerful states is the “wave of the future.”¹⁰⁸ This is expressed by George Kennan in his speech in 1947 as

¹⁰⁶ Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” 82.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Jervis, “Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behavior,” 33.

A given proportion of the adherents to the movement are drawn to it by no ideological enthusiasm [...] but primarily by the belief that it is the common thing, the movement of the future [...] and that those who hope to survive-let alone to thrive- in the coming days will be those who had the foresight to climb on the bandwagon when it was still the movement of the future.¹⁰⁹

Hence, according to this perspective, future security concerns plays an important role in the bandwagoning of weak states and is more crucial than ideological concerns. Indeed, for the sake of their survival, weak states think critically and decide on alliances. Additionally, it is claimed that for the sake of their development and power, weak states prefer to bandwagon to powerful states. Their purpose is to shape their future in a better way.

Furthermore, according to Walt, there are three main conditions that increase the chances of bandwagoning: being a weak state, lack of allies and the possibility to suppress the threatening power.¹¹⁰ Regarding the first condition, being a weak state increases the likelihood of bandwagoning since “they are more vulnerable to pressure, and they can do little to determine their own fates.”¹¹¹ It is highlighted that weak states have little power to determine or shape their future and they can easily be pressured by other states. As such, weak states desire to form alliances with powerful states to eliminate the pressure from other powerful or threatening states and to have the opportunity to determine their future and develop themselves. In his

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Stephen M. Walt, "Balancing and Bandwagoning," in *The Origins of Alliances* (Cornell University Press, 1990), 173.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

other works, Walt also emphasizes the tendency for weak states to bandwagon by stating that

Extremely weak states may be more inclined to bandwagon; because they have little deterrent or defensive strength to contribute, they must seek the winning side at all costs. And when allies are unavailable, weak states may be forced to bandwagon even if this is not their first choice.¹¹²

Thus, for weak states bandwagoning is not always their first choice, and they do not always do it willingly, but under certain conditions, like the absence of an ally, they may be obliged to bandwagon. With respect to the second condition, Walt mentions that “states are more likely to bandwagon when useful allies are unavailable, for they will face the threat alone if they choose to resist. A dearth of effective allies is apparent in bandwagoning cases.”¹¹³ Since weak states typically lack effective allies, they choose to bandwagon to a powerful state in order to resist a threatening state, which they cannot do alone or with the aid of other weak states. Regarding the last condition, Walt asserts that “the decision to bandwagon with a threatening power is based ultimately on the hope that such a step will moderate its aggressive intentions.”¹¹⁴ Hence, he alleges that in order to appease the threatening power, weak states bandwagon to a powerful or threatening state under the assumption that this will eliminate the threat of the powerful state against them. Regarding the appeasability of the dominant power, Walt expresses that weak states prefer to bandwagon to a dominant power if this power is appeasable, in other words, “when

¹¹²Walt, “Alliance Formation in Southwest Asia: Balancing and Bandwagoning in Cold War Competition,” 53.

¹¹³ Walt, “Balancing and Bandwagoning,” 173.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

its ambitions can be satisfied or deflected should the threatened power opt for alignment with it.”¹¹⁵ Hence, if a weak state is able to deal with the desires of the dominant power and if the powerful state appears to be appeasable, bandwagoning is likely to occur. From this discussion, it is clear that there are different reasons for, and perspectives on, bandwagoning in the literature.

The bandwagoning theory can be applied to the Turkish case as Turkey perceives the greatest threat from the Soviets because of a) its history, b) its proximity as the theory indicates. Moreover, due to its “weak institutions” it was in dire need of “gain/spoils of victory”. Furthermore, since Turkey was isolated position after the Second World War, there was “absence of potential allies”, and because of the “fear of the future”, Turkey was looking for allies. Since the U.S. meant “the West” for Turkey at the time because of the prepondarence of U.S. power compared to other Western states, Turkey chose to bandwagon to the U.S.

¹¹⁵Walt, “Alliance Formation in Southwest Asia: Balancing and Bandwagoning in Cold War Competition,” 53.

CHAPTER 3

TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS BETWEEN 1945 AND 1950

In order to analyze the relationship between Turkey and the U.S. during the Korean War, it is necessary to first analyze their relations after the Second World War. The relationship between them is one of the important components of their respective foreign policies. “Despite fears on both sides that this “strategic relationship” would become less strategic and less important with the end of the Cold War, the relationship has retained its significance for both countries.”¹¹⁶ Both of the World Wars had an impact on the U.S. interests in Turkey. “Only in the latter stages of the war, with deepening concern over Soviet ambitions, did relations with Turkey (and relations with Washington for Ankara) loom larger in the strategic calculus.”¹¹⁷ Therefore, it can be stated that due to the influence of the Soviet power, the U.S. focused its interest on Turkey and prioritized relations with Turkey.

Turning now to the Cold War period, both Turkey and the U.S. were interested in containing the Soviet power and both of these states had a similar approach towards international affairs.

¹¹⁶ F. Stephen Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser, "Turkey and United States," in *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty* (RAND Corporation, 2003), 159.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 162.

Turkey's internal and geopolitical positions, and the influence of the Turkish military, have fostered a security-conscious approach to policymaking. Cold War imperatives fostered a parallel, security-oriented approach to foreign relations as seen from Washington. Thus, the dominance of security issues in the bilateral relationship has intellectual and political as well as geostrategic roots.¹¹⁸

Therefore, the roots of the relationship between Turkey and the U.S. lie in security concerns that have intellectual, political and geostrategic origins.

3.1.Yalta Conference and Straits Question

After the Second World War, there was a conflict about control of the new regions and there was a need to decide the new world borders. Therefore, in order to find a solution to these problems, the three leading presidents came together in Yalta in Crimea from the 4th to 11th February 1945. American President, Roosevelt, English Prime Minister, Churchill and the Soviet Russia Leader, Stalin came together to discuss peace terms and the state of European countries. During the sessions, the military situation and dismemberment of Germany was discussed by the three leaders.¹¹⁹ On February 8, Foreign secretaries of these three state proposed having a conference in the United States on April 25 in order to conserve peace through the United Nations Organization. It was also stated that only the original members that were proposed would have the right to make decions during the conference.¹²⁰ In consideration of these regulations, they organized a conference in

¹¹⁸ Ibid. 163.

¹¹⁹ William D. Leahy, "Notes on the Yalta Conference," *The Wisconsin Magazine of History*, Winter 1954-1955, 69-70.

¹²⁰ Ibid.,70-71.

San Francisco on April 25, 1945, in order to have a discussion on the formation of the United Nations (UN). Furthermore, the three leaders proposed a condition that, aside from Germany and its allies, states that want to be part of the United Nations needed to declare war against Germany and sign the United Nations Declaration. Thus, in order to attend this conference, Turkey declared war against Germany and Japan on February 23, 1945. The motivation behind this decision was that Turkey wanted to be active in international organizations that were formed after the war and did not want to be alone in international politics. As a result of this declaration, Turkey qualified to attend the San Francisco conference. Indeed, the U.S. Ambassador, Laurence Adolph Steinhardt, visited Hasan Saka, the Foreign Minister of Turkey, and officially invited Turkey to San Francisco. Therefore, Turkey became one of the founding countries of the United Nations.¹²¹ This news made the headlines in the press. For instance, Cumhuriyet newspaper headlined this event with the words, “Yesterday, We Have Been Officially Invited To San Francisco.”¹²² On June 26, 1945, the San Francisco Conference was held and Hasan Saka represented Turkey. Furthermore, the Lend-Lease Agreement was signed by the U.S. and Turkey on 8 May 1946. Under this agreement, the U.S. gave \$4.5 million to Turkey for materials.¹²³ On February 9, 1945, the final discussion about the military

¹²¹ “San Francisco’ya Dün Resmen Davet Edildik,” (Yesterday, We Have Been Officially Invited To San Francisco) Cumhuriyet, March 7, 1945, 1.

¹²² “San Francisco’ya Dün Resmen Davet Edildik,” (Yesterday, We Have Been Officially Invited To San Francisco) Cumhuriyet, March 7, 1945, 1.

¹²³ “Allied Relations and Negotiations with Turkey,” U.S. Department of State, 6, accessed February 20, 2019, https://1997-2001.state.gov/regions/eur/rpt_9806_ng_turkey.pdf.

report of the Yalta Conference was held. The report was approved by Churchill, and Roosevelt. The plenary session of the conference started on the 10th of February with British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Eden's proposal to take common action towards an agreed upon goal. Indeed, he asserted that "when troubles arise in any of the liberated areas, the three great nations will immediately consult together on measures to carry out their joint responsibilities set out in this conference."¹²⁴ Therefore, at this session, all three states agreed to take common action against any trouble and promised to preserve peace and security. In addition, they agreed to act together during any emergency situation. Both the American Press and the Turkish Press reported on the conclusion of the conference. The New York Times and Cumhuriyet newspapers mentioned that all three leaders met on common ground and supported victory and peace.¹²⁵

The Straits Question, which was very crucial for Turkey, was also discussed at the Yalta Conference. At the conference, on 10 February, 1945, Stalin proposed changing the Montreux Convention, from which the Straits Question originated. The strait is 200-mile channel, which connects the Black Sea, the Dardanelles and Marmara.¹²⁶ The control of this channel had been decided by the international agreement known as the Montreux Convention. Of 1936, it authorized "Turkey to remilitarize the strategic waterway and, if it were "threatened with imminent danger

¹²⁴ Leahy, "Notes on the Yalta Conference," 72.

¹²⁵ Cumhuriyet, March 7, 1945, 1; The New York Times, February 4, 1945, 1.

¹²⁶ J. C. Hurewitz, "Russia and the Turkish Straits: A Revaluation of the Origins of the Problem," World Politics 14, no. 4 (July 1962): 2.

of war" or actually engaged in war (Articles 20 and 21), to permit or disallow at its discretion the passage of warships through the narrows."¹²⁷ Therefore, according to this convention, Turkey had the right to close the straits, not only during a war but also when there was a threat of war. However, Stalin objected, stating that Turkey should not have this privilege and the interest of Russia should be considered.¹²⁸ According to Stalin, the Montreux Convention was not enough for the security of Russia and the passage from the straits should be free. "Soviet delegation expressed the belief that the regime of the Straits should be altered after the war, and after a discussion of the general proposition obtained the agreement of the United States and Great Britain."¹²⁹ Hence, Soviet Russia requested that its interests be considered. The British supported the revision of the convention. "Although the British had suggested that the Soviet Government send a note on the subject, none had as yet been received. [...] The British certainly felt that Russia, as a great Black Sea power, should not be dependent on the narrow exit."¹³⁰ The U.S. also sided with Russia because of Turkey's neutral approach in the Second World War. Accordingly, due to Turkey's attitude during the Second World War, the U.S. and Britain agreed on Stalin's request. Additionally, according to the 14th Article of the Yalta Protocol, in the following meeting that was held in London, the foreign

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ A. Suat Bilge, *Güç Komşuluk: Türkiye-Sovyetler Birliği İlişkileri* (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 1992), 261.

¹²⁹ Norman J. Padelford, "Solutions to the Problem of the Turkish Straits: A Brief Appraisal," *Middle East Journal* 2, no. 2 (April 1948): 177.

¹³⁰ Edward R. Stettinius and Walter Johnson, *Roosevelt and the Russians: The Yalta Conference* (Whitefish, MT: Kessinger, 2010), Chapter 13.

ministers of the U.S., England and Soviet Russia discussed Soviet Russia's request regarding the Montreux Convention. They shared the result of this discussion with both Soviet Russia and Turkey.¹³¹ Churchill stated that "it might be advisable to give the Turks assurance that their independence and integrity would be guaranteed."¹³² In addition to this, Stalin also insisted that Turkey be informed of all actions taken after the discussion about the revision of the convention. The Yalta Conference allowed for negotiations on the borders in the region, which was crucial for Turkey, while the Straits Question was directly related to Turkey's security concerns.

3.2. Turkish Foreign Policy After the Second World War

The aim of this section is to review Turkish foreign policy after the Second World War and the evolution of its foreign policy towards the U.S. The main goals of Turkish foreign policy was to strengthen its relations with the West through alliances, to become a member of NATO and to limit its interaction with the Eastern Bloc due to the Soviet threat. Before discussing the Turkish foreign policy, it is necessary to first explain the Soviet threat.

With the end of the Second World War, in 1945, the Soviet government "officially denounced the Treaty of Friendship with Turkey, which it had signed in 1925."¹³³ Three months later, on 7 June 1945, Vyacheslav Molotov, the Soviet foreign

¹³¹ Necdet Ekinçi, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan Sonra Türkiye'de Çok Partili Düzene Geçişte Dış Etkiler* (İstanbul: Toplumsal Dönüşüm Yayınları, 1997), 252.

¹³² Edward R. Stettinius and Walter Johnson, *Roosevelt and the Russians: The Yalta Conference, Chapter 13*.

¹³³ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2013), 80.

minister requested Selim Sarper, the Turkish ambassador in Moscow, to design a new convention on the straits with Turkey on behalf of the Soviet government. Molotov asked for a new convention because,

“this would provide for the free passage of Soviet warships through the straits and their closure to non-Black Sea states, the establishment of Soviet bases at the straits, and the retrocession to Russia of the eastern provinces of Kars and Ardahan that had been returned to Turkey in 1921.”¹³⁴

Turkish officials perceived this request as a big threat to Turkey because this convention would allow the presence of Soviet military forces in Turkey, and as a result, the Soviets would have political control in Turkey. Therefore, Selim Sarper refused this request on behalf of Turkish government and insisted that “Turkey could not consider allowing Russia bases at the straits, or re-negotiation of the 1921 Turco-Soviet treaty (Kars and Ardahan). Any revision of the Montreux Convention would have to be a matter for international negotiation and agreement.”¹³⁵ Sarper highlighted that the convention could only be changed by a decision taken after international negotiations, and not at the bidding of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The request of the Soviet government caused fear in the Turkish government because it essentially meant not only the revision of the Montreux convention that defined control of the straits, but also giving over control of the whole country as Turkey would be converted into a satellite state.¹³⁶ These issues

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

outline the roots of the Soviet threat against Turkey and form the base of Turkey's desire for good relations with the West. Indeed, "the immediacy of the Soviet threat made the consolidation of Turkey's Western links and, above all, the strengthening of the strategic alliance with Washington, a leading foreign policy priority."¹³⁷

After the Second World War, Turkey maintained its relationship with the west, but did not allow the western states to interfere in its internal affairs since Turkish independence was its major priority. Turkey's aim was to eventually match the West in terms of economic, social and technological measures, in order to show its power to the USSR, which had been putting pressure on the Turkish government. Thus, the threat of Soviet control over Turkey strongly influenced relations between the U.S. and Turkey. Additionally, Turkey wanted to be seen as one of the European countries¹³⁸ and to ensure American support. In fact, the government had three main aims: to ensure that the Western Bloc did not consider the request of the Soviet government, to acquire financial assistance from the West, and lastly, to establish a security alliance with the Western Bloc.¹³⁹ Given these goals, and the looming Soviet threat, Turkey prioritized its relation with the West, and especially with the U.S.

The two-polar system also contributed to Turkey's emphasis on maintaining good relations with the U.S. The relationship between Turkey and the U.S. had been

¹³⁷ Larrabee and Lesser, *Turkey and United States*, 162.

¹³⁸ Şuhnaz Yilmaz, "Challenging the Stereotypes: Turkish–American Relations in the Inter-War Era," *Middle Eastern Studies* 42, no. 2 (March 2006): 233.

¹³⁹ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 81.

prioritized in Turkish foreign policy since 1945. “The bilateral relationship remains heavily focused on security matters, and for good reasons given the character of the environment facing Turkey and the proximity of areas where American security interest are engaged.”¹⁴⁰ Therefore, due to security concerns, Turkey prioritized its relations with the U.S. Furthermore, because of the geopolitical position of Turkey, the U.S. also attached importance to its relationship with Turkey. Turkey had the privilege of being a channel to Europe, and a neighbor to Russia in the Caucasian and Balkans. Turkey also had the ability to have an impact the Middle Eastern region. Hence, while analyzing Turkish foreign policy towards the U.S., it is necessary to consider its strategic geopolitical position.¹⁴¹ Additionally, because of the strategic importance of Turkey, both Turkey and the U.S. focused on Turkish security. “More broadly, the two countries have also shared a similar, if not entirely convergent, approach to international affairs. Turkey’s internal and geopolitical positions, and the influence of the Turkish military, have fostered a security-conscious approach to policymaking.”¹⁴² Turkey needed to emphasize its strategic position because when it applied for NATO membership for the first time, its application was not accepted, as the U.S. and Great Britain claimed that “Turkey did not belong either to Western Europe or the Atlantic and consequently she could not

¹⁴⁰ Larrabee and Lesser, *Turkey and United States*, 159.

¹⁴¹ George McGhee, *The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection: How the Truman Doctrine and Turkey's NATO Entry Contained the Soviets* (London: Macmillan, 1990), 61.

¹⁴² Larrabee and Lesser, *Turkey and United States*, 163.

join the Atlantic regional group.”¹⁴³ Additionally, the Turkish government perceived NATO membership as the symbol that could confirm that Turkey was a member of the European states.¹⁴⁴ After the success of the U.S. in the Second World War, Turkey believed that the U.S. could be an ally in its development and could protect Turkey against the Soviet threat. Thus, after the Second World War, Turkey shaped its foreign policy according to the new world order and endorsed western-leaning policies. During the development of its foreign policy, Turkey considered the interests of the West and the U.S. The most visible action taken by Turkey occurred during the Yalta Conference when it declared war against Germany in order to become a founding state of the UN¹⁴⁵, and consequently, develop close relations with the West.

After 1950, the Turkish government took “westernization to mean intimate cooperation with the Western countries at all costs and under all conditions.”¹⁴⁶ As such, Westernization became a goal for both the domestic and foreign policies of Turkey. In addition, for the sake of NATO membership, the Turkish government, without waiting for the approval of Parliament, sent 4500 troops to Korea to support the U.S. and South Korea in the Korean War.¹⁴⁷ This changed American and British

¹⁴³ E. Athanassopoulou, "Western Defence Developments and Turkey's Search for Security in 1948," *Middle Eastern Studies* 32, no. 2 (1996): 101.

¹⁴⁴ Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach*, ed. Charles G. MacDonald (New York: Routledge, 2003), 59-60.

¹⁴⁵ Leahy, "Notes on the Yalta Conference," 67.

¹⁴⁶ Mehmet Gönlübol, "NATO, US and Turkey," in *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition: 1950-1974*, ed. Kemal Haşım Karpaz (Brill Archive, 1975), 27.

¹⁴⁷ Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach*, 60.

attitudes towards Turkey, and they accepted Turkey's membership in NATO on February 18, 1952. "Turkey's role in the alliance was well defined; it was to resist Soviet expansionism by serving as NATO's southern flank."¹⁴⁸ Thus, Turkey's NATO membership gave the Turkish state new status as part of the Western society. This new role became influential not only in political terms but also in military and cultural terms, as well. Therefore, partnering with the West provided Turkey with a solution to the Soviet expansionism. Turkey's NATO membership allowed

For a continuous and spontaneous exchange of views between Turkey and her collective allies. The value of such diplomatic contacts in political, economic, and cultural relations is inestimable; more than anything else, it has enabled Turkey to establish herself as a 'European' power.¹⁴⁹

Consequently, this membership led to establishment of Turkey as a European state. In sum, during the period between 1945 and 1950, the Turkish government focused on its security concerns, namely the Soviet threat to the country. In order to protect itself, Turkish foreign policy was focused on having closer ties with the U.S. and gaining its support.

3.3. American Foreign Policy After the Second World War

Before proceeding to discuss the Truman Doctrine, it is necessary to first examine American foreign policy after the Second World War. Two crucial points about the U.S. foreign policy towards Turkey during this period should be highlighted: the attitude of the U.S. towards the Turkish government regarding the

¹⁴⁸ Yasemin Celik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy* (Westport (Conn.): Praeger, 1999), xii.

¹⁴⁹ Ferenc A. Váli, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey* (Johns Hopkins, 1971), 124-125.

control and security of the Straits, and the note that was sent by the U.S. to Turkey on November 2, 1945.

To start with, the foreign policy of the U.S. towards Turkey was mostly focused on the security and future of the straits after the Second World War. In order to secure these regions, the U.S. gave special importance to Turkey. Soviet Russia tried to find ways of infiltrating the Mediterranean region for ease of trade and defense. With the end of the Second World War, Soviet Russia put pressure on Turkey to relinquish control of the Straits. "USSR began to press Turkey for territorial concessions and the right to build naval bases on the Bosphorus, an important gateway between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean."¹⁵⁰ Therefore, the aim of the Soviets was to expand their control and dominance. In addition, during the Potsdam Conference, Stalin requested land from Turkey, and the U.S. stated that this land issue needed to be resolved. Regarding the Black Sea Straits issue, Truman stated that this was an issue that concerned the whole world. Therefore, he emphasized that the Straits Question need to be negotiated in an international meeting.¹⁵¹ The U.S. appeared to be primarily concerned with the security of the straits, rather than the security of Turkey. Moreover, in January 1945, when Soviet merchant ships passed through the Turkish Straits,

The United States at the same time took the position that since the Montreux Convention provided for passage of merchant vessels under any flag and

¹⁵⁰ George Brown Tindall and David Emory Shi, *America: A Narrative History* (New York: Norton, 2010), 1302.

¹⁵¹ Çağrı Erhan, "ABD Ve NATO İle İlişkiler: 1945-1960 Dönemi," in *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, ed. Baskın Oran, vol. 1, 1919-1980 (İstanbul: İletişim, 2001), 62.

with any cargo, there was little question as to the right of merchant vessels to pass through the Straits, and no special agreement was therefore necessary.¹⁵²

Therefore, the U.S. supported the idea that the merchant vessels of all countries should have the right to passage through the Straits and maintained that there should be no restriction on these types of vessels. President Truman remarked that “all nations should have the freedom of the seas and equal rights to the navigation of boundary rivers and waterways and all rivers and waterways which pass through more than one country.”¹⁵³ The U.S. also argued that the Straits should be regulated by international authorities. However, after a couple of months, Truman changed his perspective and stated that the control of the Straits should be given to Turkey. He changed his opinion because the U.S. government feared the presence of Soviets in the Balkans, the expansion of Soviet ideologies in the region, and ultimately, Soviet control of the region.¹⁵⁴ Therefore, Truman started to argue that Turkey should have control over the Black Sea Straits. In addition, Truman expressed in his speech on October 27, 1945, that all the states should have equal rights on rivers and channels which pass through more than one state. But, he excluded the Straits in Turkish territory from this stipulation.¹⁵⁵ Furthermore, since the U.S. was aware of the USSR’s desire to form alliances in the regions that it occupied, and its intention to

¹⁵² Harry N. Howard, "The United States and the Problem of the Turkish Straits," *Middle East Journal* 1, no. 1 (January 1947): 69.

¹⁵³ United States Department of State, *Department of State Bulletin October 28, 1945*, vol. XIII (1945), 654.

¹⁵⁴ Yusuf Sarıınay, *Türkiye'nin Batı İttifakına Yönelişi ve NATO'ya Girişi (1939-1952)* (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1988), 51.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

remain in Poland, the U.S. decided to change its policy regarding the Straits and to support Turkey, in an effort to prevent further Soviet expansion.¹⁵⁶ These series of events explicitly show the change in the attitude of the U.S. towards Turkey, and Truman's words make it clear that the U.S. had become more supportive of the Turkish government.

In addition, the United States' commitment to its support of Turkey was clearly illustrated in the note that was sent by the U.S. to Turkey on November 2, 1945. The note proposed having an international conference in 1946 in order to update the provisions regarding control of the Straits in the Montreux Convention. The note was sent by the American Ambassador, Edwin Wilson, to the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Turkey.¹⁵⁷ The note called for five main allowances: the free passage of commercial vessels from all nations, the free passage of warships belonging to Black Sea Powers through the Strait, restriction of the passage of non-Black Sea Powers, except during times of peace or with a UN order, the foundation of UN, and lastly, the removal of Japan from membership.¹⁵⁸ In response to this note, the Turkish government confirmed that Turkey would gladly attend this international conference and reassured the U.S. that Turkey would approve any international decision that would not violate Turkish independence, sovereignty or

¹⁵⁶ Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *II. Dünya Savaşı'ndan Günümüze Türk Dış Politikası* (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2006), 63.

¹⁵⁷ Priscilla Mary Roberts, *The Cold War: Interpreting Conflict through Primary Documents* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2019), 177.

¹⁵⁸ United States Department of State, *Department of State Bulletin November 11 1945*, vol. XIII (1945), 766.

territorial integrity.¹⁵⁹ To sum up, the U.S. foreign policy initially focused on the security of the Straits, but evolved over time to prioritize the security of Turkey, itself.

3.3.1. The Truman Doctrine

The Truman Doctrine, which was signed on March 4, 1947, is the promise of the U.S. President Harry S. Truman to provide military aid to Greece and Turkey. It is also known as Public Law 75. It is “the principle of assistance to countries of the free world under the threat of communist aggression having been accepted by the Congress.”¹⁶⁰ The U.S. government adopted this doctrine because the British government had decided to stop assisting Greece and Turkey. The origins of the doctrine date back to “the Cold War and the threat from Soviet communist totalitarianism, the geopolitical upheaval from World War II, economics, the decline of Great Britain as a great power, the U.S. rise as a new kind of superpower, and the welfare of Western civilization.”¹⁶¹ Since the British government used up all its resources and reserves in order to win the war, it was not able to continue providing aid to Greece and Turkey. As such, the U.S. government started to discuss to provide aid to both states.¹⁶² The First Secretary of Britain sent two notes to the Secretary of

¹⁵⁹ Howard, "The United States and the Problem of the Turkish Straits," 70.

¹⁶⁰ Joseph C. Satterthwaite, "The Truman Doctrine: Turkey," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 401, no. 1 (1972): 74.

¹⁶¹ Elizabeth Edwards Spalding, "The Enduring Significance of the Truman Doctrine," *Orbis* 61, no. 4 (August 1, 2017): 2.

¹⁶² Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military*

State's office on February 21, 1947. The first one stated that Britain was planning to halt its aid to Greece on April 1, 1947. It also highlighted the fact that the situation in Greece was worsening and its economy and security were deteriorating. The second note stated that the British government could no longer assist Turkey and mentioned that Turkey did not have enough power to finance and modernize its army. Therefore, the British government proposed that the U.S. government continue providing aid to Greece and Turkey, as the United States had enough economic and military power to help these states.¹⁶³ This request was especially important to the British government and they believed that Truman would not refuse it.

With the British government's withdrawal of aid from Greece and Turkey, the U.S. started to discuss this issue. The United States Secretary was considering immediate action and the office of the Under Secretary, Dean Acheson, Director of the Office of New Eastern and African Affairs, Loy Henderson and John D. Hickerson, who was the director of the office of European Affairs, held a meeting to find a solution to the crisis. Henderson emphasized that if the U.S. did not act, Greece and Turkey would lose their power and their economy would not recover. In the case of Greece, military and economic aid from Britain began before the war ended. After the end of the Second World War, an extreme leftist party came into power in Greece and the USSR wanted to benefit from this change by spreading its

Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (London: William Collins, 2017), 429-430.

¹⁶³ Satterthwaite, "The Truman Doctrine: Turkey," 75.

communist ideology in the region. The U.S. was especially keen on preventing this shift because if Greece came under the control of the communist regime, this would lead to the communist control of Turkey as well.¹⁶⁴ In fact, the spread of communism in Greece would not only affect Turkey, but also other states in Europe. These considerations forced the U.S. to take action and apply the Truman Doctrine in order to fight against communism.¹⁶⁵ If the U.S. had refused to aid Greece, communist partisans, who were supported by Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, might have taken control of Greece.

Furthermore, another motivation for the Truman Doctrine was the United States' interest in the security of the Eastern Mediterranean region. The aim of the U.S. was to promote this interest.¹⁶⁶ For instance, Satterthwaite expressed that

If the British withdrew their troops from Greece and we did not intervene, the Greek communist partisans supported by Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were sure to gain control of Greece. If this happened, the free world would lose the eastern Mediterranean and the Near East to the communists.¹⁶⁷

Regarding Turkey, he stated that "Turkey, the only country in the area with an army strong enough to make the Russians hesitate, would find itself in an untenable position."¹⁶⁸ Thus, President Truman agreed with the British government that the U.S. should aid Greece and Turkey in order to prevent communist control over these

¹⁶⁴ Dennis Merrill, "The Truman Doctrine: Containing Communism and Modernity," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 36, no. 1 (2006): 31.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Şuhnaz Yılmaz, "Turkey's Quest for NATO Membership: The Institutionalization of the Turkish–American Alliance," *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 12, no. 4 (November 26, 2012): 486.

¹⁶⁷ Satterthwaite, "The Truman Doctrine: Turkey," 75.

¹⁶⁸ Satterthwaite, "The Truman Doctrine: Turkey," 75.

states. He also believed that for international peace and the security of the U.S., such aid was crucial. Truman expressed his opinion by saying that “should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far reaching to the West as well as to the East.”¹⁶⁹ He endorsed providing assistance to Greece and Turkey because his government perceived these states to be a gateway between the East and the West. In other words, “these countries were connected to Europe, to the Middle East and beyond to Asia. Obviously for the U.S. President, America’s strategic interests were also threatened.”¹⁷⁰ Therefore, the primary concern of the U.S. was protecting its strategic interest through the provision of aid. Since, Greece and Turkey connected Europe, the Middle East and Asia, the U.S. government was especially invested in preventing communist control in this region. Moreover, Gaddis claimed that “the American security depended upon maintenance of a European balance of power.”¹⁷¹ Hence, he emphasized that for the sake of the freedom of Europe, the U.S. needed to aid Greece and Turkey.

However, there was some opposition to the U.S. government’s decision. Indeed,

Vandenberg and other Congressional leaders felt strongly that the administration had not kept the Congress fully informed, had delayed too long in dealing with the implications of Great Britain’s economic decline,

¹⁶⁹ Harry S. Truman, "Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine," in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President, Harry S. Truman, 1947* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1963), 179.

¹⁷⁰ Spalding, "The Enduring Significance of the Truman Doctrine," 4.

¹⁷¹ John Lewis Gaddis, "Was the Truman Doctrine a Real Turning Point?" *Foreign Affairs* 52, no. 2 (January 1974): 389.

and had failed to go directly to Stalin about the deterioration of the U.S.-USSR relations.¹⁷²

Some Congress members were not happy about not being fully informed about the government's decision to aid Greece and Turkey. In addition, they were concerned that this decision would mean that the U.S. would aid any state in any part of the world that needed democratic freedom. In response, the U.S. government insisted that Greece and Turkey were the only states to which such aid would be provided.¹⁷³ Further opposition came from Republican Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio, who reacted to the doctrine by accusing Truman of acting as a policeman of the world. Moreover, Claude Pepper, a Democratic Senator of Florida, and Henry Wallace, former Commerce Secretary, "faulted the doctrine for its emotional anti-communism, its inclusion of military aid, and its failure to involve the United Nations, but encountered criticism for their willingness to sacrifice the national interest to an unknown, international future."¹⁷⁴ These officials opposed the provision of military aid because of its ambiguous consequences for the U.S. Moreover, like the members of Congress, the American society also opposed the decision to provide military aid. According to a poll done by Vandenberg, although the majority of the American society supported the idea of providing economic and financial aid to Greece and Turkey, they were against providing military aid to these

¹⁷² Lee Edwards, "Congress and the Origins of the Cold War: The Truman Doctrine," *World Affairs* 151, no. 3 (Winter 1988-89): 132.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Merrill, "The Truman Doctrine: Containing Communism and Modernity," 34.

countries.¹⁷⁵ In response to this backlash, it was proposed that military aid be provided under the United Nations control. However, on behalf of the American government, Acheson countered that if the UN controlled military aid, it would take too much time, and maintained that, given the emergency situation they were facing, the U.S. should be allowed to help militarily.¹⁷⁶

Despite the oppositions and concerns, Henderson and his team prepared a recommendation and an action plan for the president. After the Cabinet meeting, the U.S. government agreed to aid Greece and Turkey since the U.S. was the only state that could aid these countries, and this provision of aid was essential for their continued independence and freedom. Hence, General Marshall expressed the necessity of the aid to the Congress. He also said that the State Department in cooperation with Army and Navy would prepare recommendations for the President.¹⁷⁷ On the next day, the recommendation was prepared by the senators and President Truman accepted the recommendation. He approved the provision of aid by asserting that

We are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁵ Edwards, "Congress and the Origins of the Cold War: The Truman Doctrine," 132.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: Norton, 1987), 218.

¹⁷⁸ Edwards, "Congress and the Origins of the Cold War: The Truman Doctrine," 131.

He remarked that the aim of the Truman Doctrine is to secure the U.S. and world peace. Truman also highlighted that aid to Greece and Turkey was not only necessary for peace in the Near East, but also necessary for peace in the world, as it facilitated the freedom of states and the restriction of communism's impact in the world.

After gaining Truman's approval, approval from the Congress was also necessary. Therefore, a meeting was arranged between the President and the Congress with Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan. Truman underlined the fact that Britain caused a serious crisis by stopping aid to Greece and Turkey. He, also, emphasized that "the fall of Greece and Turkey would cause 'confusion and disorder' in the entire Middle East and would have a 'profound effect' upon Europe."¹⁷⁹ Furthermore, Truman met with the members of Congress on March 12, 1947 and made a speech in which he asserted that Greece called for financial and economic help and the U.S. should not ignore this call. Indeed, he presented the situation in Greece in great detail and indicated that Greece had no power to handle this problem, not only because of economic instability, but also because of its weak military. In addition, he claimed that the U.S. had the power to aid Greece in the reconstruction of Greek government for independent democracy. Therefore, he asserted that the U.S. must assist Greece. Truman also expressed his opinion about Turkey. He claimed that freedom and independence of Turkey were crucial as they were for Greece. He asserted that the economy of Turkey was instable and reminded

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

the Congress that during the Second World War, the U.S. government helped the Turkish society. He argued that the Turkish society once again needed similar support because the war had financially eroded the state. He further claimed that it was the duty of the U.S. to aid this country for the sake of political and economic stability and integrity in Turkey. In addition, Truman stated that when free nations called for aid from the U.S., the American government needed to help them maintain their freedom; otherwise, the peace and welfare of the world would be jeopardized.¹⁸⁰ He also claimed that in order to preserve their freedom and stabilize their economy and domestic policy, the U.S. needed to aid both Greece and Turkey.¹⁸¹ Furthermore, Truman once again emphasized that for the world peace, it was necessary for the U.S. to help Greece and Turkey. For all these reasons, Truman petitioned the Congress for \$400 million in aid to Greece and Turkey until 30 June, 1948.¹⁸²

Another reason for the necessity of the Truman Doctrine was the desire to contain the Soviets. Tindall and Shi asserted that “the principle embedded in the Truman Doctrine committed the United States to intervene throughout the world in order to “contain” the spread of communism.”¹⁸³ Therefore, one of Truman’s

¹⁸⁰ Joseph M. Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks: (February 21-June 5, 1947)* (New York: Viking Press, 1955), 269-274.

¹⁸¹ Jeffrey A. Engel, Mark Atwood Lawrence, and Andrew Preston, eds., *America in the World: A History in Documents from the War with Spain to the War on Terror* (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2014), 167.

¹⁸² Harry S. Truman, "The Truman Doctrine" (address, President Harry S. Truman’s Address Before a Joint Session of Congress, March 12, 1947).

¹⁸³ George Brown Tindall and David Emory Shi, *America: A Narrative History* (New York, NY: Norton, 2010), 1302.

concerns was the expansion of communism. He thought that if the U.S. did not help Greece and Turkey, they would not be able to resist the Soviet pressure, and as a consequence, communism would become influential in these regions. Hence, Truman insisted on financially aiding both states in overcoming their economic and political instability. After about two months of Congressional discussions about Truman's request, \$400 million in military and economic aid to Turkey and Greece was approved because of national security concerns, and the fear of communism and political consequences. Truman's request was approved in the Congress on April 22, 1947 with 67 affirmative votes against 23 counter votes. In the Chamber of Deputies, the proposal was accepted on May 9, 1947 with 287 affirmative votes against 107 counter votes.¹⁸⁴ With the approval of the Congress, President Truman signed the bill on May 22 called Public Law 75 for the change in the foreign policy of the U.S.¹⁸⁵ Regarding Public Law 75, Truman stated in his memoirs that "this was, I believe, the turning point in America's foreign policy, which now declared that wherever aggression, direct or indirect, threatened the peace, the security of the US was involved."¹⁸⁶ Therefore, Truman defined the Truman Doctrine as a turning point for the U.S. that would influence its future.

¹⁸⁴ Thomas G. Paterson, John Garry Clifford, and Kenneth J. Hagan, *American Foreign Relations: A History Since 1895* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 240; Edwards, "Congress and the Origins of the Cold War: The Truman Doctrine," 137.

¹⁸⁵ Satterthwaite, "The Truman Doctrine: Turkey," 75; Edwards, "Congress and the Origins of the Cold War: The Truman Doctrine," 140.

¹⁸⁶ Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs of Harry S. Truman Years of Trial and Hope*, vol. 2 (New York: New American Library, 1965), 105-106.

Once news of the Truman Doctrine reached Turkey, the Turkish Press found the U.S. military aid favorable, and emphasized the fellowship between Turkey and the U.S., while criticizing the Soviets.¹⁸⁷ The Greek Press, were more cautious, however, and focused on the fact that the terms and conditions of the Truman Doctrine were harsh. The 2nd and 4th articles, in particular, were highlighted and criticized by the Greek press because these two articles gave the U.S. the right to interfere in international affairs. Furthermore, unlike Turkey, Greece was to receive not only military aid, but also economic and financial aid. Consequently, the U.S. aid to Greece was evaluated differently by the Greek Press than it was by the Turkish Press.¹⁸⁸ Additionally, the U.S. announced \$400 million in aid but provided only \$337 million. Of this, \$268 million in aid was given to Greece, while \$69 million in aid was given to Turkey. The Turkish government used the full amount they received for military spending, while 59% of the aid given to Greece was used by the Greek government for military spending.¹⁸⁹ The money that was given to Turkey by the U.S. was around \$152.5 million including the military equipment. Turkey used \$147.5 million for modernization of its navy, army forces and air forces and \$5 million was used for the construction of roads.¹⁹⁰ It could be remarked that

¹⁸⁷ Emina1p Malkoç, "Türk Basınında Truman Doktrini Ve Türkiye'ye Amerikan Yardımları (1947-1950)," *İstanbul Üniversitesi Yakın Dönem Türkiye Araştırmaları Dergisi*, no. 9 (2006): 118-119.

¹⁸⁸ Mahmut Akkor, "II. Dünya Savaşı'nın Sonu Ve Truman Doktrini'nin Ortaya Çıkışı," *YAKANÜVİS- Uluslararası Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi* 2, no. 2 (Fall 2017): 11.

¹⁸⁹ Melih Esenbel, *Türkiye'nin Batı İle İttifaka Yönelişi: Nur Bilge Crissin Önsözü İle* (İstanbul: İsis, 2000), 58-59.

¹⁹⁰ Baskın Oran, ed., *Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş Savaşı'ndan Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt 1 1919-1980* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2001), 534-535.

the Truman Doctrine helped the recovery of the Turkish military. Also, “in Greece, Economic Cooperation Administration officials, who administered the U.S. aid, took up positions in various government ministries where they restructured tax and budgetary policies.”¹⁹¹ Therefore, with the economic aid, Greece’s economy started to recover.¹⁹² Additionally, “the U.S. military advisors supplied and retrained the Greek National Army and devised an aggressive counterinsurgency strategy. As promised, the aid program also funneled modern weaponry to Turkey’s military establishment.”¹⁹³ Thus, the Greek military benefited considerably from the U.S. aid, as did Turkey’s military, which was also able to recover and modernize.¹⁹⁴ Furthermore, the U.S. officials had initially thought that the money that they provided to Turkey was enough. But, as the time went on, they decided to increase financial aid to Turkey. Additionally, for the continuity, in 1948, the U.S. officials made a regulation and printed law which was the transfer of aid to Turkey and Greece under the “Foreign Aid Law”. This resulted in the continuity of the U.S. aid to both countries. On October 6, 1949, the U.S. accepted the Mutual Defence Act and the money that was sent by the U.S. to these countries was placed under the control of the Economic Cooperation Administration.¹⁹⁵ In sum, the U.S. financial

¹⁹¹ Merrill, "The Truman Doctrine: Containing Communism and Modernity," 35.;

¹⁹² Yılmaz, "Turkey's Quest for NATO Membership: The Institutionalization of the Turkish–American Alliance," 486.

¹⁹³ Merrill, "The Truman Doctrine: Containing Communism and Modernity," 35.

¹⁹⁴ Yılmaz, "Turkey's Quest for NATO Membership: The Institutionalization of the Turkish–American Alliance," 486.

¹⁹⁵ Akkor, "II. Dünya Savaşı'nın Sonu ve Truman Doktrini'nin Ortaya Çıkışı," 12.

aid played a key role in the relationship between Turkey and the U.S. Truman Doctrine formed the basis of this relationship as it helped both Turkey and Greece to regain their economic and military strength.

3.3.2. Marshall Plan

After the Second World War, European states were in a state of chaos because of the loss of military and economic power. This, along with the destruction caused by the war, led to the rise of the Soviet Union and communism. To counter this threat, the U.S. supported the idea of providing economic support to European countries so that they could preserve their independence, both economically and politically, and resist the Soviet threat.¹⁹⁶ Therefore, the aim of the U.S. was to have political and economic cooperation among the European states in order to fight against communism and economic depression in Europe.

“After 1945, for 2 years, the U.S. Secretary of State, George Marshall, understood the necessity of extending more consistent and sustained help by supplying the European states with free consumer goods, based on an annual request made by every beneficiary state, as part of a 4-year plan.”¹⁹⁷

For this reason, the U.S. funded around \$15 million to 16 European states between 1945 and 1946. However, these European states were only able to use this aid to close budget deficits. As the funds were not enough for the reconstruction of these

¹⁹⁶ Hal Brands, *What Good Is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 2014), 28.

¹⁹⁷ Maria Bolocan, "An Analysis of the Marshall Plan: Its History and Development," *Revista Română De Studii Eurasiatice* VIII, no. 1-2 (2012): 95.

states, the U.S. began searching for a new solution. As Truman later expressed, “the financial possibilities of the European states were low and therefore, they required a substantial aid in view of accomplishing their economic, social, financial and political reconstruction.”¹⁹⁸ Therefore, more comprehensive aid was crucial for the recovery of the European states, and on June 5, 1947, the Foreign Minister of the U.S. proposed the “Marshall Plan” at the speech that he delivered at Harvard University. He proclaimed that the European states should come together and work towards economic progress and expressed that if a common plan was proposed, the U.S. would not hesitate to support them. In addition, he asserted that “United States should do whatever it could to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace.”¹⁹⁹ According to the Marshall Plan, such economic cooperation would allow European states to make up their losses together. Additionally, if any assistance was necessary, the U.S. would step in and help them.²⁰⁰ To put it briefly, the Marshall plan was the U.S. program for providing assistance to the European countries, and the keystone of this plan was economic cooperation among the European states. Truman further asserted that “our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., 96.

¹⁹⁹ United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), *The British Commonwealth; Europe*, vol. III (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947), 238.

²⁰⁰ Diane B. Kunz, "The Marshall Plan Reconsidered: A Complex of Motives," *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 3 (May/June 1997): 165.

conditions in which free institutions can exist.”²⁰¹ With the Marshall Plan, Truman tried to provide a working economy to the European states for free economic mobility. Additionally, the two main aims of the U.S. for the Marshall Plan were to strengthen the West against communism and to facilitate Europe’s participation in world trade.²⁰² Therefore, with the Marshall Plan, the U.S. government aimed not only to aid European states, but also to protect the U.S. national interests. Moreover, this aid had positive consequences for the U.S. For instance, American influence in the European states increased because of the use of goods and machinery from the U.S. Thus, “the Marshall Plan created an “empire by invitation”, in which Americans and Europeans jointly planned European recovery.”²⁰³

Although the American society believed that it was necessary to assist the European states, they criticized the extent of assistance proposed. Specifically, conservatives criticized the Marshall Plan because it allowed the U.S. to interfere too much in the Western economy, which would bring unknown consequences. For instance, Robert Taft, who was the Republican leader and became conservative on foreign aid issues, asserted that the “Marshall Plan was a giant ‘European TVA,’ a vast Rooseveltian ‘giveaway program.’”²⁰⁴ “In the long run, no nation can live on

²⁰¹ Engel et al., *America in the World a History in Documents from the War with Spain to the War on Terror*, 170.

²⁰² Baskın Oran, "TDP'nin Kuramsal Çerçevesi," in *Türk Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 1*, ed. Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim, 2001), 486.

²⁰³ David R. Goldfield et al., *Twentieth-Century America: A Social and Political History* (Boston: Pearson, 2013), 293.

²⁰⁴ Greg Behrman, *The Most Noble Adventure: The Marshall Plan and the Time When America Helped Save Europe* (Riverside: Free Press, 2007), 148-149.

the bounty of another nation””, he said. Given all the aid already meted out, and Europe’s continued ills, Taft believed history was on his side.”²⁰⁵ However, during the decision-making process, conservatives voted in favor of providing aid in hopes that “the Marshall Plan would restore Europeans’ faith in democratic leadership.”²⁰⁶ For these reasons, the European states accepted the Marshall Plan at the Paris Conference between July 11 and 13, 1947. The plan was accepted by 16 states—Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom. With the adoption of the Marshall Plan, the U.S. officials believed that the influence of communism on these governments could be prevented.²⁰⁷ Consequently, the U.S. Congress accepted the Marshall Plan on September 11, 1947.

Having discussed the Marshall Plan in general, its relevance to Turkey should also be discussed. Turkey was included in the Marshall Plan on July 8, 1948. Turkey had high expectations of this initiative, which further strengthened relations with the U.S. Turkey attended the Paris Conference on 12 July, 1947 and declared that they needed \$615 million.²⁰⁸ However, the directors of the conference did not accept this request primarily because of the different motivations of the U.S. and

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ David Hein, "The Marshall Plan: Conservative Reform as a Weapon of War," *Modern Age*, Winter 2017, 11.

²⁰⁷ Maria Bolocan, "An Analysis of the Marshall Plan: Its History and Development," 95.

²⁰⁸ Yılmaz, "Turkey’s Quest for NATO Membership: The Institutionalization of the Turkish–American Alliance," 487.

Turkey with regards to the Marshall Plan. Specifically, with this initiative, the U.S. aimed to reconstruct Europe and its infrastructure in general, while Turkey aimed to develop itself.²⁰⁹ Since the U.S. government's intention was to aid only the European states, they had initially excluded Turkey. American experts described the reasons for Turkey's exclusion from the Marshall Plan in their detailed report, in which they also provided an analysis of the Turkish economic situation. This report highlighted that foreign investments in Turkey led to an increase in Turkey's national income of over 5%. It also pointed out that until 1947, 90% of the investments in Turkey were made by the government, and just 5% was made by private enterprises. In addition, with the U.S. aid, the national income of Turkey increased by around 45%.²¹⁰ The report also indicated that although the Second World War caused widespread devastation to many European states, which were still struggling economically, Turkey's economy was in a better situation.²¹¹ This led the U.S. government to exclude Turkey from the aid plan on account of their relative economic strength. Furthermore, the report highlighted that Turkey had limited transportation capabilities and that its foreign trade deficit had been growing since 1946²¹², although it was still less than that of the other European states. In addition,

²⁰⁹ Yusuf Çınar, "Modernleşme Ve Bağımlılık Teorisi Ekseninde Marshall Yardımı Ve Türkiye," *MCBÜ Sosyal Bilimler* 16, no. 2 (June 2018): 335.

²¹⁰ Richard D. Robinson, "Impact of American military and economic assistance programs in Turkey," Report to the American Universities Field Staff, 1956, 8., quoted in Şuhnaz Yılmaz, "Turkey's Quest for NATO Membership: The Institutionalization of the Turkish–American Alliance," *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 12, no. 4 (November 26, 2012): 487.

²¹¹ George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971* (Washington, DC: AEI, 1976), Chapter 2, part 1, paragraph 5.

²¹² Ibid.

while Turkey would play a crucial role in the reconstruction of Europe under the Marshall Plan, the U.S. was not interested in the development of Turkey.²¹³ This indifference by the U.S. caused fear among Turkish officials, who were concerned about being abandoned by the U.S. However, Turkey responded by highlighting the fact that it needed aid not only because of economic concerns, but also because of political ones, namely the Soviet threat. In light of this, the U.S. decided to include Turkey in the Marshall Plan. Turkey, however, benefited less than the other states from the Marshall aid.²¹⁴ The U.S. decided to aid Turkey in order to prevent the Turkish government from limiting its relations with the U.S., which might have resulted in communist domination in Turkey. To put it another way, “unlike Italy and Greece, American fears that led to Turkey’s inclusion in the Marshall Plan were aroused solely by an external Communist threat.”²¹⁵ The U.S. also explained that “Turkey needed American aid even though it was not destroyed during the war, because it served as an outpost of the West against the Soviet Union and had a heavy defense burden.”²¹⁶ Therefore, in making their decision, the U.S. prioritized Turkey’s geostrategic position and included Turkey in the Marshall Plan. Thus, on April 16, 1948, Turkey signed the European Economic Cooperation Agreement and on July 4, 1948, Turkey signed the Economic Cooperation Agreement with the U.S.

²¹³ Çınar, "Modernleşme Ve Bağımlılık Teorisi Ekseninde Marshall Yardımı Ve Türkiye," 336.

²¹⁴ Yusuf Çınar, "Modernleşme Ve Bağımlılık Teorisi Ekseninde Marshall Yardımı Ve Türkiye," 336.

²¹⁵ Barry Machado, *In Search of a Usable Past: The Marshall Plan and Postwar Reconstruction Today* (Lexington, VA: George C. Marshall Foundation, 2007), 86.

²¹⁶ Yılmaz, "Turkey’s Quest for NATO Membership: The Institutionalization of the Turkish–American Alliance," 487.

The Turkish Grand National Assembly approved both of these agreements on July 8, 1948.²¹⁷ After signing these agreements, the U.S. gave instructions to Turkey on how to use the aid provided. These instructions were given in a report by Max. W. Thournburg, who was an American government adviser. The report highlighted that Turkey did not engage enough in agriculture and requested that Turkey focus on agriculture in order to contribute to the import and export of European agricultural products.²¹⁸ In addition, the U.S. government asserted that Turkey could not develop enough because of its statist perspective. Hence, in the report called for progressive industrialization led by private sector, with the U.S. cooperation.²¹⁹ In keeping with the suggestions in the report, in 1947, Turkey used a high amount of aid in agriculture, as 75% of the Turkish society engaged in farming and two-thirds of the lands were arable. Hence, Turkey tried to modernize its agriculture by following the recommendations of the U.S., instead of following its own ideas. Furthermore, \$352 million was given to Turkey between the years of 1948 and 1952, \$175 million of which was direct assistance, while \$177 million was indirect assistance. 40% of this money was used for military spending in Turkey, \$84 million was a loan, \$73 million was remittance and \$17 million was conditional aid from direct assistance. Thus, the U.S. controlled the allocation of aid, because it wanted to control the sale

²¹⁷ FRUS, *The Near East, South Asia, and Africa*, Vol V, (1950), 13-15.

²¹⁸ William C. Mallalieu, "The Origin of the Marshall Plan: A Study in Policy Formation and National Leadership," *Political Science Quarterly* 73, no. 4 (December 1958): 488.

²¹⁹ Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971*, Chapter 2, Part 1, Paragraph 8.

of Turkey's processed goods.²²⁰ Moreover, after the Marshall Plan, Turkey became the supplier of raw material and foodstuffs, while at the same time, demanding manufactured products. In addition to this, before the Marshall Plan Turkey was a self-sufficient state with its own economy, but after it, Turkey became complementary to the European economy.²²¹

Under the Marshall Plan, between 1948 and 1959, Turkey spent \$1.207.434.000 in total, \$988,076,000 of which was used directly, while \$195,402,000 was used indirectly by Turkey. Turkey mainly used this aid in the agricultural industry, and the military²²², which benefited both directly and indirectly from a total of \$103.602.000. Turkey also used Marshall aid to boost the private sector. In fact, between 1957 and 1958, Turkey transferred \$210.733.760 in direct and indirect assistance to the private sector.²²³ Moreover, the Marshall Plan had a crucial impact on Turkey's foreign policy since it became clear that Turkey was part of the Western Bloc.²²⁴ Also, thanks to this aid, the "Turkish national income grew nearly 45 percent during the five years following the start of the

²²⁰ Mallalieu, "The Origin of the Marshall Plan: A Study in Policy Formation and National Leadership," 488.

²²¹ Çınar, "Modernleşme Ve Bağımlılık Teorisi Ekseninde Marshall Yardımı Ve Türkiye," 339.

²²² Yılmaz, "Turkey's Quest for NATO Membership: The Institutionalization of the Turkish–American Alliance," 487.

²²³ Refii Şükrü Suvla, *Türkiye ve Marshall Planı* (İstanbul: İsmail Akgün, 1951), 8, quoted in Yusuf Çınar, "Modernleşme Ve Bağımlılık Teorisi Ekseninde Marshall Yardımı Ve Türkiye," *MCBÜ Sosyal Bilimler* 16, no. 2 (June 2018): 343.

²²⁴ Çınar, "Modernleşme Ve Bağımlılık Teorisi Ekseninde Marshall Yardımı Ve Türkiye," 345.

program, in an atmosphere of only moderate inflationary pressure.”²²⁵ Therefore, between 1948 and 1952, with the Marshall Plan, Turkey was able to strengthen its economy. The U.S. government continued providing Marshall aid until 1963, and as a result, Turkey maintained close relations with the U.S. in most foreign affairs matters. Additionally, the Marshall Plan facilitated the growth of the European economy and cooperation between European states.

3.3.3. Establishment of NATO

Having discussed the role of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, the final part of this section addresses the establishment of NATO. Both the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were the first the U.S. initiatives against Soviet expansionism. However, neither of them could be a permanent solution to the Soviet threat. The U.S. discussed the outline of the proposed treaty of NATO on March 18, 1949 with western alliance.²²⁶ With the establishment of NATO on the 4th of April, 1949, the U.S. began following a containment policy towards the Soviets. The U.S. believed that this organization could prevent the Soviet threat permanently. In addition, with the establishment of NATO, one of the aims of the U.S. was to form a collective security arrangement, specifically for European states.²²⁷ This desire became the main concern of American foreign policy. NATO was intended to be the

²²⁵ Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971*, Chapter 2, Part 1, Paragraph 8.

²²⁶ Türkaya Ataöv, *Amerika, NATO ve Türkiye* (Ankara: İleri, 2006), 136.

²²⁷ Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971*, Chapter 2, Part 1, Paragraph 12.

most effective the U.S. led organization responsible for security in the West. Indeed, according to the official documents of the U.S., “the essential task was to create confidence in western Europe that further Communist inroads would be stopped. The issue must be definite and clear.”²²⁸ Thus, Communists were the main opponent of the western bloc and NATO was the permanent solution to this opponent. In addition to this, another major concern of the U.S. was to protect capitalism and maintain order. Therefore, to achieve these goals, the U.S. wanted to form military alliances, and according to the U.S. government, NATO was the key to such alliances.²²⁹ The origins of NATO goes back to the Five Power Pact, also known as the Brussels Treaty. Five powers—Belgium, France, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom—signed the Brussels Treaty on March 17, 1948, as a collective defense alliance.²³⁰ The main purpose of this treaty was to show that European states could cooperate with each other in matters of security. Another goal of the parties involved was to form a common defense system, strengthen economic and cultural relations and set out a plan for long-term cooperation. Accordingly, the Brussels treaty was the first step for the foundation of the North Atlantic Treaty.²³¹ After this treaty was signed, in the middle of 1948, Republican Senator Arthur Vandenburg, prepared a draft resolution to the American Congress. This resolution

²²⁸ FRUS, *Western Europe*, Vol III, (1948), 2.

²²⁹ Ataöv, *Amerika, NATO ve Türkiye*, 147.

²³⁰ "Five-Power Pact Signed at Brussels, March 17, 1948," *International Organization* 2, no. 2 (June 1948): 427.

²³¹ Hüseyin Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikasında 1950'li Yıllar* (Ankara: ODTÜ, 2007), 10.

recommended a treaty be signed between the U.S. and Western Europe for mutual defense and assistance. On July 11, 1948, the American Congress accepted this resolution, which became known as the Vandenberg Resolution.²³² Once the approval of the Congress had been obtained, discussions about the specific conditions of the treaty started. During the negotiation process, three main issues were discussed by the Congress and the states that signed the Brussels Treaty. The first was related to guaranteed the U.S. assistance. Specifically, the European states requested that the U.S. provide a guarantee that it would lend assistance in the event of an attack. However, this would only occur with the approval of the U.S. Congress. The second issue was about the U.S. military assistance. Specifically the Western states requested assistance with the recovery of their military whenever needed, but the U.S. refused this request and asserted that this required comprehensive assistance. The last issue was about the signatories of the treaty. The original states that signed the Brussels Treaty wanted to create a new treaty with just themselves and the U.S. But, the U.S. wanted to involve the North Atlantic states. Furthermore, during the discussion process, Truman declared America's intention. He pointed out that if an attack occurred against the U.S. in the North Atlantic Area, only the U.S. should deal with the issue in accordance with the UN Charter Article 51.²³³ In the light of these discussions, on April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed by 12 founding countries— the United States, Canada,

²³² Fahir Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi 1914-1995* (İstanbul: Kronik Kitap, 2018), 447-449.

²³³ FRUS, Western Europe, Vol III, (1948), 73.

Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United Kingdom—and NATO was formed with the signing of NATO treaty. The main purpose of the treaty was to form a collective defense alliance and to cooperate with each other in defense matters in the event that of an attack against any of these states.²³⁴ The main concern of NATO was to fight against Soviet aggression since one of the root causes of the U.S. involvement in the treaty was the Soviet Union threat, especially after the Berlin Depression. Hence, the U.S. focused its efforts on the prevention of Soviet expansionism.

The decision of Western Europe to include the U.S. as a party to the treaty, was driven by the economic and military power of the U.S. The parties of the treaty stated that without the support of the U.S., it would be difficult for the organization to stand against the Soviet threat. As such, the parties of the treaty wanted the U.S. to be involved in the NATO treaty. The 9th Article of the Brussels Treaty gives the parties of the treaty the right to invite other states to join the treaty. Article IX states, “the High Contracting Parties may, by agreement, invite any other State to accede to the present Treaty on conditions to be agreed between them and the State so invited.”²³⁵ Later on, NATO had 16 member states with the addition of Turkey and Greece in 1952, Western Germany in 1955 and Spain in 1982.²³⁶

²³⁴ "North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949," U.S. Department of State, 1949, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/nato>.

²³⁵ B. Brussels Treaty Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence Signed at Brussels on 17 March 1948, August 25, 1948, accessed February 12, 2019, https://www.nato.int/ebookshop/video/declassified/doc_files/Brussels_Treaty.pdf; Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikasında 1950'li Yıllar*, 10.

²³⁶ Váli, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey*, 119-156.

Having discussed the establishment of NATO, it is necessary to discuss the underlying reasons for the involvement of Turkey. Turkey had four main reasons for joining NATO. The first was the Soviet threat. Turkey perceived the U.S. as a power capable of resisting the Soviet threat. Given “the replacement of Germany by the United States as the main bulwark, and therefore model, in resistance to the ancient Russian threat.”²³⁷ It is unsurprising that Turkey perceived the U.S. as a superior power that could withstand any threat. The second reason for Turkey’s NATO membership was its involvement in the Council of Europe. Turkey became part of the Council of Europe in 1949, and as a result, Turkey was accepted as a European state. This gave Turkey legal ground to apply for NATO membership.²³⁸ Turkey’s involvement in the Council of Europe also represented the Turkish government’s support of the idea that Turkey was part and parcel of Europe. Indeed, the government argued that Turkey should be part of any organization in which the West was one of the parties.²³⁹ Hence, Turkey pursued western politics. The third reason for Turkey’s desire to join NATO was their concern over a possible decrement in the U.S. financial aid. For instance, Turkey asserted that if it was excluded from NATO, the financial aid that was given at the end of the Second World War would decline. Also, with the establishment of NATO, the U.S. extended its financial aid to Western Europe, under the name of the Truman Doctrine. Hence, Turkey assumed

²³⁷ Bernard Lewis, "Recent Developments in Turkey," *Institute of International Affairs* 27, no. 3 (July 1951): 323.

²³⁸ Oral Sander, *Türk –Amerikan İlişkileri (1947-1964)* (İmge, 2016), 99.

²³⁹ Ibid.

that this extension would lead to a decline in the U.S. aid to Turkey.²⁴⁰ The Turkish government, therefore, put greater emphasis on NATO membership, not only to prevent the decline in its financial assistance, but also to continue getting financial assistance from the U.S. The last reason for Turkey's desire to join NATO was the preservation of democratic order. It was argued that in order to secure democratic order in Turkey, NATO membership was essential. Indeed, all the western countries were cooperating in order to secure their democratic regime and protect their rights.²⁴¹ Since Turkey had transitioned from a single-party regime to a multi-party regime, there was a political instability in the state. The Turkish government thought that cooperating with the western world would ease the transition process. Indeed, according to Turkish officials, joining NATO and cooperating with the western world was the solution. In light of these reasons, Turkey formally applied for membership in NATO on August 1, 1950, but this application was rejected due to cultural and religious differences.²⁴² Although Turkey had valid reasons for wanting to join NATO, the European states objected. "[T]here were strategical and ideological objections: Greece and Turkey, although connected by a narrow frontier in Thrace, were isolated from the rest of the help of sea and air power. Turkey's exposed location in the Middle East was questioned."²⁴³ Therefore, because of the

²⁴⁰ Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971*, Chapter 2, Part 1, Paragraph 13.

²⁴¹ Sander, *Türk –Amerikan İlişkileri (1947-1964)*, 101.

²⁴² Sevinç Tekindor Von Zur Mühlen, "Korean War in the Turkish Press," *Turkish Studies* 13, no. 3 (September 2012): 526.

²⁴³ Váli, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey*, 116.

geographical position of Turkey, the European states did not want Turkey to be a part of NATO. However, despite their objections, Turkey became a member state of NATO on February 28, 1952, along with Greece.²⁴⁴ As a consequence of Turkey's membership, the NATO treaty was rearranged and the territorial limits of NATO were modified. To the Article 6 of the treaty, 'the territory of Turkey' expression added to the explanation of the border limits.²⁴⁵ From that point on the borders of the organization included the Turkish territory and Mediterranean borders. In sum, the establishment of NATO was another crucial factor in relations between Turkey and the U.S. after the Second World War. It was established in 1949 at the request of the parties of the Brussels Treaty. The U.S. agreed to take part in the establishment of NATO because of the Soviet threat, and Turkey wanted to be a member of NATO because of security and financial assistance concerns. All in all, Turkey's NATO membership had a strong influence on its relations with the U.S.

²⁴⁴ Satterthwaite, "The Truman Doctrine: Turkey," 81.

²⁴⁵ Váli, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey*, 117.

CHAPTER 4

THE KOREAN WAR

The main aim of this part of the thesis is to investigate the reasons for the Korean War, its historical background and consequences of the war. Before proceeding to the details of the war, some general information should first be given. To start with, the geopolitical position of Korea should be noted. Korea is a peninsula in Eastern Asia. The size of the entire country is around 220.675km².²⁴⁶ As of 2019, the population of South Korea is 51.275 million and the population of North Korea is 25,685 million.²⁴⁷ It has borders with China and Russia on the northern side, and with Japan on the eastern side. The Yellow Sea separates China and Korea, and the Sea of Japan separates Japan and Korea. Regarding the separation of Korea into North and South Korea, it should be pointed out that Korea was under the control of Japanese empire. In 1895, it was taken under the protection of Japan and was a colony of Japan from 1910 to the 1940s.

In August 1945, on the eve of the collapse of Japan when the victorious Soviet Army was over-running the Korean peninsula, the Soviet Union agreed to an impromptu American proposal that Korea should be divided

²⁴⁶ "Latitude and Longitude Facts," World Atlas - Maps, Geography, Travel, July 12, 2016, accessed February 12, 2019, <https://www.worldatlas.com/aatlas/imageg.htm>.

²⁴⁷ "North Korea Population (LIVE)," Worldometers, accessed February 18, 2019, <http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/north-korea-population/>.

into two zones across the 38th Parallel for the purpose of acceptance of military surrender.²⁴⁸

Hence, the 38th parallel became the border between North and South Korea with the support of both the Soviet Union and the U.S. After this division, there was a period of deadlock and the UN General Assembly placed the issue on its agenda in 1947 at the request of the U.S. The solution of the General Assembly was to hold free elections in Korea. For the elections, the assembly formed a Temporary Commission (UNTCOK). After these developments, on 25 June 1950, at 4.00 a.m. the Korean War officially started with the 38th parallel border violation by North Korea. The details of this war will be discussed in the following sections.

4.1. Historical Background

4.1.1. The Origins of the Korean War

Before explaining the outbreak of the Korean War, it is necessary to first explain the origin of the war. The invasion of Korea happened after the Second World War. With the surrender of Japan on 15 August 1945, Korea got over the colony of Japan.²⁴⁹ However, this freedom ended with the Soviet occupation in 1945, which served the Soviet agenda of communist expansion. The U.S. responded by immediately acting against the Soviets in order to prevent them from occupying

²⁴⁸ Karunakar Gupta, "How Did the Korean War Begin?" *The China Quarterly* 52 (1972): 701.

²⁴⁹ Wada Haruki, *The Korean War: An International History* (Lanham: Roman & Littlefield, 2013), 1.

the whole of Korea and the U.S. sent troops to South Korea.²⁵⁰ The U.S. feared the rapid action taken by the Soviets because the U.S. government interpreted it as evidence of Soviets' intention to take control of all of Korea. Therefore, in order to prevent this possibility, the U.S. sent their troops to the Southern part of Korea. Although the Korean peninsula held no strategic importance for either side, neither the U.S. nor the Soviets withdrew their troops. Indeed, "by the end of 1945, the joint Soviet-American administration of Korea had come to resemble the situation in Germany, with neither side prepared to withdraw for fear that the other might not."²⁵¹ The goal of both sides was to have an influence on the region and more rights than the other side. Afterwards, the U.S. came up with the solution of dividing the Korean land into two parts at the 38th parallel line. This solution was accepted by the Soviets and the 38th parallel became the border between the two sides.²⁵² With this solution, the U.S. had two purposes. These were "to unify the Korean peninsula in order to establish a new government free from any foreign powers and to foster conditions that will separate Korea from economic dependence upon Japan."²⁵³ Therefore, the U.S. wanted a unified Korea without the intervention of any other state.

²⁵⁰ Leif A. Gruenberg and Kevin Hillstrom, *Defining Moments: The Korean War* (Chicago, IL: KWS Publishers, 2011), 17.

²⁵¹ John Lewis. Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997), 70.

²⁵² Gruenberg and Hillstrom, *Defining Moments: The Korean War*, 19.

²⁵³ Tae-Gyun Park, "U.S. Policy Change Towards South Korea in the 1940s and the 1950s," *Journal of International and Area Studies* 7, no. 2 (December 2000): 96.

Although the U.S. and the Soviets decided on the division of Korea into north and south, they could not agree on a trusteeship for a unified and free Korea.²⁵⁴ There were negotiations between the Soviets and the U.S. from 1946-1947, but both sides failed to find a common solution. After this string of unsuccessful discussions, the United States brought the issue to the United Nations, which proposed holding elections. However, this proposal was rejected by the Soviets²⁵⁵, who felt that the elections would be a departure from the initial agreement they had with the U.S.²⁵⁶ Despite the Soviet Union's rejection, the United States petitioned the UN and, on September 17, the problem of the division of Korea was put on the agenda of the UN. Then, as stated before, the UN decided to form a Temporary Commission on Korea and to hold elections in May 1948.²⁵⁷ However, the Soviet Union did not agree to engage in an election process that would involve both sides of Korea. In fact, both North Korea and the Soviet Union rejected the UN control of the governmental election process.²⁵⁸

Despite the objections of the Soviets and North Korea, an election was held on May 10, 1948 in South Korea under the control of the United Nations. As a result of these free elections, the government of the Republic of Korea (ROK) was formed

²⁵⁴ Joel R. Campbell, "The Wrong War: The Soviets and the Korean War, 1945-1953," *International Social Science Review* 88, no. 3 (2014): 6.

²⁵⁵ Paul M. Edwards, *The Korean War: A Historical Dictionary*, series 23 (Lanham, Md: Scarecrow Press, 2003), 4.

²⁵⁶ Campbell, "The Wrong War: The Soviets and the Korean War, 1945-1953," 6.

²⁵⁷ K. D. Ewing, Joan Mahoney, and Andrew Moretta, "Civil Liberties and the Korean War," *The Modern Law Review* 81, no. 3 (May 1, 2018): 396.

²⁵⁸ Gruenberg and Hillstrom, *Defining Moments: The Korean War*, 20.

in South Korea under Syngman Rhee's presidency. The South Korean officials designated Seoul as the capital of the country.²⁵⁹ A few months later, on September 9, 1948, an election was held in North Korea under the regulation of the Soviet Union. As a result of this election, a communist regime was formed under the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Kim Il Sung was appointed as President and officials named Pyongyang as the capital of North Korea.²⁶⁰ Thus, what started out as an attempt to bring about the unification of Korea, ended with the formation of two different governments. On the one front, there was the nationalist leader, Syngman Rhee, and on the other, there was the communist leader, Kim Il Sung.²⁶¹ Furthermore, the division of Korea into north and south occurred as a result of three levels of political dynamics. "[T]he first was the cold war between the US and the USSR and the divided occupation. The second was the relation between the Korean people and the US and Soviet occupying forces. The third was the political struggles among the Korean people themselves."²⁶² Thus, the division of Korea was brought about by not only the conflict between the U.S. and the USSR, but also by the behavior of the Korean people. After this division and until the initiation of the war, neither side tried to negotiate on the unification of the Korean peninsula.

²⁵⁹ Russell D. Buhite, *Soviet-American Relations in Asia, 1945-1954*, 1st ed. (Norman: University Press of America, 1981), 158-162.

²⁶⁰ Andrei Lankov, *From Stalin to Kim Il Sung: The Formation of North Korea, 1945-1960* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002), 43-47.

²⁶¹ Edwards, *The Korean War: A Historical Dictionary*, 5.

²⁶² Myunglim Park, "The 'American Boundary', Provocation, and the Outbreak of the Korean War," *Social Science Japan Journal* 1, no. 1 (April 1988): 38.

After the elections in 1948, both the USSR and the U.S. started to withdraw their military forces from North and South Korea, respectively.²⁶³ However, although both states had completely withdrawn within one year, they had left behind a military imbalance between South and North Korea. In other words, “huge differences existed between North and South Korea in their readiness for future military action and the condition, quality, and quantity of their military equipment.”²⁶⁴ For instance, in North Korea, the Soviet Union left behind small tactical air forces and 150 medium-sized tanks, while in South Korea, the U.S. did not leave behind any military aircraft or tanks.²⁶⁵ Moreover, “North Korea had a three-to-one numerical advantage in divisional artillery, and its best guns far outranged those of South Korea.”²⁶⁶ In South Korea, however, “in June 1949 the 5th Regimental Combat Team was withdrawn, leaving only the 500-man Korean Military Advisory Group.”²⁶⁷ Therefore, after the withdrawals of the United States and the Soviet Union, North Korea clearly had the stronger military. To sum up, there were four main reasons for the initiation of the war. These were the failed negotiations on Korea, the discussion of the Korean problem in the United Nations,

²⁶³ Charles M. Dobbs, *The Unwanted Symbol: American Foreign Policy, the Cold War, and Korea, 1945-1950* (Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1981), 153.

²⁶⁴ Gruenberg and Hillstrom, *Defining Moments: The Korean War*, 24.

²⁶⁵ William Whitney Stueck, *The Korean War: An International History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 11.

²⁶⁶ Ibid.

²⁶⁷ Edwards, *The Korean War: A Historical Dictionary*, 4.

the establishment of two states in Korea and lastly, the U.S. fear of the communist influence and the expansion policy of the Soviet Union.

4.1.2. The Outbreak of the Korean War

Having discussed the origins of the Korean War, this section will focus on to the outbreak of the Korean War. To start with, who initiated the war is unclear. On the one side, North Korea claimed that South Korea initiated the war, while South Korea declared that North Korea launched the first attack. The attack occurred in the early hours of June 25, 1950.²⁶⁸ After the first attack, North Korean forces fired across the 38th parallel from 6 different positions . The North Korean People's Army (NKPA) then crossed the 38th parallel with Russian T-34 tanks.²⁶⁹ North Korean soldiers also attacked from the sea and moved towards the South Korean borders. At 9:30, on the same day, the North Korean forces took Kaesong.²⁷⁰ Moreover, since South Korea was at a disadvantage militarily when compared with North Korea, they were not able to resist the northern attack. Therefore, the North Korean forces were able to seize the capital of South Korea, Seoul, before crossing the Han River and moving on to the southern cities of Taejon and Taegu.²⁷¹ Thus, North Korea was able to invade a large area of the South Korean region. The imbalance in the military strength between South and North Korea was not the only

²⁶⁸ Ewing, Mahoney, and Moretta, "Civil Liberties and the Korean War," 396.

²⁶⁹ Edwards, *The Korean War: A Historical Dictionary*, 6.

²⁷⁰ Stueck, *The Korean War: An International History*, 10.

²⁷¹ Edwards, *The Korean War: A Historical Dictionary*, 6.

factor that led to the North Korean invasion of South Korea. The weakened fighting ability of South Korea had an impact on the success of the North Korean forces too. For instance, between April 17 and June 23, the South Korean army was under an intensive training for emergency situation. Between April 17 and May 3, the army was in standby preparations, between April 29 and May 2, it was in alert situation, between May 9 and May 27, the army was again in standby preparations, and lastly between June 11 and June 23, the army was in emergency alert situation. Therefore, there was a strict military education program for the South Korean army. The South Korean army was tired due to the intensive program.²⁷² Furthermore, “there were systematic actions that severely weakened South Korea’s fighting ability and threw the command structure into chaos that was further accelerated as the outbreak of war became imminent.”²⁷³ Hence, the military in South Korea was unprepared for war.

While the conflict continued between North and South Korea, Harry Truman was in Missouri. So, the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson informed him of the attack and requested that he come back to Washington since the situation was serious. Related with this briefing, Truman stated: “I was sure that they [Russians] had trained the North Koreans in order to create a Communist state in Korea as a whole and that their intention was to overthrow the Republic of Korea, which had been set up by the United Nations with the Russians’ approval.”²⁷⁴ He further stated

²⁷² Park, "The ‘American Boundary’, Provocation, and the Outbreak of the Korean War," 47.

²⁷³ Ibid.

²⁷⁴ Gruenberg and Hillstrom, *Defining Moments: The Korean War*, 32.

that “the conclusion that I had come to was that force was the only language that the Russian dictatorship could understand. We had to meet them on that basis.”²⁷⁵ Therefore, it can be concluded that Truman’s point of view was that North Korea had attacked South Korea in a bid for control of the entire Korean peninsula, and that attack was supported by the Soviet Union. Also, due to the aggression of the North Korean forces, Truman was determined to use force in order to resist their hostility. When he arrived in Washington, he convened his secretaries, advisers, chairman and generals on June 25.²⁷⁶ At no point did Truman’s perspective change. He always maintained that the northern attack occurred with the backing of Stalin. In other words, the U.S. officials asserted that North Korea would not attempt such an attack without Stalin’s authorization. The U.S. also believed that the attack would not have occurred without Soviet-supplied armed forces.²⁷⁷ Thus, during the meeting, “Acheson argued for increased military aid to the ROK, the U.S. Air Force cover for the evacuation of Americans, and the interposition of the Seventh Fleet between Taiwan and the China mainland-thus obviating a Communist invasion of the island.”²⁷⁸ Secretary Dean Acheson played a crucial role in the decision-making process and accelerated the process. He also insisted on increasing military

²⁷⁵ Ibid.

²⁷⁶ Morton H. Halperin, "The Limiting Process in the Korean War," *Political Science Quarterly* 78, no. 1 (March 1963): 17.

²⁷⁷ Charles E. Bohlen, *Witness to History, 1929-1969* (New York: Norton, 1973).

²⁷⁸ Bruce Cummings, *The Korean War: A History* (New York: Modern Library, 2011), 11.

assistance to the South Korean government.²⁷⁹ Moreover, Truman expressed that “the attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war.”²⁸⁰ These words make clear President Truman’s fear about the communist threat. Additionally, he expressed that with this attack, the Soviet Union’s desire to spread communism became obvious. The U.S. government realized that they needed to take action against the communist expansion for the sake of world freedom. In addition to this, this attack was further proof of the expansion of communist ideology with armed forces throughout the world, especially in Africa, the Middle East and Eastern Europe.²⁸¹ Another reason for the U.S. to participate in the war was to prevent a third world war. In fact, “the major American aim in Korea was to prevent a third world war; the United States was determined not to give the Soviets any excuse to initiate global war.”²⁸² For these reasons, as well as the decisive stance of North Korea, the United States quickly decided to take part in the war and sent support troops to South Korea.

After President Truman had conferred with his cabinet, he offered to consult with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). He requested that the council

²⁷⁹ Charles E. Bohlen, *Witness to History, 1929-1969* (New York: Norton, 1973).

²⁸⁰ Truman, *Memoirs of Harry S. Truman Years of Trial and Hope*, 339.

²⁸¹ Gruenberg and Hillstrom, *Defining Moments: The Korean War*, 30.

²⁸² Halperin, "The Limiting Process in the Korean War," 23.

issue the resolution.²⁸³ The UNSC honored this request and issued Resolution 82 for ‘immediate cessation of hostilities’ on June 25, 1950. The UNSC members accepted the resolution unanimously. Resolution 82 was different from other UN resolutions in that “this resolution effectively paved the way for armed intervention for the first time in its history. It called for an “immediate cessation of hostilities” and for the withdrawal of North Korean forces back to a position north of the 38th parallel.”²⁸⁴ With the UNSC resolution, Truman indicated the willingness of the U.S. government to send military aid to South Korea. He expressed his thoughts by stating that “our concern over the lawless action taken by the forces from North Korea, and our sympathy and support for the people of Korea in this situation, are being demonstrated by the cooperative action of American personnel in Korea.”²⁸⁵ Two days after the first attack, on June 27, the UN Security Council issued the second resolution which specified that “urgent military measures are required to restore international peace and security.”²⁸⁶ The Council requested that UN member states provide assistance to South Korea. Having gained the support of the UN, Harry Truman approved the use of air support in order to rescue victims. He also sent the U.S. 7th Fleet to Taiwan. Despite the presence of the U.S. forces in South Korea, North Korea did not retreat, and instead, moved towards the southern

²⁸³ Roy Edgar. Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu: June-November 1950* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Dept. of the Army, 1961), 36.

²⁸⁴ Ibid., 37.

²⁸⁵ Gruenberg and Hillstrom, *Defining Moments: The Korean War*, 34.

²⁸⁶ Ibid.

regions. On July 4, 1950, under the orders of General William Dean, the 24th Infantry Division were able to hold back the North Korean People's Army at the Kum River. In addition to this, the 5th Air Force moved towards South Korea in order to prevent any further attack by the communist army.²⁸⁷

So far, this section has focused on the beginning of the war and the immediate responses of the U.S. and the UN. It is also necessary to discuss the phases of the Korean war. According to Paul Edwards, the Korean War can be categorized into four main phases. The first phase includes the initial stages of the war, in other words, the initiation of the war and United Nations' involvement. The second phase concerns the North Korean interference to Yalu and Inchon. The third phase was marked by China's involvement in the war. The fourth phase includes the Hill War, which was the defensive war and the armistice and cease-fire period.

The first phase covers the period between June 25, 1950 and September 15, 1950. As previously stated, the involvement of the United Nations is part of the first phase of the Korean War. The beginning of this stage was marked by the invasion of the Republic of South Korea by North Korean forces on June 25, 1950 at 4 o'clock in the morning. The ambassador of the U.S., Warren Austin, immediately informed the UN about this invasion by saying that

This wholly illegal and unprovoked attack by the Korean north forces constitutes a breach of the peace and an act of aggression. It would appear from the nature of the attack and the manner in which it was launched that it constitutes an all-out offensive against the Republic of Korea.²⁸⁸

²⁸⁷ Edwards, *The Korean War: A Historical Dictionary*, 6.

²⁸⁸ Bud Hunnings, *The Korean War, An Exhaustive Chronology* (Jefferson, North Carolina: MC Farland & Company, 2007), 33.

Hence, the U.S. government saw the attack as an act of aggression and called for aid. In response, the UNSC issued a resolution within its special session by stating that “noting with grave concern the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea, the Security Council determines that this action constitutes a breach of the peace.”²⁸⁹ This was the first resolution, called Resolution 82, and it was passed on June 25, 1950. Resolution 82 called for the immediate cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel, and lastly, for aid from all UN member states.²⁹⁰ The UN also petitioned its member states to help stop the North Korean attack. Two days later, on June 27, 1950, the UNSC passed the second resolution, Resolution 83, which urged its member states to help South Korea by cooperating with the UN to stand against the North Korean forces. The resolution “recommends that the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.”²⁹¹ A few days later, the UN passed another resolution, Resolution 84, on July 7, 1950. One of the requests of this resolution was that the member states of the UN supply military forces and assistance. The resolution also requested that the U.S. act as commander during the war and authorized the use of UN flags during operations against North

²⁸⁹ Ibid.

²⁹⁰ Resolution 82, United Nations Security Council, *Resolutions Adopted by the Security Council in 1950*, by S/RES/82 (1950), June 25, 1950, 4, [https://undocs.org/S/RES/82\(1950\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/82(1950)).

²⁹¹ Resolution 83, United Nations Security Council, *Resolutions Adopted by the Security Council in 1950*, by S/RES/83 (1950), June 27, 1950, 5, [https://undocs.org/S/RES/83\(1950\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/83(1950)).

Korea.²⁹² Thus, since all member states agreed to participate and aid UN forces in the Korean War, a unified force of UN member states was formed. Furthermore, the UNSC passed another resolution related to this Unified Command, called Resolution 85. With this resolution, the Security Council “requests the Unified Command to exercise responsibility for determining the requirements for the relief and support of the civilian population of Korea and for establishing in the field the procedures for providing such relief and support.”²⁹³ Moreover, the UNSC wanted to be kept updated on all actions taken with regards to this issue so that it could effectively track the process. Basically, all four of these resolutions called for member states to help the UN and South Korea resist the attack by North Korean forces and to keep the 38th parallel as the border. The UNSC also insisted on getting information about all stages and wanted to be present for all steps. In response to these resolutions and calls issued by the United Nations, UN member states quickly started to send their troops and aid to South Korea. Hence, “South Korea became the ‘far away nation’ that required the actions of concerned nations if it, and eventually the world, was to be spared. The aggression in Korea was also an important testing ground of American and UN resolve to stop communist expansion.”²⁹⁴ Indeed, the reason the UN member states sent troops to South Korea so quickly was to prevent the expansion of communism. They were aware of the fact that United Nations was

²⁹² Resolution 84, United Nations Security Council, *Resolutions Adopted by the Security Council in 1950*, by S/RES/84 (1950), July 7, 1950, 6, [https://undocs.org/S/RES/84\(1950\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/84(1950)).

²⁹³ Resolution 85, United Nations Security Council, *Resolutions Adopted by the Security Council in 1950*, by S/RES/85 (1950), July 31, 1950, 6-7, [https://undocs.org/S/RES/85\(1950\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/85(1950)).

²⁹⁴ Edwards, *The Korean War: A Historical Dictionary*, 7.

the only organization that had the power to prevent this expansion. Therefore, the anti-communist states cooperated and stood against the North Korean attack to prevent communist expansion.

The second phase covers the period between September 15, 1950 and mid-October 1950. On September 15, 1950, McArthur planned Operation Chromite, which “was an amphibious landing at the west coast port of Inchon.”²⁹⁵ For this plan, X Corps, which included the first Marine Division and the Seventh Infantry Division, were prepared by orders of General Edward Almond. Afterwards, X Corps surrounded Inchon and Kimpo Airfield. In addition, the Eighth Army of the U.S. quickly gained control of the northern part of Korea and liberating the region. As a consequence, the North Korean People’s Army was cut off from its supplies and connections, and withdrew from the southern region. The USSR had incorrectly predicted that America would not cross the parallel, despite the U.S. warnings to the contrary. However, the Chinese warned the U.S. government through Indian ambassador. Indeed, “the warning arrived in Washington at 5.35 a.m. local time on October 3, 1950, in the shape of a telegram from London relaying the information as reported to the British Foreign Office by its representative in Peking.”²⁹⁶ Due to the warning of the Chinese, the U.S. did not want to move on. Accordingly, both the South and North Korean troops stayed on their side of the 38th parallel.²⁹⁷ After this

²⁹⁵ Ibid.

²⁹⁶ Geoffrey Warner, "The Korean War," *International Affairs* 56, no. 1 (January 1980): 105.

²⁹⁷ John Speed Meyers, "Reputation Matters: Evidence from the Korean War," *Journal of International and Area Studies* 22, no. 2 (December 2015): 28.

point, it was assumed that the war had ended and both sides had accepted to stay within their borders. However, this was not the case, as the ROK and United Nations forces crossed the 38th parallel and advanced north. "American troops had crossed the 38th parallel on October 7, 1950 and the Russians broke off the contract."²⁹⁸ During this phase, the Eighth Army crossed the western part of the mountains, while at the same time, X Corps crossed the eastern side. The last event of this phase was the 17th Infantry Regiment's arrival at the Yalu River.²⁹⁹

The third phase covers the period of the involvement of China in the Korean War. The movement of the ROK and United Nations forces across the 38th Parallel marked an important turning point as the People's Republic of China had made it clear that if UN forces crossed the 38th Parallel, they would side with North Korea and participate in the war.³⁰⁰ In response to the Chinese warning, MacArthur ensured Truman that this would not occur. However, China decided to enter the war in June 1950, nine months after it began. This phase started officially with the involvement of China in the war in October 1950. Before explaining the consequences of China's involvement, it is necessary to discuss the reasons for its involvement. China's involvement in the war stemmed from a desire to protect its territorial integrity, its prestige and its gain.³⁰¹ Moreover, China was also driven to participate in the war because China was concerned that it would miss out on the

²⁹⁸ Warner, "The Korean War," 105.

²⁹⁹ Edwards, *The Korean War: A Historical Dictionary*, 8.

³⁰⁰ Campbell, "The Wrong War: The Soviets and the Korean War, 1945-1953," 16.

³⁰¹ Halperin, "The Limiting Process in the Korean War," 18.

resources in Korea that the other powerful force might exploit, and they felt that through their involvement they would be able to inflict enough damage to get that powerful force to do what it wanted. This was expressed as

The final step seems to have been prompted in part by general concern over the range of opportunities within Korea that might be exploited by a determined, powerful enemy on China's doorstep. [...] It might succeed in inflicting sufficient damage to force the enemy to compromise his objectives and to accede to some of Peking's demands.³⁰²

Hence, for the sake of its future, the Chinese government decided to send troops to North Korea. Their goal was to damage the forces of the enemy and protect their own territory. Furthermore, China wanted "to repay North Korean help in their revolution, to defend their border, and to supplant Soviet influence in Korea."³⁰³ Thus, China felt indebted to North Korea because of its provision of aid in the past. With these considerations in mind, the Chinese government entered the war in the middle of October 1950. In mid-October 1950, the forces of China and the forces of the Republic of Korea (ROK) fought against each other. However, since the UN forces wanted to take back Yalu, they attacked North Korea. Accordingly, China again intervened in the war a couple of days later in November and fought against UN forces.³⁰⁴ Later, on 23 November 1950, the ROK troops were attacked by around 200,000 Chinese forces. As a consequence, Chinese troops were able to cross the Yalu River and greatly weaken UN forces. "The blood which flowed on

³⁰² Allen S. Whitining, *China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War* (New York: Macmillan, 1960), 159.

³⁰³ Campbell, "The Wrong War: The Soviets and the Korean War, 1945-1953," 16.

³⁰⁴ Barton J. Bernstein, "New Light on the Korean War," *The International History Review* 3, no. 2 (April 1981): 258.

both sides during the weeks and months that followed not only failed to reunite Korea; it formed a divide in relations between the U.S. and Communist China which could not be bridged for another twenty years.”³⁰⁵ Hence, the involvement of China in the war led to the breakdown of the relationship between the U.S. and China. However, during this phase of the Korean War, X Corps were able to recapture Seoul and Truman authorized the UN troops to protect the 38th parallel. Moreover, with these new developments and with the intervention of Chinese troops, South Korea’s goals changed. Initially, South Korea’s aim was to unify Korea. However, as the war progressed, it’s primary objectives shifted to pushing North Korean troops back, strengthening South Korea and restoring its sovereignty. At this phase, Chinese launched strikes against both the 7th Infantry Division and the 1st Marine Division. After the strikes, Chinese troops withdrew their forces, and Seoul was occupied by the North Korean forces on 3 January 1951.³⁰⁶ The course of the war changed at the end of the third phase.

The fourth phase started with a new form of war, Hill War, which refers to the stalemate and negotiation process, and the cease-fire period. During this phase, in the middle of 1951, both the U.S. and USSR pretended that the war had stabilized and that it would end without the victory of either side.³⁰⁷ During this phase, General Matthew B. Ridgway was appointed following the death of General Walton

³⁰⁵ Warner, "The Korean War," 107.

³⁰⁶ Paul M. Edwards, *The Korean War* (Malabar: Krieger Pub., 1999), 18.

³⁰⁷ Allan Reed Millett, *The War for Korea, 1950-1951: They Came from the North* (Lawrence (Kan.): University Press of Kansas, 2010), 417.

Walter. Once he arrived, he tried to regenerate the Eighth Army and their morale. Moreover, under the command of General Ridgway, on March 27, 1951, the Eighth Army arrived at the 38th Parallel and Seoul was liberated from North Korean occupation by the southern forces. General Ridgway and his troops also formed Line Wyoming and Line Kansas. These were the Main Lines of Resistance for the remainder of the war. Later, in November 1952, the UN Command adopted a new defense policy and determined the territorial rights of states. The transition from mobile warfare to static warfare led to durable defensive positions which resulted in the disarmament of the parties and the pursuit of a cease-fire.³⁰⁸ As previously mentioned, this phase comprised the negotiation process and the hill wars. The first negotiation talks started on June 23 1951 at the request of Adam Malik, who was the Soviet Ambassador to the UN. Truman called this a “cautious overture” and both sides agreed to discuss armistice.³⁰⁹

The U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson decided that UN commander Matthew Ridgway should call for direct negotiations in Korea. This he did on June 29, the Chinese immediately accepted, suggesting negotiations begin at Kaesong, just inside the Communist lines, on July 10.³¹⁰

The Truce talks started on July 10 at Kaesong under the direction of Vice Adm. C. Turner Joy from the UN and Lt. Gen. Nam Il from North Korea.³¹¹ During the negotiation process, the sides discussed the current battle front. Although the U.S.

³⁰⁸ Edwards, *The Korean War*, 18.

³⁰⁹ Clay Blair, *The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003), 934-942.

³¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 941.

³¹¹ Cumings, *The Korean War: A History*, 31.

and UN wanted the 38th parallel to be the border, the Soviets insisted that the border should be on the current battle front.³¹² The main concern of these negotiation was the exchange of prisoners and both sides agreed to free their prisoners.³¹³ However, with Joseph Stalin's death on March 5, 1953, negotiations were postponed until the new leader of the Soviets, Georgi Malenkov called for peace talks to resume. During the negotiation process, the parties agreed to allow the prisoners to choose where they want to go back to.³¹⁴ The parties involved in these negotiations, the United Nations, the Republic of China and North Korea, signed the Armistice on July 27 1953.³¹⁵ The signatories were General Mark Clark and general William Harrison on behalf of the UN, Marshall Peng The-huai on behalf of the Republic of China, and lastly, General Nam Il and Marshall Kim Il-Sung on behalf of North Korea.³¹⁶ Although a ceasefire had been established, the discrepancy between North and South Korea continued until 1955. Effectively, after the signing of the armistice, the Korean war ended in 1955.

Before proceeding to examine the impact of the involvement of Turkey in the Korean War on Turkish-American Relations, it is necessary to discuss the resolution process. The outbreak of the Korean War occurred soon after the

³¹² Stanley Sandler, *The Korean War: No Victors, No Vanquished* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1999), 255.

³¹³ Ibid., 250-258; Cumings, *The Korean War: A History*, 31.

³¹⁴ Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, *Korea: The Unknown War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), 191-198.

³¹⁵ Edwards, *The Korean War*, 18.

³¹⁶ Edwards, *The Korean War: A Historical Dictionary*, 9.

transition from a single party regime to a multi party regime in Turkey. After 27 years of the Republican People's Party (RPP) government, under İsmet İnönü's leadership, the Democratic Party (DP) won the elections on May 22, 1950 and Menderes became Prime Minister. Since the new government was more prone to western ideology, Menderes perceived the Korean War as an opportunity for close relations with the western world. Therefore, on July 18, 1950, in a meeting held in Yalova, the DP government decided to send troops to Korea. They came to a mutual understanding after hours of discussion. The participants were "President Celal Bayar, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, Vice-PM Samet Ağaoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs Fuad Köprülü, Minister of National Defense Refik Şevket İnce, Chief of the Staff General Nuri Yamut"³¹⁷ Although, the Turkish press supported the decision, the opposition party criticized it, because this decision was taken without any discussions in the Grand National Assembly.³¹⁸ Therefore, the views of Turkish society were divided. On the one hand, the Turkish Press stated that the decision was based on the preservation of peace and freedom in the world.³¹⁹ On the other hand, RPP, who were not actually against aiding Korea, opposed the decision specifically because it had been made without the permission of the assembly.³²⁰ Further opposition came from the Association of Peace-lovers, led by Behice Boran.

³¹⁷ Mühlen, "Korean War in the Turkish Press," 529.

³¹⁸ Gavin D. Brockett, "The Legend of 'The Turk' in Korea: Popular Perceptions of the Korean War and Their Importance to a Turkish National Identity," *War & Society* 22, no. 2 (October 2004): 120.

³¹⁹ Nadir Nadi, "Hükümetin Kararı," *Cumhuriyet*, July 27, 1950.

³²⁰ Mühlen, "Korean War in the Turkish Press," 529.

They opposed both the decision to send troops to Korea and the fact that that decision was made without discussing the issue in the Grand National Assembly (GNA). Since their opposition was severe, the government accused the Association of disseminating communist propaganda of communism and destroying the state from the inside. The government began investigating Behice Boran and Adnan Cemgil, who was the general secretary of the association, and this silenced the opposition of the association.³²¹ The DP government rejected all opposition, “defended its position, and insisted that there was no need to ask the Grand National Assembly for permission, as the decision was in line with the UN declaration that the GNA had previously ratified.”³²² Despite considerable opposition, the Turkish government decided to send three companies of Turkish troops to Korea, under the command of General Tahsin Yazıcı, on September 25, 26, 29, 1950, respectively.³²³

4.2.Results

Having discussed the historical background of the Korean War, the final section of this part will examine the consequences and costs of the war. Millions of people lost their lives or were injured during this war. In particular, 33,629 American lives were lost and 103,284 Americans were injured; 59,000 people from the Republic of Korea were killed and 291,000 were injured. From British

³²¹ Ali Naci Karacan, "Bozguncuları Tasfiye Zamanı Gelmiştir." *Milliyet*, August 1, 1950; "Behice Boran Ve Üç Suç Ortağı Tevkif Edildi," *Zafer*, July 30, 1950; Nadir Nadi, "Barışseverler Cemiyeti Hakkında Tahkikat", *Cumhuriyet*, July 30, 1950.

³²² Mühlen, "Korean War in the Turkish Press," 529-530.

³²³ Altan Öymen, *Değişim Yılları* (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2014), 560.

Commonwealth Forces, which included Austria, the United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand, 1,263 people were killed and 291,000 were injured. From Belgium, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Netherlands, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and Turkey a total of around 1,800 people lost their lives and 7,000 were wounded. From the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and from the People's Republic of China around 500,000 people passed away and one million were injured.³²⁴

As for political results, after the Korean War, the political landscape did not change. The division of Korea into South Korea and North Korea was maintained as both sides accepted the 38th parallel as the border. However, the international impact of the war was notable as it led to the consolidation of relations between the superpowers and the states who sent assistance to the war.³²⁵ Stueck also claimed that "the hopes of Turkey, Greece, Australia, and New Zealand went well beyond the U.S. desires, but the smaller states obtained the alliance relationships they sought."³²⁶ Therefore, the war resulted in new alliances. In addition, during the war, the presence of the U.S. troops in Europe increased as did the number of the U.S. troops in Korea.³²⁷ Another conclusion was that neither the U.S. nor the USSR was dominant in the war. Furthermore, according to Stueck,

³²⁴ Ibid. 10.

³²⁵ Stueck, *The Korean War: An International History*, 303.

³²⁶ Ibid.

³²⁷ Sandler, *The Korean War: No Victors, No Vanquished*, 264.

“in Western Europe, the war produced a more ambiguous result than generally has been recognized. While bolstering the tendency in Western Europe toward close association with the United States, the Korean crisis exacerbated fears and tension that eventually served to define the limits of the Atlantic alliance.”³²⁸

Thus, the Korean War had both positive and negative consequences for the Western European states. Additionally, while the war led to a close relationship between Western Europe and the U.S., it also led to fear about the Atlantic alliance. Furthermore, the Korean War also gave rise to the polarization of the parties of the war. On the one hand, there was the communist side, i.e., the Soviet Union, and on the other hand, there was the anti-communist side, i.e., the United States. The world gathered around these two superpowers until the end of the war.

³²⁸ Ibid.

CHAPTER 5

EVALUATION OF INVOLVEMENT OF TURKEY AND THE U.S. IN THE KOREAN WAR

5.1.The Involvement of the U.S. in the Korean War

The previous chapter provided brief information about Korea and a summary of the political dynamics of the Korean War. The reasons for the involvement of the U.S. and Turkey in the war should also be discussed. To begin with the involvement of the U.S., there were three main reasons for the U.S. participation, which were the the desire to prevent communist and Soviet expansionism, to prevent the violation of UN Charter and to protect American prestige and political economy.

The most important reason for the participation of the U.S. was their desire to prevent the spread of communism and the expansion of the Soviets. Truman expressed his concerns by making connections with previous wars. For instance, he asserted that

Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen and twenty years earlier. I felt certain that if South Korea was allowed to fall, Communist leaders would be emboldened to override nations closer to our own shores. If the Communists were permitted to force their way into the Republic of Korea without opposition from the free world, no small nation would have the courage to resist threats and aggression by stronger Communist neighbors. If this was allowed to go

unchallenged it would mean a third world war, just as similar incidents had brought on the second world war.³²⁹

Clearly Truman was deeply concerned about the impact of communism on various states and its spread throughout the world. He further stated that if the U.S. could not prevent the attack, they might all be faced with another world war. Truman said: “in the great world struggle in which the U.S. and other free nations are resisting the determined efforts of the Soviet imperialism to dominate the world, the success of American efforts to help the people of Korea build a free nation is of immeasurable importance.”³³⁰ Therefore, for the freedom of Korea and the rest of the world, the communist expansion should be prevented. The U.S. intended the intention of the U.S. to contribute to world peace through a free world understanding by getting involved in the war. Therefore, the U.S. supported the idea that for the freedom of the world, the participation of the U.S. government in the Korean War and its assistance to South Korean troops was necessary. This was expressed by Truman as “if we are faithful to our ideals and mindful of our interests in establishing peaceful and prosperous conditions in the world, we will not fail to provide the aid which is so essential to Korea at this critical time.”³³¹

Related with the protection of world peace, the U.S. officials declared that the North Korean attack was backed by the Soviet military whose ultimate goal was

³²⁹ Truman, *Memoirs of Harry S. Truman Years of Trial and Hope*, 333.

³³⁰ Harry S. Truman, "Online Collections; The Korean War and Its Origins, Truth about Korea," Harry S. Truman, 1-3, accessed March 6, 2019, <https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/online-collections>.

³³¹ Harry S. Truman, "Online Collections; The Korean War and Its Origins, Truth about Korea," 3.

domination of the whole world. Furthermore, the U.S. officials claimed that “it was only South Korea’s inability to defend itself, which subsequently led to the U.S. military intervention. Truman’s decision marked the beginning of America’s reluctant crusade to ensure worldwide peace and stability through military means.”³³² Thus, through military intervention, the U.S. endeavored to secure peace worldwide. Moreover, Acheson remarked that “it was vital as a symbol of the strength and determination of the west. A feeble response would encourage new aggressive actions elsewhere and demoralize countries adjacent to the Soviet orbit.”³³³ Hence, the strength of the West and South Korea was crucial for resisting against Soviets. Furthermore, prevention of Soviet aggression was also influential on the involvement of the U.S. in the war. Indeed, Halperin expressed that, by using force, the U.S. could prevent the spread of communism in other parts of the world.³³⁴ Truman emphasized the Republicans’ obstruction and propaganda by asserting that “Republican leaders in the party and the Congress are now engaged in a frenzied effort to hide their guilt for obstructing the efforts of the Administration to strengthen the Republic of Korea and the free world. They are brazenly propagating false and distorted accounts of certain aspects of the U.S.- Korean relations.”³³⁵ Also the U.S., aimed to encourage pluralistic democracy in the Third

³³² James I. Matray, "America's Reluctant Crusade: Truman's Commitment of Combat Troops in the Korean War," *The Historian* 42, no. 3 (May 1980): 455.

³³³ Stueck, *The Korean War: An International History*, 43.

³³⁴ Halperin, "The Limiting Process in the Korean War," 16.

³³⁵ Harry S. Truman, "Online Collections; The Korean War and Its Origins, Truth about Korea," 2.

World countries, including Korea.³³⁶ For instance, Park claimed that the attack was a consequence of the aggression of Italy, Japan and Germany during the Second World War. He further asserted that “if the aggression went unchecked, it was thought, the communists would be encouraged to set into motion a series of actions that would eventually force the Americans into a total war with the Russians.”³³⁷ Remarkably, the purpose of the U.S. was to restrict the power of communism in the world, without directly attacking the USSR. Furthermore, Stueck expressed that “to the United States, the Korean conflict became a struggle for credibility, to prove that the liberal democracy of people unused to sustained effort abroad could rise to the challenge of international communism.”³³⁸ Hence, he emphasized the power of liberal democracy. Also, Park asserted that “in the late 1940s, the U.S. knew how important it was to resist the infiltration and diffusion of Communism through domestic stability and the limited acceptance of demands from below.”³³⁹ Furthermore, in order to stand against the expansion of communism, the U.S. adopted economic reforms, because “this was part of the objective of building the material foundations for an anti-Communist stronghold and for victory in the struggle against Communism through the normal development of transplanted

³³⁶ Park, "The 'American Boundary', Provocation, and the Outbreak of the Korean War," 34-36.

³³⁷ Hong-Kyu Park, "American Involvement in the Korean War," *The History Teacher* 16, no. 2 (February 1983): 253.

³³⁸ Stueck, *The Korean War: An International History*, 43.

³³⁹ Park, "The 'American Boundary', Provocation, and the Outbreak of the Korean War," 35.

capitalism.”³⁴⁰ Furthermore, the U.S. Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, asserted that although some members in the meeting in the Blair House, defined the Korean War as a ‘limited intervention’, for the sake of Western freedom, the U.S. government needed to participate in the war.³⁴¹ The fear of communist control in the world led to the involvement of the U.S. in the war. Also, in order to eliminate the communist influence in Korea, the U.S. utilized psychological and economic tools.³⁴² In short, in order to prevent Soviet and communist expansionism, the U.S. agreed to join the Korean War.

Second reason for the U.S. participation in the war was prevention of the violation of the United Nations Charter by a security threat in South Korea. The U.S. officials argued that in order to secure and settle the conflict in a peaceful way, the U.S. involvement was necessary. Truman explained this to Congress on July 19, 1950. He remarked that

This outright breach of the peace, in violation of the UN Charter, created a real and present danger to the security of every nation. This attack was, in addition, a demonstration of contempt for the UN, since it was an attempt to settle, by military aggression, a question which the UN had been working to settle by peaceful means.³⁴³

Thus, he argued that it was the duty of the U.S. to take action to prevent the violation of the UN Charter and the threat to the peace in Korea. The use of military

³⁴⁰ Ibid., 38.

³⁴¹ Haruki, *The Korean War: An International History*, 84.

³⁴² Park, "U.S. Policy Change Towards South Korea in the 1940s and the 1950s," 103.

³⁴³ Harry S. Truman, "Online Collections; The Korean War and Its Origins, Truth about Korea," 14.

force in this attack was especially important given that the purpose of the UN was to solve problems through peaceful means. Moreover,

The attack on the ROK, therefore, was a clear challenge to the basic principles of the UN in Korea. If this challenge had not been met squarely, the effectiveness of the UN would have been all but ended, and the hope of mankind that the United Nations would develop into an institution of world order would have been shattered.³⁴⁴

Therefore, the U.S. emphasized the secure and peaceful world order that was upheld by the UN. Also, the impact of the UN in the world, and specifically in Korea, was of great importance to the U.S. As Truman stated, if the attacks of North Korea on South Korea went unchallenged, confidence in the UN's power to maintain world order would be lost.

According to Bruce Cumings, another reason for the participation of the U.S. in the war was to protect American prestige and the political economy. He stated that "the decision to intervene in force was Acheson's decision, supported by the president but taken before UN, Pentagon, or congressional approval. His reasoning had little to do with Korea's strategic value, and everything to do with American prestige and political economy: "prestige is the shadow cast by power," he once said, and the North Koreans had challenged it; American credibility was therefore at stake."³⁴⁵ Consequently, Acheson's decision to allow the participation of American forces in the war was crucial for the protection of American values. The U.S. government reasoned that if the prestige of America was lost, its power would also

³⁴⁴ Ibid., 15.

³⁴⁵ Cumings, *The Korean War: A History*, 12.

decline. In other words, American prestige and power in the eyes of the world would be lost if they did not participate in the war. Furthermore, the U.S. also wanted to gain influence in the entire Korean peninsula.³⁴⁶ By joining the war, the U.S. wanted to play a crucial role in the formation of an independent and united Korea. Further, if the U.S. government became successful, it would take attention in the world. In addition, the Western European States forced the U.S. to take immediate action in response to the North Korean attack. Hence, the U.S. felt a burden on its shoulders and immediately sent its troops to South Korea. The Dutch Foreign Minister, Dirk Stikker, asserted that if the U.S. did not take action, the results would affect the whole Asian region. Furthermore, the French Foreign Office pointed out that if the U.S. did not assist South Korea, the U.S. would lose its prestige in the eyes of the Western countries, as well as the trust they had placed in the United States. The British press also forced the U.S. to take immediate action. Given these strong reactions by the European states, the U.S. inferred that if it did not take action, the Western states would certainly question their commitment to NATO.³⁴⁷ Thus, one of the reasons for the U.S. involvement in the Korean War was the fear that the European states might lose their confidence in the U.S. This fear led the U.S. to send troops to South Korea. If the U.S. had lost the trust of the European states it would lead to the loss of the commitment of European states to NATO. The U.S. officials also thought that if they lost the trust of the European states, the loss of the prestige

³⁴⁶ Park, "U.S. Policy Change Towards South Korea in the 1940s and the 1950s," 91.

³⁴⁷ Larson, "Bandwagon Images in American Foreign Policy: Myth or Reality?" 97.

of the U.S. would soon follow. Therefore, the U.S. insisted on taking action in the war. To sum up, the reasons for the involvement of the U.S. in the Korean War were the communist threat, the fear of Soviet expansionism, the fear that trust in the UN might be damaged with the disruption of the world order, the desire to protect American prestige and the pressure of the Western European States to take action.

5.2.The Involvement of Turkey in the Korean War

The purpose of this section is to discuss the reasons for the participation of Turkey in the Korean War. Having discussed the reasons, historical background and consequences of the Korean War, it is necessary to examine the participation of Turkey in this war. Turkey's involvement in the war stems from two interrelated reasons, which are to become a NATO member and to find ally to fight against communism and Soviet threat. Before discussing these reasons, it is necessary to examine why Turkey chose to bandwagon to the U.S. This thesis argues that Turkey's participation in the Korean War can be explained by Turkey's decision to bandwagon to the U.S. because of American power and the assistance it could provide.

After the Second World War, two distinct poles emerged, i.e., the Communist and anti-Communist sides. On the communist side, there was the USSR and on the anti-communist side, there was the U.S. From the end of the Second World War to the end of the Cold War, both sides endorsed the ideological approach, established by John Foster Dulles, that is based on the axiom "who is not with me is

against me.”³⁴⁸ In this atmosphere of clearly-drawn divisions, Turkey was obliged to choose a side, and for the sake of its future, Turkey chose to side with the anti-communists. The reason for this choice was expressed by Vali. who asserted that

Turkey’s nearly unique urge to become a member of the European family of nations and to be recognized as such provided an additional impulse to her desire to be tied, by every available device, to the West. Identification with that part of the world and with the civilization represented by it was to guarantee security, development, and acculturation.³⁴⁹

Thus, Turkey chose to be on the side of the anti-communists because of its desire to be a part of the European world, to strengthen its relations with the West, and lastly, to be seen as a member state of the Western World. From the Turkish perspective, aligning with the Western World guaranteed its economic and military development as well as its security. In addition, the Turkish government believed that the assistance of the West would promote the development and reconstruction of their country.

For Turkey, at that time, the West meant the U.S. mainly. Indeed, Turkey was justified in seeing the U.S. as a giant power. The U.S. became the representative of the Western World after the Second World War because of its considerable power, as evidenced by its massive Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and military expenditure. To fully grasp the immense power of the U.S. it is useful to compare the U.S. data with those of France, Germany, the United Kingdom (UK) and the USSR. In order to make accurate comparisons, the International Geary-Khamis dollars were used, as

³⁴⁸ Váli, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey*, 115.

³⁴⁹ Ibid.

this is the most appropriate unit of currency for historical data analysis. This sort of money refers to

An aggregation method in which category “international prices” (reflecting relative category values) and country purchasing power parities (PPPs) (depicting relative country price levels) are estimated simultaneously from a system of linear equations. Has the property of base-country invariance, matrix consistency and transitivity.³⁵⁰

Hence, Geary-Khamis dollars is an international monetary value that can be used for comparison. Based on data obtained from Maddison calculations, the following results were obtained. The Graph 1 shows the GDP variations in the U.S., UK, Germany, France and the USSR between the years of 1870 and 1960.




Figure 1: GDP Levels between the years 1870-1944 (1990 International Geary-Khamis Dollars)³⁵¹

³⁵⁰ OECD Statistics Directorate, OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms- Geary-Khamis Method Definition, , accessed June 14, 2019, <https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=5528>.

³⁵¹ "Groningen Growth and Development Centre," Groningen Growth and Development Centre, accessed June 14, 2019, <http://www.ggdcc.net/>.

Figure 1 shows that between 1870 and 1879 (approximately), all the countries had roughly the same GDP, but from 1879, the US GDP began a gradual rise, which became more dramatic as time went on and the difference in US GDP and the GDP of the other countries became larger and larger. Around 1939, the US GDP shot up dramatically and by 1944, the US GDP was roughly 1.4 million Geary-Khamis Dollars higher than Germany, which had the highest GDP among the other countries at the time by a tiny margin. Hence, as time progressed, the annual GDP of the U.S. increased steadily.




Figure 2: GDP Levels between the years 1945-1944 (1990 International Geary-Khamis Dollars)³⁵²

Table 1: GDP Levels between the years 1945-1960 (1990 International Geary-Khamis Dollars)³⁵³

Time (Years)	France	Germany	UK	US	Total Former	
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³⁵² "Groningen Growth and Development Centre," Groningen Growth and Development Centre, accessed June 14, 2019, <http://www.ggdcc.net/>.

³⁵³ Ibid.

					USSR	World Total
1945	102.154	302.457	347.035	1.644.761	333.656	
1946	155.326	143.381	331.985	1.305.357	332.727	
1947	168.330	161.011	327.044	1.285.697	369.903	
1948	180.611	190.695	337.376	1.334.331	420.555	
1949	205.174	223.178	349.955	1.339.505	465.631	
1950	220.492	265.354	347.850	1.455.916	510.243	5.336.686
1951	234.074	289.679	358.234	1.566.784	512.566	5.651.080
1952	240.287	314.794	357.585	1.625.245	545.792	5.912.796
1953	247.223	341.150	371.646	1.699.970	569.260	6.211.331
1954	259.215	366.584	386.789	1.688.804	596.910	6.423.300
1955	274.098	406.922	400.850	1.808.126	648.027	6.832.919
1956	287.969	436.086	405.825	1.843.455	710.065	7.154.233
1957	305.308	461.071	412.315	1.878.063	724.470	7.427.228
1958	312.966	481.599	411.450	1.859.088	778.840	7.664.818
1959	321.924	516.821	428.107	1.997.061	770.244	8.015.605
1960	344.609	558.482	452.768	2.046.727	843.434	8.434.828

Moreover, according to Table 1 and Figure 2, with the end of the Second World War, the GDP of the USSR increased as well, especially during 1950s. Its GDP became 510 thousand Geary-Khamis dollars, whereas, GDP of the U.S. was 1.455 million Geary-Khamis dollars. At the end of the war, in 1955, GDP of the U.S. and USSR were 1.808 million and 648 thousand Geary-Khamis dollars respectively. The power of the U.S. could be also interpreted from the impact of its GDP on the world total GDP. For instance, in 1955, the GDP of the U.S. was 1.808 million Geary-Khamis dollars and the world total was 6.832 million Geary-Khamis dollars. Hence, one sixth of the total world GDP belonged to the U.S. In short, the variation in GDP levels of these states showed that GDP of the U.S. grew explicitly and the U.S. was a giant power when compared with other states. In a very short period of time, the GDP of the U.S. grew a lot and became the most powerful state in terms of GDP.³⁵⁴

³⁵⁴ Ibid.

Furthermore, military power is another indicator of the immense power of the U.S. One way to understand the military power of states is to analyze their military expenditure. Oxford University researchers analyzed the military expenditure of France, Germany, Russia, the UK and the U.S. The Table 2 shows the change in the military expenditure of these countries between 1940 and 1960 and Graph 3 reflects the values in this table.




Figure 3: Military expenditure between 1940-1960, (in dollars)³⁵⁵

Table 2: Military expenditure between 1940-1960, (in dollars)³⁵⁶

Time (Years)	France	Germany	Russia	United Kingdom	United States
1940	57,5	213,5	61,9	100,2	16,7
1941	5,7	272,7	64,9	106,4	59,4
1942	6,5	322,5	64	117,8	227,2
1943	8	374,7	66,7	128,6	603,2
1944	9,9	414,2	66,1	132,7	710,3
1945	9,8	84,7	68,4	135,3	716,2
1946	8,9		61,8	125,1	318,1
1947	11,7		73,6	42,3	90,9

³⁵⁵ Max Roser and Mohamed Nagdy, "Military Spending," Our World in Data, August 03, 2013, accessed June 14, 2019, <https://ourworldindata.org/military-spending>.

³⁵⁶ Ibid.

1948	5,5		79,2	20,7	66
1949	7,5		84,2	18,9	81,4
1950	8,9		92,4	14,2	86,7
1951	12,2		112	17,9	185,8
1952	16,5		119,8	23,7	261,8
1953	18,9		137,9	24,8	268
1954	18,3		150,2	23,6	229
1955	15,5		155,5	23	213,2
1956	18,6		136,1	23	212,6
1957	18,2		136	21,6	219,4
1958	17,4		145,7	21,5	219,2
1959	17,3		163,9	21,1	221,4
1960	18,3		173,1	21,7	212,6

Data show that in 1940, Germany's military expenditure was the highest, with 213,5 billion dollars, whereas the military expenditure of the U.S. was by far the lowest, just 16 billion dollars. The UK, Russia and France respectively spent \$100,2 billion, \$61,9 billion dollars and \$57,5 billion on their military. However, by the end of the Second World War, these rankings had changed. The military expenditure of the U.S. (716,2 billion dollars) was much higher than that of the other countries, while the military expenditure of Russia (68,4 billion dollars) was the lowest. The military expenditure of the UK, France and Germany was \$135,3 billion, \$97,9 billion dollars, \$84,7 billion dollars, respectively. Therefore, by the end of the war, the U.S. had proven its power not only in economic terms, but also in terms of its military, which can be inferred from its military expenditure. However, in the years leading up to the outbreak of the Cold War, the U.S. military expenditure declined sharply and remained quite low until 1950, when the Korean War began and its military expenditure increased to 86,7 billion dollars. Additionally, given the conflict between the U.S. and Russia, it's unsurprising that Russian military expenditure (92,4 billion dollars) was not far from that of the U.S. However, by the end of the

war in 1955, the U.S. military spending had reached 213,2 billion dollars, far more than any other country, and around nine times greater than the military expenditure of the UK.³⁵⁷ Thus, the U.S. military expenditure provides compelling evidence of the scale of its power and its considerable investment in its military. At the beginning of the Second World War, Germany was the giant power, but by the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the Korean War, the U.S. military had outpaced all others. In sum, the annual GDP and military expenditure of the U.S. provide proof of its immense power and convincing reasons for weak states to bandwagon to the U.S.

Therefore, it is not surprising that Turkey perceived the United States as a source of strength, wealth and power for itself. In fact, according to Vali,

The West had become identified primarily with the transatlantic giant, the United States, the source of apparently unlimited strength and wealth. The opportunity to gain at one stroke military security, prosperity, and national fulfillment induced the otherwise suspicious and calculating Turk to throw himself unreservedly into the arms of his newly discovered, generous, and ingenuous ally and friend.³⁵⁸

Because of these strengths, Turkey wanted the chance to benefit from the U.S. assistance in its military, economy, security and development. As such, Turkey decided to bandwagon to the U.S. This decision clearly supports Walt's claims that weak states prefer to bandwagon to powerful states in order to benefit from the assistance of the powerful state. Further, he expressed that "client states are likely to exaggerate their propensity to bandwagon, in order to persuade their patrons to

³⁵⁷ Ibid.

³⁵⁸ Váli, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey*, 116.

provide more support.”³⁵⁹ Although Turkey had no direct profit to gain from the Korean War or nor any interest in Korea, in order to persuade the U.S. to provide more aid, Turkey sent troops to South Korea, proving its willingness to join the war. In the Turks’ eyes, attending to the war was necessary for NATO membership. If Turkey could be able to persuade the U.S., Turkey would be a member of NATO, because, for Turkey, at that time NATO meant the U.S. mainly. Moreover, Turkey chose the U.S. to bandwagon because of the freedom provided by the U.S. Indeed, “with regard to the U.S., even with liberal values and benign intent, just like any general unipole, it has less structural restrictions in comparison to other states due to the huge difference in capabilities, such that it has the freedom to roam and conduct various grand strategies.”³⁶⁰ Therefore, the U.S. appealed to Turkey because of its liberal principles, and the opportunities that it provided for freedom of movement and much-needed assistance. Hence, Turkey decided to bandwagon to the U.S. In addition, another reason for Turkey to bandwagon to the U.S. was the power and geographic proximity of the U.S. For instance, “the United States was far more powerful than the Soviet Union during the early cold war. Yet geographic proximity and Soviet ambitions made the USSR appear more threatening to Turkey.”³⁶¹ In accordance with Walt’s theory, therefore, from the Turkish perspective, the U.S. was

³⁵⁹ Walt, "Alliance Formation in Southwest Asia: Balancing and Bandwagoning in Cold War Competition," 60.

³⁶⁰ William Kang and Jaechun Kim, "Turco-Iranian Alignment: Balancing or Bandwagoning with the US?" *Journal of International and Area Studies* 23, no. 1 (June 2016): 19.

³⁶¹Walt, "Alliance Formation in Southwest Asia: Balancing and Bandwagoning in Cold War Competition," 71.

more powerful when compared with the USSR. Also, because of the proximity of the USSR to Turkish land and its desire to expand communism, Turkey preferred the U.S. as a bandwagon. With regard to the geographic proximity, Stephen Walt argued that states make alliances in order to balance the threat. He further claims that

In addition to its overall capabilities, the degree to which a state threatens others is also affected by its geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions. [...] If balancing behavior is the norm, therefore, an increase in any of these factors—power, proximity, offensive capabilities, or aggressive intentions—should encourage other states to ally against the most threatening power.³⁶²

Thus, Walt asserts that the geographic proximity of a threat encourages weak states to form alliances in order to balance the threat. Accordingly, this assumption could be applied to the Turkish choice of the U.S. as bandwagon. Indeed, the geographic proximity of the USSR made it more of an immediate threat to the Turkish state, which chose to balance this threat by bandwagoning to the U.S. Ultimately, Turkey favored bandwagoning to the U.S. because of the positive consequences this move would have on Turkish society.

So far, this chapter has focused on why Turkey chose the U.S. to bandwagon. In this context, Turkey's participation in the Korean war can also be examined from the the perspective of bandwagoning theory. As previously mentioned, weak states bandwagon for various reasons, such as to increase their gains and diminish their losses³⁶³, balance more dangerous domestic or foreign

³⁶² Walt, "Alliance Formation in Southwest Asia: Balancing and Bandwagoning in Cold War Competition," 54.

³⁶³ Donnelly, "Realism," 35.

threats³⁶⁴, weak governmental institutions³⁶⁵, to gain profit³⁶⁶, share in the spoils of victory,³⁶⁷ wave of the future³⁶⁸ and absence of potential allies³⁶⁹ can also motivate bandwagoning. All these reasons form the foundation for Turkey's participation in the Korean War. Therefore, this thesis argues that there are two interrelated clusters of reasons for the involvement of Turkey in the war: the desire for membership in NATO and to find an ally to fight against the communist and Soviet threat.

The first reason for Turkey's participation in the war was its desire for membership to NATO. Brown argued this point by stating that "Turkey sent troops to Korea in order to achieve one basic goal: to pave the way for Turkey to be accepted as a member of NATO."³⁷⁰ Furthermore, the Korean War was an opportunity for Turkey to change its image in the western world and achieve NATO membership.³⁷¹ Hence the aim of Turkey by participating in the Korean War, was to increase its gain³⁷² according to bandwagoning theory. Turkey's gain was NATO membership as a result of its involvement in the war. Indeed, Turkish officials

³⁶⁴ Scweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," 74.

³⁶⁵ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 218.

³⁶⁶ Ibid., 79.

³⁶⁷ Ibid., 79.

³⁶⁸ Jerwis, "Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behavior," 33.

³⁶⁹ Walt, "Balancing and Bandwagoning," 173.

³⁷⁰ Brown, "The One Coalition They Craved to Join: Turkey in the Korean War," 97.

³⁷¹ Mühlen, "Korean War in the Turkish Press," 526; Brockett, "The Legend of 'The Turk' in Korea: Popular Perceptions of the Korean War and Their Importance to a Turkish National Identity," 111.

³⁷² Donnelly, "Realism," 35.

perceived both NATO membership and close ties with the western world to be rewards for its participation in the war. In addition, the government of Turkey felt that actively participating in the war would provide security to the country since it would have the support of NATO and close relations with the western world. By participating in the war, Turkey was able to show its willingness for NATO membership and bravery to the world. Menderes' government recognized that participating in the Korean War would pave the way for membership in NATO.³⁷³ This idea was also endorsed by the American Senator, Harry Cain, who held "the belief that participating in the UN police action could enhance Turkey's prospects for NATO membership."³⁷⁴ In addition, in a statement to the press, Cain remarked that "I can say we are going to be much more sympathetic in helping those who helped most in Korea. We went all of our friends tied together as free nations militarily, economically and politically."³⁷⁵ These sentences explicitly show that sending troops to South Korea would change the U.S. government's perspective on Turkey's NATO membership. Therefore, with the goal of NATO membership in mind, Turkey joined the Korean War and helped South Korea resist the North Korean attack. Moreover, Mr. Cain argued that the war was not against America, but against the United Nations. If free states did not participate in the Korean War, the UN would collapse and each state would need to take care of themselves. If the UN

³⁷³ Yılmaz, "Turkey's Quest for NATO Membership: The Institutionalization of the Turkish-American Alliance," 490.

³⁷⁴ Brown, "The One Coalition They Craved to Join: Turkey in the Korean War," 103.

³⁷⁵ FRUS, *The Near East, South Asia, and Africa*, Vol V, (1950), 1286.

could not take control of the region, a third world war would break out, ushering in the dawn of a dark age. In addition, he mentioned that it would be easier for Turkey to become one of the member states of NATO if it sent its troops to Korea.³⁷⁶ In sum, the possibility of NATO membership was another of Turkey's motivations for joining the war.

In close relation with the first goal of becoming a NATO member, the second reason for Turkey's participation in the war was to find an ally to fight against communism and Soviet threat. Before delving into this discussion, it is necessary to evaluate the relations between Turkey and the West.

This section will first examine the image of Turkey in the eyes of the Westerners. A negative image of Turkey had been formed due to the neutral position Turkey had taken during the Second World War. Because of its neutrality, Turkey was perceived as an enemy and as an unreliable state by each side. This view was also expressed in the article by Jim Bell in Time magazine:

Turkey emerged from World War II lonely and friendless. It had played the hard-to-get neutral, declaring war on Nazi Germany only at the last moment, in February 1945, in time to qualify for UN membership. It was cut from the Balkans and the Arab World too, and isolated from Islam. No one loved Turks. The Turks loved no one.³⁷⁷

Jim Bell also remarked that Turkey stood alone after the Second World War because of its preferences.³⁷⁸ In order to have close relations with the Western states, Turkey need to change this negative image. Accordingly, "[T]he image question of Turkey

³⁷⁶ "Mr. Cain Dedi Ki: Türkiye Kore'ye Asker Göndermeli," *Ulus*, July 26, 1950.

³⁷⁷ Jim Bell, "Turkey: Strategic and Scrappy," *Time*, July 26, 1951.

³⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

on the international arena was a real concern for the Turkish politicians as it presented a major obstacle toward a closer alliance with the Western powers.”³⁷⁹ Thus, Turkey desired to change its image in the western world.

In order to change its image, the most crucial step that Turkey took was its decision about participating in the Korean War. Indeed, the Korean War gave Turkey the opportunity to change its image in the West. For instance, “Turkish national identity was heavily influenced by public perceptions of Turkey’s place in the world, and the Korean War provided a unique opportunity for Turkey to resolve the difficulties it had been encountering in this regard.”³⁸⁰ In addition to this view, it was argued that the close relations with the Western society would result in greater economy, military and diplomacy in Turkey.³⁸¹

Turkey wanted to end this loneliness because of its security concerns. Indeed, because of its neutral attitude during the Second World War, Turkey had no ally and it perceived this loneliness as a threat to its security.³⁸² In order to end its isolation, Turkey tried to find an ally during the Cold War. During this period, there were only two sides which were communist and anti-communist poles.

³⁷⁹ Mühlen, "Korean War in the Turkish Press," 527.

³⁸⁰ Brockett, "The Legend of 'The Turk' in Korea: Popular Perceptions of the Korean War and Their Importance to a Turkish National Identity," 111.

³⁸¹ Lippe, "Forgotten Brigade of the Forgotten War: Turkey's Participation in the Korean War," 94.

³⁸² Yılmaz, "Turkey's Quest for NATO Membership: The Institutionalization of the Turkish-American Alliance," 484.

In this equation, Turkey need to choose one side in the absence of potential allies.³⁸³ Turkey perceived the U.S. more powerful than Soviets and perceived Soviets as a threat. The Soviet threat perception formed in the eyes of Turkey after the Second World War. For instance,

Turkey's fears of Soviet intentions increased throughout World War II, as the Soviets continued to press Turkey to enter the fighting in the Balkans regardless of the destruction it might cause to Turkey. Moreover, the USSR demanded that American and British assistance to Turkey stop if Turkey remained neutral.³⁸⁴

Thus, the Turkish perception of Soviets as a threat started during the Second World War as explained in the third chapter of this thesis.

Moreover, Turks were afraid that if the Soviets had not been stopped in Korea, Turkey might have been the next target. It was argued that if the Soviets' actions in Korea were not challenged, they would set their sights on Turkey in the future. In defense of Turkish involvement in the war, Namık Arğuç, who was the commander of the Second Turkish Brigade in Korea, declared that

While we fight here together with the UN troops, we feel that we are defending our own country. [...] Some people in our country ask us why we have been fighting here. Our answer is as such: the communist threat is worldwide; in order to crush this threat, we have to fulfill our duty.³⁸⁵

Thus, since Turkey perceived the spread of communism as a threat, and was afraid that it would gain a foothold in Korea, and later affect Turkey, the Turkish government sent troops to Korea.

³⁸³ Walt, "Balancing and Bandwagoning," 173.

³⁸⁴ Brown, "The One Coalition They Craved to Join: Turkey in the Korean War," 98.

³⁸⁵ Brown, "The One Coalition They Craved to Join: Turkey in the Korean War," 97.

As Turkey did not want domination by a powerful actor from which it perceived threat, it sought to bandwagon to another powerful actor. In fact, according to Brown, “the only hope the Turks had was to ally with a power strong enough to deter the Soviets; should deterrence fail, the ally would need sufficient armed forces to prevent the Soviets from taking over the country.”³⁸⁶ Hence, Turkey wanted to escape from the Soviets and to find ally with a force strong enough to resist the Soviets. The ally would be the Western state because of its military power to resist against Soviets and economic power to support Turkish economy. Due to this perception, Turkey tried to ally with the Western bloc, especially with the U.S.³⁸⁷ As stated at the beginning of this chapter, West mainly meant the U.S. for Turkey, therefore, Turkey tried to have close ties with the U.S. Indeed, Turkey tried to make alliance with the U.S. because, Turkish officials believed that with the support of the U.S., they would be able eliminate the Soviet threat. Indeed, as a weak state, Turkey was defenseless and lacking in terms of its economy and military. Therefore, Turkey needed to ally with one side to strengthen itself and benefit from this alliance.³⁸⁸ Indeed, the Turkish government believed that the U.S. was the only power who could stand against the Soviet threat and protect Turkey. Furthermore, by joining the war, the Turkish government clearly expressed that Turkey did not want to live under communist ideals or Soviet oppression. They

³⁸⁶ Ibid.

³⁸⁷ Brockett, "The Legend of 'The Turk' in Korea: Popular Perceptions of the Korean War and Their Importance to a Turkish National Identity," 112.

³⁸⁸ Scweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," 74.

sought an alliance with a power that could assist them in standing against this threat, and the U.S. had proven that it was such a power. Furthermore, the West was representing the economic power and Turkey wanted to be part of this by participating in the Korean War. Therefore, the Turkish government perceived Western aid as an opportunity for the recovery of its economic instability.

In particular, the Democrat Party places special emphasis on the benefits that would accrue from close ties with the West. But to increase aid, the Turks had to prove their value to the West. In 1950, the Democrat Party government presented participation in Korea as the way to insure assistance from the West.³⁸⁹

For the assistance in terms of economic development, Turkey wanted to be closer to the West. When these developments were analyzed under bandwagoning theory, the desire of Turkey to share in any victory³⁹⁰ lead Turkey to ally with the West. Turkish officials had identified the West as the only hope for the survival of an independent Turkish society. They believed that an alliance with the West, the dominant power of the time, would land them squarely on the winning side. With such a victory in hand, the Turks believed they would be able to attain what they have always desired, specifically improved economy, military and NATO membership.

Given the Soviet threat, concern for the future³⁹¹ was at the forefront of Turkey's decision to join the war. According to the bandwagoning theory, weak states also choose to bandwagon out of concern for their future. Indeed, such

³⁸⁹ Ibid.

³⁹⁰ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 79.

³⁹¹ Jerwis, "Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behavior," 33.

concerns play a crucial role in the decisions that weak states make, Turkey included. The looming Soviet and communist threat caused the Turks to be concerned for their future. They did not want to be dominated by communism, and participating in the war on the side of the U.S. guaranteed a secure and prosperous future for Turkey. Thus, for the sake of its survival as an anti-communist state, Turkey chose to attend the war on the side of the U.S. by bandwagoning to it. In short, finding ally to fight against communist and Soviet threat was the second reason for the involvement of Turkey in the Korean War.

In sum, the possible reasons for the involvement of Turkey in the Korean War were the desire of the Turkish government to be a member state of NATO and to find an ally in order to fight against communism and Soviet threat.

CHAPTER 6

THE IMPACT OF THE INVOLVEMENT OF TURKEY IN THE KOREAN WAR ON TURKISH AMERICAN RELATIONS

There were various consequences of the Korean War for Turkish-American relations. For the United States, the war was crucial in terms of the lessons learned from their failures and victories. Winston Churchill expressed that the war was important because it led to the rearming of the U.S. Additionally, as a result of the war, the hostile actions of the Soviet Union and spread of communism were prevented to some degree with the efforts of the United Nations.³⁹² For the Turkish state, the war caused a duality in Turkish perceptions of the U.S. For instance, “on the one hand the Turks admired America’s wealth and technological sophistication, but on the other they resented American attitudes of superiority and condescension.”³⁹³ Thus, the Turkish people wanted to have close relations with the U.S., due to their considerable power and resources, but at the same time, they felt uncomfortable about the perceived American superiority. Furthermore, with the integration of the Turkish military and the military of the western states, including

³⁹² Edwards, *The Korean War: A Historical Dictionary*, 11.

³⁹³ Lippe, "Forgotten Brigade of the Forgotten War: Turkey's Participation in the Korean War," 100.

the U.S., the Turkish military gained strength. This led to a change in the position of the Turkish military. Throughout the 1950s, its military was perceived as one of the political actors in Turkish society. The importance of the military increased with the assistance and projects of the U.S. military.³⁹⁴ Additionally, the Korean War led to a change in Western perceptions of Turkey's strategic value. The Turkish government had been trying to get Western assistance. One of the reasons for Turkey's participation to the war was to prove its strategic value to Western society. By participating, Turkish troops could be able show their braveness and power. Due to these achievements, the West came to realize its strategic value. With these more positive impressions of Turkey, European and the U.S. assistance to and investments in Turkey increased.

In addition to these positive consequences, Turkey also faced negative consequences as a result of participating in the Korean War. For instance, the Turkish government spent its limited resources on the military and its troops in order to meet the strategic needs of NATO. Also, the Turkish opponents of the war highlighted the big difference in Turkey's wealth and in the Americans' wealth.³⁹⁵

Turkish soldiers in Korea were paid five dollars per month, while officers received 25 dollars. The similarities between the Koreans and Turks were obvious to the Turkish soldiers, who saw the contrast between the poverty of Korea and Turkey and the wealth and resources of the Americans in Korea.³⁹⁶

³⁹⁴ Ibid.

³⁹⁵ Ibid., 101.

³⁹⁶ John M. Vander Lippe, "Forgotten Brigade of the Forgotten War: Turkey's Participation in the Korean War," *Middle Eastern Studies* 36, no. 1 (2000): 99.

Thus, Turkish society complained about the difference in wealth between the U.S. and Turkish troops. All in all, the various consequences of the Korean War were felt by many and the war shaped the relationship between the West and Turkey, specifically. The following section will consider the impact of the involvement of Turkey in the Korean War on Turkish-American Relations.

6.1.Turkey's War Effort and Its Repercussions

Having discussed the reasons for Turkey's bandwagoning to the U.S., this section will focus on how the involvement of Turkey in the Korean War affected bilateral relations. This thesis argues that the impact Turkey's involvement in the Korean War on Turkish-American relations during the Korean War can be explained within the bandwagoning theoretical framework. Within this framework, the Korean War affected bilateral relations mainly in two domains. Since the war contributed to the formation of alliance ties between two countries, its main repercussions were felt in the domains of security and economy. The following part will explain these factors respectively.

6.1.1. Security Domain

To start with the security domain, with the attendance of Turkey to the war, the bilateral relations were affected by four main factors. These were military aid, membership to the UNSC, prevention of communism and Soviet threat and lastly, the membership to NATO.

Military relations will first be examined, followed by other issues. With the participation of Turkey in the Korean War, the military relations evolved to reflect the U.S. dominance. The U.S. became responsible for the provision of military equipment, training of the Turkish military and transportation. Hence, under the framework of bandwagoning theory, dominance of the U.S. in terms of military aid could be matched with the gains and diminish the losses³⁹⁷ reasoning. Through military aid in terms of the military equipment support, military training and transportation of Turkish troops, Turkey tried to develop its military and increase its gain. For the sake of these gains, Turkey bandwagoned to the U.S. and accepted the dominance of it. With respect to American dominance, during the Korean War, the U.S. was the dominant power to which the UN had granted the authority to lead the other states. In fact, the Supreme Military Command of the United Nations had given the United States full control over actions to be taken during the Korean War. The UN stated that the Chief of Staff of the United States was responsible for military assistance.³⁹⁸ Hence, the U.S. was in charge and responsible for the final decisions related to the war. Due to this authorization, the Turkish military was under the command of the U.S. military. The UN Command even authorized General MacArthur to decide on the employment of Turkish troops.³⁹⁹ Thus, the UN had instructed Turkish commanders to consult the U.S. on any decisions

³⁹⁷ Donnelly, "Realism," 35.

³⁹⁸ Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı Arşivi (ATASE): ATASE, Kore Harbi Kataloğu, Kutu: 2, Gömlek:41, Belge: 41-2, 26 September 1950.

³⁹⁹ ATASE, Kore Harbi Kataloğu, 4/47/47-2, 27 September 1950.

regarding Turkish troops. Moreover, the U.S. was also responsible for the spending, equipment and education of the Turkish military and the military of all states that sent aid to South Korea. The U.N. had asserted that all troops sent to aid South Korea must provide their own military equipment using their own resources. If they could not, they needed to equip themselves with American-type weapons.⁴⁰⁰ In addition, the UN affirmed that if the weapons could not be brought, these weapons could be obtained using the U.S. resources by way of the U.N.⁴⁰¹ Turkey obtained American-type weapons and received training with these weapons.⁴⁰² Additionally, not only the weapons, but also the components of the weapons needed to be American, because the U.S. was responsible for maintaining them. Thus, all military equipment was under the control of the U.S. and sales of American-type weapons contributed to the U.S. economy. Moreover, in addition to the weapons, military training was also controlled by the U.S. officials. For instance, the U.S. specialists scheduled the military education program of Turkish soldiers, which was accepted by Turkish officials. In addition, this education was mostly given by American specialists and the program was prepared based on American aid.⁴⁰³ For instance, Turkey followed a policy which gave a big role to the U.S. assistance. The Turkish government had absolute confidence in the ability of the U.S. to develop and strengthen the Turkish military. Furthermore, the amount of munition, material and

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁰¹ ATASE, Kore Harbi Kataloğu, 2/41/41-4, 26 September 1950.

⁴⁰² ATASE, Kore Harbi Kataloğu, 3/127/127-1, 13 September 1950.

⁴⁰³ ATASE, Kore Harbi Kataloğu, 1/22/22-23, 26 August 1950.

fuel oil to be used by artillery battalions were determined by the U.S.⁴⁰⁴ Thus, the U.S. was the dominant power and had full control during the Korean War. The U.S. dominance in the Turkish-American relations can be illustrated briefly by the use of American ships for the transportation of soldiers from Turkey to Korea. For instance, the III. Battalion and the brigade depot company anti-tank team boarded the MAKRAY ship. The second group was the II. Battalion of the regiment. This group transported by the American ship named W.G. HAAN. The III. Battalion moved to the camp with the American transport vessel MAKRAY.⁴⁰⁵ Therefore, Turkey was even dependent on the U.S. for transportation. Also, Turkey acted under the rules of the U.S. In other words, the U.S. made decisions and Turkey carried them out. Additionally, the U.S. officials also arranged the use of American troopships in emergency situations. In the event that an emergency arose on any of the ships, including the Haan, Private Johnson and Makray ships, American troopships would provide transportation. Indeed, “the course of navigation and battle with the American ships and course of action under the emergency case will be determined at the end of the contact with the senior commander of the American troopship on 25/9/1950.”⁴⁰⁶ Therefore, the U.S. regulated all the issues related with the transportation of the Turkish troops. Additionally,

During the Cold War, the US perceived Turkey as a barrier against the Soviet Union and perhaps more importantly, as a military base in the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean. Thus, supporting and modernizing the Turkish

⁴⁰⁴ ATASE, Kore Harbi Kataloğu, 1/22/22-24, 26 August 1950.

⁴⁰⁵ ATASE, Kore Harbi Kataloğu, 3/127/127-3,4, 13 September 1950.

⁴⁰⁶ ATASE, Kore Harbi Kataloğu, 2/5/5-1, 22 September 1950.

army and establishing military and intelligence facilities in Turkish territory were the major methods by which the US achieved its global aims in the region.⁴⁰⁷

Accordingly, the relations between the U.S. and Turkey were based on the U.S. goal in the eastern region of diminishing the power of the USSR. In addition to this, the threat of Soviet expansion led the U.S. to strengthen its relations with Turkey because of its geographic importance. Through aiding the development of the Turkish military, the U.S. aspired to limit Soviet expansion. For the sake of the protection of Turkey, the U.S. arranged the education, material support and transportation of Turkish troops. Ultimately, the relationship between Turkey and the U.S. during the war reflected the fact that in order to prevent Soviet expansion, the U.S. followed a helpful policy towards Turkey. Indeed, the U.S. aided the Turkish military, and in return, Turkey stood with the U.S. against the Soviets. More importantly, the U.S. assisted the Turkish military even before Turkey became a member of NATO. Therefore, positive bilateral relations were crucial for both sides. In short, in this bilateral relationship, the U.S. was the dominant power that decided the rules and Turkey was the weak power that acted in accordance with these rules.

Before discussing the second issue that have an impact on bilateral relations, which is the desire of Turkey for membership to UNSC, it is necessary to first discuss the loyalty of Turkey to the U.S. Turkey tried to show its allegiance to the U.S. through loyalty to the UN. For instance, the Prime Minister of Turkey, Adnan

⁴⁰⁷ Ayşe Ömür Atmaca, *Old Game In A New World: Turkey and The United States From Critical Perspective*, PhD diss., Middle East Technical University, 2011 (Ankara, 2011), 27.

Menderes, declared that Turkey was loyal to the UN and paid attention to what it said. He expressed this during an interview in which he said that

Turkey has always declared its commitment to the UN Charter. In the opinion of our government, the strongest collateral of the preservation of the whole peace is the fulfillment of the faithfulness of the condition. For this reason, we consider it obligatory for every state member of the United Nations to place its obligations in the executive position without hesitation.⁴⁰⁸

The UN was also the political link between Turkey and the U.S. Therefore, Turkey put special emphasis on UN decisions about the war. As stated before, the UN authorized the U.S. to decide on every step related to the Korean War, and the U.S. played a crucial role in the action taken by UN. Therefore, Turkey perceived UN's call to war as obligatory not only for the sake of peace and freedom in the world, but also for the sake of its relations with the U.S. Furthermore, Menderes emphasized their focus on peace by stating that "as solidarity exists among the United Nations members, there should be no doubt that the right and peace will prevail."⁴⁰⁹ Menderes also highlighted that for the preservation of unity, every member state needed to aid South Korea. In addition, since Turkey wanted to show its commitment to the U.S., the commanding state according to UN directives, Turkish officials refrained from acting against the U.S. decisions. By participating in the war and taking the side of the U.S., Turkey showed its loyalty to the U.S. and conveyed their dependence on the U.S. and their agreement with them on this issue.

⁴⁰⁸ Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi (BCA), BCA, 30-1-0-0 / 5 - 26 – 29, 1954.

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid.

It is also necessary to examine the formation of common foreign policies of both states with the participation of Turkey in the war. The U.S. welcomed the participation of Turkey in the war. This was stated in the speech in WOR radio in New York by Mr. Fulton Lewis, who was American radio broadcaster. He stated that

When communists were trying to dominate Turkey with Greece, we have provided weapons to Turkey. America really prevented the communist threat in Eastern Europe. It was a great honor for us to be appreciated due to these aids. In today's case, and especially in these conditions, the offer by Turkey to provide assistance to South Korea is extremely refreshing.⁴¹⁰

Therefore, with these words, the U.S. gave the message that they would aid Turkey when Turkey was helpless. Additionally, the participation of Turkey in the Korean War led to a change in their opinions about each other. Turkey's acceptance of aid strengthened its relations with the U.S. and Turkey felt obliged to send troops to Korea, because America had reminded them of the aid it had provided in the past. Therefore, the U.S. call for assistance in the war was perceived as an obligation by Turkish officials and perhaps a chance to repay the U.S. for the aid they had received.⁴¹¹ In other words, Turkey felt indebted to the U.S. for its assistance, and this feeling led to cordial relations between these nations. Furthermore, the U.S. government expressed its support of Turkey's participation in the war because it was mutually beneficial. For instance,

The Prime Minister referred to official reports made him by Provincial Governors that Turkish decision to send troops to Korea had met with wide enthusiastic support. [...] He concluded: "Korean War has opened new era, one in which we must strive harder and work faster towards common

⁴¹⁰ BCA, 30-1-0-0 / 102 - 630 – 8, 5 August 1950.

⁴¹¹ Ibid.

objectives. We will not be Utopians but apply ourselves to practice realities.⁴¹²

This quotation illustrates the relations between Turkey and the U.S. It clearly emphasizes that the decision of Turkey to participate in the war on the side of the U.S. resulted in a new phase in Turkish-American relations. Both states sought common goals and developed their cooperation. Accordingly, the relations between Turkey and the U.S. during the war led to the development of their common aims and strengthened their relations. The pursuit of their common objectives was beneficial for both sides. Moreover, the Prime Minister of Turkey, Adnan Menderes affirmed that “it is no longer important to remain neutral in world politics; I stated that the countries are moving towards blocking, and that we should be on the side of the countries governed by the democratic regime, not the iron curtain, according to the practice of the state policy since Atatürk.”⁴¹³ Thus, Menderes described the regime of the Soviet Union as an iron curtain and the regime of the U.S. as democratic, which was in line with the Turkish government’s ideologies. In addition, he emphasized that it was crucial for Turkey to take a side because being neutral would bring only adverse outcomes. Menderes expressed that since being neutral would not bring positive consequences, the Turkish government did not want to be neutral anymore. He also asserted that the concern of Turkish officials was to align with the Western Bloc as this would be beneficial to Turkish society. This idea was also supported by İsmet İnönü, who was the former president. For instance,

⁴¹² FRUS, *The Near East, South Asia, and Africa*, Vol V, (1950), 1288-1289.

⁴¹³ Taşkın Tuna, *Adnan Menderes’in Günlüğü* (Şule Yayınları, 2002), 113.

İsmet İnönü asserted that “he was in favor of joining NATO and Turkish participation in the ranks of the Western Bloc would be more beneficial and more appropriate for the interests of the country.”⁴¹⁴ Therefore, aligning with the western bloc was not only supported by the ruling Turkish government, but also by the opposition. However, although the Turkish government and the U.S. government supported Turkish participation in the Korean War, Turkish society did not agree on this issue. This could be deduced from the farewell ceremony of soldiers all across the country. While in some regions, the Turkish public supported Turkey’s participation in the war, in other regions this decision was not supported by society.⁴¹⁵

When we move to evaluation of the UNSC membership, Turkey wanted to be chosen by the UN as a member of the Security Council from the Middle East. Thus, in order to persuade the UN, and the U.S. in particular, Turkey sent troops to South Korea and made an effort to inspire the member states of the UN. This membership could also be explained as increasing gain⁴¹⁶ and gaining profit⁴¹⁷, under the framework of bandwagoning theory. According to the Turkish government’s perspective, for the sake of being a member state of the UNSC, Turkey wanted to have close relations with the U.S. through attending the Korean

⁴¹⁴ Ibid., 101.

⁴¹⁵ ATASE, Kore Harbi Kataloğu, 3/127/127-2,3, 18-21 September 1950.

⁴¹⁶ Donnelly, “Realism,” 35.

⁴¹⁷ Walt, *The Origins of Alliance*, 218.

War. The New York News Report presented the willingness of Turkey for membership:

While the United Nations is observing its timid position in the face of the Korean issue, the United Nations considers the member elected to the Security Council from the Middle East. Turkey has started to an aggressive and open campaign to enter the Congress. For Middle East, Turkey indicates that Council membership that is generally given to Arab States should not be restricted by only members of Arab League. At the same time, he asserts that it is the strongest state in the Middle East and inspires that it is worthy of being elected by the General Assembly. The rest of the Arab League estimates that membership will hit Lebanon, Iraq or Syria. In today's crisis confrontation, it would be more accurate for Arabs, in the face of changing and hesitant situation, to give the Council membership to Turkey, which is under the democratic government administration.⁴¹⁸

Therefore, the desire for membership in the UN Security Council from the Middle East was one of the reasons for which Turkey joined the Korean War. The report emphasized that Turkey followed an aggressive and open campaign for membership. In addition to this, Turkey wanted to prove its power and determination for membership. As a consequence, Turkey decided to join the Korean War. According to the report, the U.S. preferred to elect Turkey for membership because of its democratic government. Hence, by joining the war, Turkey convinced both the U.S. and UN. Furthermore, while the Arab States were hesitant to take an active role in the Korean War, Turkey demonstrated to the U.S. and the UN its willingness to do so in order to gain Security Council membership. In short, the impact of Turkish involvement in the Korean War was the membership of Turkey to UNSC through convincing the U.S. government.

⁴¹⁸ BCA, 30-1-0-0 / 102 - 630 – 8, 5 August 1950.

The third repercussion of the Korean War was to defeat communist threat.⁴¹⁹ With the involvement of Turkey in the war, Turkey and the U.S. formed close ties in order to fight against communism and the Soviet threat. This could be associated with the will for balancing dangerous foreign threat,⁴²⁰ and the wave of future,⁴²¹ reasoning of bandwagoning of weak states. In order to prevent communist threat and its influence in Turkey, Turkey tried to balance communist threat by forming alliance with the U.S. Related with the wave of future, Turkey had concerns about its future, because of the will of Soviets to control Turkey, as stated before. Hence, in order to eliminate this possibility, Turkey attended the war on the side of the U.S. to get its support and to have a powerful ally against communist threat. Moreover, from the Turkish government's perspective, communism was equivalent to rape. For instance, Menderes stated that "it is the duty of all member states to accept the request for assistance from any country that has been raped. [...] It is evident that it is important and promising to maintain common peace and prevent new encroachments."⁴²² Therefore, Menderes recognized that communism was a common enemy and highlighted the fact that member states of the UN should meet on common ground and stand against communist attacks. At this stage, Turkey and America, once more, had the same opinion about communism, namely that it was an

⁴¹⁹ Aydın Menderes and Taha Akyol, *Demokrasiden Darbeye: Babam Adnan Menderes* (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2011), 115.

⁴²⁰ Scweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," 74.

⁴²¹ Jerwis, "Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behavior," 33.

⁴²² BCA, 30-1-0-0 / 5 - 26 – 29, 1954.

opponent to be defeated. Additionally, both states acted in unison during the Korean War to eliminate the communist threat. In addition to this, the National Development Party also asserted that the participation of Turkey in the war on the side of the U.S. was the proper course of action according to the UN Agreement.⁴²³ Furthermore, the participation of Turkey in the war was perceived as the proper course of action by the U.S. as well. Additionally, the U.S. officials remarked that “Turkey's military aid proposal is very meaningful. Because this small country, since the address of the world war, sits in the mouth of the Soviet barrel. Russia and its supporters are under constant force.”⁴²⁴ Therefore, the U.S. government supported Turkey's decision to join the war and perceived Turkey as a barrier to Russian expansion. Moreover, the U.S. and Turkey relied on each other to prevent Soviet mobilization and their relationship was based on trust and pursuit of a common goal, the prevention of communist and Soviet expansion. Indeed, having a common enemy was one reason for their affiliation and this strengthened Turkish-American relations. The Turks also denounced communism. For instance, “it was a great pleasure for the Turkish Armed Forces to go to Korea with the US Navy where there is the ideology which attempts to drag humanity into captivity for the satisfaction of unconscious ambitions.”⁴²⁵ The ideology referenced in this quote was communism. Turkish officials described communism as despicable and saw it as the cause of the enslavement of humanity. In addition, the Turkish government

⁴²³ BCA, 30-1-0-0 / 17 - 98 – 49, 21 August 1950.

⁴²⁴ BCA, 30-1-0-0 / 102 - 630 – 8, 5 August 1950.

⁴²⁵ ATASE, Kore Harbi Kataloğu, 4/40/40-2, 1950.

expressed that communism was hostile not only towards the western bloc, but also towards the freedom of humanity. The communist threat brought Turkey and the U.S. closer to each other. During the war, their foreign policies towards each other were geared towards intensifying their stance against communism. In fact, political relations between Turkey and America were heavily influenced by their common goal of defeating communism. Also, Turkish officials perceived the defeat of communism as a matter of national honor and dignity. This was articulated as:

Are you able to grasp the honor and responsibility of this war movement that you will enter at the other end of the world, tens of thousands of kilometers from our homeland? You're going to destroy the devil, the devil of communism, who tries to drag humanity into captivity by using mental motives. You're going to show the sample of heroism. [...] It is the symbol of national honor and dignity.⁴²⁶

Hence, the Turkish government linked participation in the war for the sake of destroying communism with national honor and valor. Accordingly, one of the main reasons for Turkish involvement in the war was to defeat communism and liberate the South Koreans. The Turkish government perceived communism as a barrier to freedom and peace and highlighted that getting involved in the war would be a great honor for Turkey. Moreover, although Korea was geographically very distant from Turkey, there was no hesitation on the part of the Turks to join the war because the Turkish government wanted to see communism eradicated from the world. In pursuit of this goal, the Turkish government prioritized their relations with the U.S. and became closer to the U.S. Ultimately, the communist threat led to close relations between the U.S. and Turkey, with the participation of Turkey in the Korean War.

⁴²⁶ ATASE, Kore Harbi Kataloğu, 4/40/40-6, 1950.

Both states acted together in order to defeat the communist threat and to strengthen their relations with the participation of Turkey in the Korean War.

Membership in NATO is the last repercussion of the Korean War. Turkey used its participation in the Korean War as a means of changing the U.S. government's decision about its NATO membership. This membership could be also associated with the desire to increase gain⁴²⁷ and gaining profit⁴²⁸ reasoning under the framework of bandwagoning theory. For the sake of NATO membership, Turkey attended the Korean War.⁴²⁹ By participating in the war, Turkey persuaded the U.S. for its membership to NATO. The membership was the gain and profit for Turkey and for these positive consequences, Turkey was determined to bandwagon to the U.S. Moreover, Harris asserted that "the Menderes government recognized that the Korean gambit offered the opportunity it was seeking to force the gates of NATO."⁴³⁰ Thus, the Turkish government understood the fact that their participation in the Korean War was the key to membership in NATO. Turkey also wanted to show its power and courage to the Western World in an effort to persuade them. The

⁴²⁷ Donnelly, "Realism," 35.

⁴²⁸ Walt, *Origins of Alliance*, 218.

⁴²⁹ Harris, *Troubled Alliance Turkish American Problems in historical perspective, 1945-1971*, 39-40.; Brockett, "The Legend of 'The Turk' in Korea: Popular Perceptions of the Korean War and Their Importance to a Turkish National Identity," 111.; John Vanderlippe, "Forgotten Brigade of the Forgotten War: Turkey's Participation in the Korean War," *Middle Eastern Studies* 36, no. 1 (2000): 92-102.; Fusun Türkmen, "Turkey and the Korean War," *Turkish Studies* 3, no. 2 (Autumn 2002): 161-180.; Hüseyin Bağcı, "Türkiye'nin NATO Üyeliğini Hızlandıran İki Önemli Faktör: Kore Savaşı ve ABD Büyükelçisi George Mc Ghee," *ODTÜ Gelişme Dergisi* 18 (1991): 1-35.; Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 425.

⁴³⁰ Ibid. Chapter 2, Part 1, Paragraph 22.

U.S. position on Turkey's NATO membership was expressed clearly by George Wadsworth. "He had observed a growing feeling among Turkish leaders and the people that Turkey should be included in the European collective security arrangement. The Korean development, which occurred during this period, intensified this feeling to the extent that the question is now a major issue in Turkey."⁴³¹ Therefore, the U.S. certainly supported the inclusion Turkey in the European collective security arrangement under the membership of Turkey to NATO. He also argued that Turkey would contribute to European security with collective action and he emphasized that the issue of NATO membership was one of the main concerns for Turkey. Evidence of Turkish feelings on the issue was that

The Turks feel that they could contribute materially to the collective strength of Western Europe and, on the other hand, believe that Turkey's inclusion would enhance its own security. The Ambassador said that in Europe today there are three important organizations: The Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), the Council of Europe, and the North Atlantic Treaty. Turkey is included in the first two, and her exclusion from the latter on a geographical basis would, in his opinion, be inconsistent.⁴³²

Thus, Turkey was keen on being a part of NATO because of the belief that it could contribute to NATO and because of the security NATO could provide. In other words, for the sake of the security of Turkey, the Turkish government was willing to be a member state of NATO. This quotation also emphasized that Turkey was a member of other European organizations and excluding Turkey from NATO membership would be inconsistent because if Turkey could not be regarded as a

⁴³¹ FRUS, *The Near East, South Asia, and Africa*, Vol V, (1950), 1301.

⁴³² Ibid.

European state, then it should not have been included in the other two organizations. Turkey's request for NATO membership could not, therefore, be rejected on the grounds that Turkey is not within the European borders.

Turkey's desire for membership in NATO stemmed from its security concerns. NATO was a defense partnership between fourteen states with the aim of protecting peace among free nations. Indeed, it was the mutual security system which aimed to resist invasion.⁴³³ Therefore, the key factor in this partnership was cooperation among partners. If a nation was attacked by another state, other NATO members would assist that nation in defending against the attack. Turkey wanted to be part of an organization that would cooperate to address the security concerns of its member states. Since Turkey was under the threat of the Soviets and communism, it searched for a partner to protect its society. Also, Turkey, as a nation state, wanted to be part of NATO to protect its own independence and peace.⁴³⁴ Due to these concerns, Turkey wanted to have close relations with the U.S. Turkey believed that the U.S. would influence other states to accept its membership in NATO. Therefore, in order to persuade the U.S., Turkey decided to send troops to South Korea, and this caused the U.S. to support Turkey's NATO membership. Additionally, "in these bloody battles, in Korea, Turkish and American artillery always supported the infantry in the most perfect way and showed incredible successes."⁴³⁵ Hence, during the war, both states cooperated and supported each

⁴³³ ATASE, Kore Harbi Kataloğu, 95/109/109-1, 1950.

⁴³⁴ ATASE, Kore Harbi Kataloğu, 95/109/109-4a, 1950.

⁴³⁵ ATASE, Kore Harbi Kataloğu, 152/82/82-2, 3 October 1973.

other for the sake of Turkey's NATO membership. Ultimately, Turkey's desire for NATO membership was another factor that influenced Turkish-American relations during the Korean War. Hence, NATO became a tool for close relations between Turkey and the United States.

In summary, there are four main issues that affected the relations between Turkey and the U.S. as a result of the involvement of Turkey in the war, namely military aid, UN Security Council Membership, the desire to defeat the communist threat, and NATO membership.

6.1.2. Economic Domain

Economic domain is the second area that was affected by Turkey's entrance to the Korean War. Turkey participated in the war to secure the continuity of economic aid, including Marshall Plan and Truman Doctrine and to increase the number and volume of foreign investments in Turkey. Consequently, with the participation of Turkey in the war, the American economic aid and the rate of foreign investments in Turkey increased largely. To start with the continuity of the American economic aid, it could be asserted that there was a strict distinction between the American aid before and after the Korean War. Indeed, during the period of implementation of the Marshall Plan, the aid was mostly given as debt. But after 1952, the aid was given in the form of grants due to the economic conditions of Turkey. These grants were initially used in the areas directed by the

U.S. for investment.⁴³⁶ From 1954, the grants were directly devoted to the financing of imported goods. After 1954, the U.S. started to send the surplused agricultural production to Turkey under the name of grant aid. Moreover, between 1952 and 1958, the U.S. loaned Turkey for 35- 40 years with 2.5%- 4% interest.⁴³⁷ Shortly after the Korean War, the economic aid by the U.S. increased. The following table shows the American economic aid to Turkey between 1949 and 1960 under the form of grants, debt and other forms.

Table 3: Economic aids of the U.S. (1949-1960) (in million dollars)⁴³⁸

American Economic Aid per years (in U.S. millions dollars)											
1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960
33.8	72	49.8	69.6	46.2	92.3	68.1	99.9	96.9	85.7	103.3	84.4

⁴³⁶ Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş Savaşı'ndan Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 1 1919-1980*, 553.

⁴³⁷ Ibid.

⁴³⁸ Ibid.; *Türkiye'ye Amerikan İktisadi Yardımları*, vol. 47 (Maliye Bakanlığı), 20.




Figure 4:American Economic Aid per years (in millions dollars)

As can be seen from the Table 3 and Figure 4, the total American economic aid in 1949 was 33.800.000 U.S. dollars. At the beginning of the Korean War, the economic aid was more than doubled when compared with the previous year and became 72.000.000 U.S. dollars in 1950. Through the end of the war, it decreased smoothly to 46.200.000 U.S. dollars in 1953. Between 1954 and 1962, the economic aid was in total 867.500.000 U.S. dollars. During these periods, the military aid were 305.700.000 U.S. dollars and 1.550.000.000 U.S. dollars respectively. These data show that the economic aid rised after the Korean War rapidly. The most striking result to emerge from the data is that while the aid was 46.2 million dollars in 1953, one year later, it doubled and became 92.3 million U.S. dollars.⁴³⁹ Hence, with the end of the war, the American aid to Turkey increased rapidly. This proved

⁴³⁹ Ibid.

the idea that the Turkish involvement in the war affected the Turkish-American relations in a positive way. Taken together, these results suggest that there is an association between the involvement of Turkey in the Korean War and the amount of American economic aid to Turkey. When we move to the areas that Turkey used the aid, it could be asserted that the American economic aid was used in areas where the U.S. wanted rather than in the areas that Turkey needed. The majority of the aid was spent on buying agricultural machinery and road construction equipment from the U.S. For instance, the number of tractors in Turkey was around 1000 in 1940 and this amount rised to 4000 in 1955.⁴⁴⁰ Hence, within 15 years the number of tractors quadrupled in Turkey. Not only the number of tractors but also the cultivated area enlarged. For example, in 1950, the cultivated area was 14.542.000 hectares, in 1956 it rose to 22.453.000 hectares.⁴⁴¹ These increments illustrate the impact of the involvement of Turkey in the war on the rise of American economic aid.

Turning now to the impact of involvement on foreign investments in Turkey, the Democratic Party executives asserted that the economic recovery occurred due to American economic assistance. Therefore, they remarked that an opportunity should be given to American entrepreneurs for investment in Turkey, because they thought that this would lead to rise in economic aid to Turkey. For this purpose, the DP government printed a set of law. Such as, Foreign Investment Law (August 1, 1951), Law on the Encouragement of Foreign Capital (January, 18 1954), and lastly

⁴⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁴¹ Ibid.

Petrol Law (March 7, 1954). These laws became effective and attracted American investors. For instance, during the period between 1954 and 1965, 30.5% of the foreign capital that entered the country for investment was belong to American entrepreneurs.⁴⁴² In short, as a result of the involvement of Turkey in the war, American economic aid and American investments in Turkey increased.

The reasons within the context of the economic domain relate to the bandwagoning theory, from two perspectives: to increase gain⁴⁴³ and weak governmental institutions.⁴⁴⁴ To start with the purpose of increasing gain,⁴⁴⁵ in order to continue to economic benefit from the Marshall Plan and Truman Doctrine, Turkey chose to join the Korean War by bandwagoning to the U.S. and becoming its ally. At the beginning of the war, the U.S. officials dropped a hint that if Turkey participated in the war, economic aid would continue.⁴⁴⁶ Hence, for the sake of economic aid, Turkey joined the Korean War. In sum, having closer relations with the western world was one of the gains, Turkey expected to achieve by bandwagoning to the U.S. Since only the U.S. could keep a promise for these rewards, Turkey agreed to participate in the war on their side.

⁴⁴² Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş Savaşı'ndan Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 1 1919-1980*, 554.

⁴⁴³ Donnelly, "Realism," 35.

⁴⁴⁴ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 218.

⁴⁴⁵ Donnelly, "Realism," 35.

⁴⁴⁶ FRUS, *The Near East, South Asia, and Africa*, Vol V, (1950), 1286.

Secondly, states with weak governmental institutions⁴⁴⁷ are more prone to bandwagoning. For Turkey, the root cause of the weakness in their governmental institutions was economic instability. For instance, with the end of the Second World War, the Turkish economy was not able to recover and its military had been depleted.⁴⁴⁸ Because of the weak governmental institutions of Turkey, the economy and military were not able to recover after the Second World War. Therefore, as the government itself could not deal with these problems, it searched for assistance from foreign states, specifically from the U.S. The Marshall Plan and Truman Doctrine were the main sources of funding for its economy. Hence, for the continuity of this aid, Turkey joined the Korean War. By participating in the war, Turkish officials wanted to regain the trust of the U.S., the only state they felt would offer the assistance they needed in order to strengthen their own institutions and replenish their depleted military and economy. In brief, Turkey's weak governmental institutions prevented its depleted military and economy from recovering and influenced its decision to bandwagon to the U.S. and join the war.

In summary, in the economic domain there are two main issues that affected the relations between Turkey and the U.S. in terms of economic needs which are increases in American economic aid and American investment in Turkey. These issues can also be associated increase in gain and weak governmental institutions with the bandwagoning theory from the perspective of Donnelly and Walt.

⁴⁴⁷ Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 218.

⁴⁴⁸ Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş Savaşı'ndan Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt 1 1919-1980*, 489-490.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, this thesis has analyzed the impact of Turkey's participation in the Korean War on the relationship between Turkey and the United States. During this period, their relations were strengthened and they followed common foreign policies. With its participation in the war, Turkey had the chance to affiliate with the Western bloc and to participate in the Western world. It was argued that in their relationship, the U.S. was the dominant power, whereas Turkey was the weak one. Thus, this thesis defended the idea that the relationship between Turkey and the United States can be explained by applying the bandwagoning theoretical framework. Since, this thesis is a historical study, the use of primary sources is crucial because the archival documents provide evidence for the historical background of the war and evolution of Turkish-American relations. Hence, in order to understand the events and come to a conclusion on bilateral relations, the use of primary sources is important. The application of bandwagoning theoretical framework helps to form the connection between the evidences from the archival documents and secondary resources. Hence, the use of primary sources and application of theory strengthen the findings which differentiate this study from the others. Furthermore, the questions why Turkey joined the Korean War and how the

relations between Turkey and the U.S. developed as a result of this involvement were discussed in detail. The reasons for Turkey, a weak state, to cooperate with the U.S., the dominant power, were also examined in this thesis.

Turning now to the details of the chapters of the thesis, after the introduction, the first chapter discussed the existent literature on Turkish-American relations and their involvement in the Korean War. It also set the framework of the bandwagoning theory. The second chapter focused on Turkish-American relations between 1945 and 1950. This chapter also examined the Yalta Conference and Straits Question, and the foreign policy of both Turkey and the United States between 1945 and 1950. At the end of the Second World War, new borders were determined at the Yalta Conference by the leaders of the United States, England and Soviet Russia. During the negotiation process, the Straits Question was one of the topics they discussed. The negotiations on the straits and renewal of the Montreux Convention were crucial for Turkey because of their impact on the security of Turkey.

The section on the foreign policy of Turkey after the Second World War asserted that the main concern of Turkey was to have close relations with the U.S. and the Western world because of the communist threat and its desire to be a member state of NATO. The section on American foreign policy after the Second World War discussed the attitude of the U.S. towards the control and security of the Straits. This section pointed out that the main concern of the U.S. initially, was the security of the Straits, but overtime, its concern shifted to the sovereignty and security of Turkey. After discussing this change, this section analyzed the policies of the U.S. towards Turkey. For instance, economic and military assistance during this

period were discussed by analyzing the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan. This thesis emphasized that the Turkish military and economy benefited from these sources of aid. On the one hand, the Turkish economy and military were strengthened and, on the other hand, the U.S. had the chance to prevent the expansion of communism and the Soviets by drawing Turkey to its side. The last section of this chapter discussed the establishment of NATO and Turkey's NATO membership, both of which played an important role in the relations between Turkey and the U.S. This section argued that Turkey wanted to be part of NATO because of its security concerns and desire to ally with the Western World. The U.S. favored Turkey's NATO membership in order to prevent Soviet expansion. All in all, this chapter discussed Turkish-American relations between 1945 and 1950 and argued that the foundation of their close relations lay in this period.

The third chapter focused on the Korean War. This chapter discussed the historical background of the war and the results of the war. Within the historical background, this thesis elaborated on the origin and the outbreak of the war. It was argued that the war originated from four main events. These were the negotiation process on Korea, the discussion of the Korean problems in the United Nations, the establishment of two states in Korea, and the elections in South Korea which led to the establishment of the ROK. Following these events, the Korean War started in 1950 and ended in 1955 with an armistice between the parties. The last part of this chapter discussed the consequences of the war, one of which was the acceptance by both sides of the 38th parallel as the border between North Korea and South Korea.

The war also strengthened the relations between Turkey and the Western Bloc, especially the U.S. In short, the Korean War ended with various consequences.

The fourth chapter focused on the reasons for the involvement of Turkey and the U.S. in the Korean War. This thesis argued that the U.S. involvement in the Korean War was the result of four main factors. These were the communist threat, the fear of Soviet expansionism, the fear of the loss of confidence in the UN with the destruction of the world order, and the obligation to protect American prestige. Regarding the communist threat, this chapter argued that the goal of the U.S. in this war was to prevent expansion of communism and to strengthen its power in the world without directly fighting with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the U.S. stood against Soviet expansion and showed its strength by joining the war in support of South Korea. The motivation of the U.S. was to ensure world peace and freedom. From this perspective, the U.S. perceived its participation in the war as an obligation. Regarding the UN, the concern of the U.S. was to protect the UN Charter and prevent the violation of this charter. This chapter maintained that one of the main duties of the UN was to preserve security in the world and to defend against threats to the security and freedom of states. Therefore, this thesis argued that it was the responsibility of the U.S. to provide assistance to South Korea as a UN member. The participation of the U.S. was perceived as an obligation by American officials, who felt that confidence in the UN would be lost if the U.S. failed to settle the conflict and keep the peace in the world. The last reason for the involvement of the U.S. in the war was the protection of American prestige. Accordingly, if the U.S. did not take action against the North Korean attack, it would lose some of its power and

prestige in the eyes of the world. Also, the U.S. participated in the war because of the pressure applied by the European States. Indeed, the European states argued that if the U.S. did not act on this issue, their confidence in their partnership would be lost. Furthermore, they insisted that the U.S., as a superpower, should be sensitive to issues that pose a threat to world peace and freedom.

The reasons for the involvement of Turkey in the Korean War within the framework of bandwagoning theory were also discussed in this thesis. This thesis argued that there were two main reasons that led to the participation of Turkey in the war. These were the desire for membership in NATO and the desire to find an ally to fight against communism and Soviet threat. This thesis argued that the desire for membership in NATO led Turkey to participate in the war. Indeed, the Turkish government assumed that by participating in the war, Turkey would have a chance to show its power and bravery to the West, especially to the U.S., in order to become a member state of NATO. The second reason for the participation of Turkey in the war was the desire to find an ally to fight against communism and Soviet threat. Turkey perceived communism and the Soviets as threats to its freedom, therefore, it tried to ally with the West, specifically the U.S., to protect the country from communism and Soviet domination. If the Soviets were successful in the war, communism would have the opportunity to expand its reach in the world. This would pose a threat to Turkey because the possibility of a communist attack would increase with Soviet expansion. Consequently, in order to protect itself, Turkey tried to find an ally who would support and protect it from these threats. From the Turkish perspective, the West was the best choice for an alliance because of its

powerful economy, military and diplomatic relations. This thesis asserted that since Turkey wanted to be part of this power, it participated in the Korean War. In short, there were various reasons for the involvement of both the U.S. and Turkey in the Korean War.

While examining the the reasons for the involvement of Turkey, the reasons were studied from the perspective of bandwagoning theoretical framework. According to this theory, weak states form alliances with powerful states for various reasons. These include to increase their gains and diminish their losses, to balance domestic or foreign threats, to prevent weak governmental institutions, to gain profit, to avoid attack and to share in the spoils of victory. Additional reasons for bandwagoning include concerns about the future of the state, an absence of potential allies. This thesis applied these reasons for bandwagoning to Turkey's participation in the Korean War. According to the first reason, Turkey participated in the war in order to increase its gains. This thesis argued that Turkish participation in the war would lead to the continuation of the U.S. assistance. For the balancing of threat, this thesis argued that by participating in the war on the side of the U.S., Turkey aimed to balance the Soviet threat and the Turks perceived the U.S. to be the only power capable of balancing the Soviets' power and protecting Turkey from this threat. Concerns about the future of the state was another reason for bandwagoning of weak states. For instance, Turkey had concerns about future of itself because of the communist and Soviet threat, and so, it participated in the war on the side of the U.S. Moreover, in order to eliminate the possibility of attack and share the victory, Turkey preferred to bandwagon to the U.S. Turkey preferred the U.S. because it was

the only dominant power in the new world order. Consequently, by being on the U.S. side in the Korean War, Turkey was able to increase the possibility of victory as a consequence. The absence of potential allies and the desire to appease the most threatening power are also motivations for weak states to bandwagon. Due to the existence of only two poles in the world, the U.S. and the Soviets, Turkey needed to take a side so as not to become an enemy of both sides. When Turkey considered the positive and negative consequences, it preferred to side with the U.S.

The last chapter evaluated the impact of participation of Turkey in the Korean War on bilateral relations from the bandwagoning theoretical framework. This impact was evaluated under two main clusters which were the security perception and economic needs. Relying on the archival material from the Turkish General Staff, this thesis argued the impact of the Korean War was felt most on economic and security domains. In the security perception cluster American military aid, the desire for UN Security Council Membership, the desire to defeat the communist threat, and lastly the desire for NATO membership were discussed. During the war, the U.S. provided most of the military equipment and it supported the Turkish military financially. Indeed, for the purpose of preventing Soviet expansion, the U.S. sought a policy which would assist the Turkish military. By supporting Turkey, the U.S. formed a barrier to the Soviets because Turkey became an obstacle to its expansion. This policy of the U.S. resulted in close relations between the U.S. and Turkey in which the U.S., the dominant power, made the rules, and Turkey, the weak state, acted in accordance with those rules. UNSC Membership was the second issue. By participating in the war, Turkey wanted to

show its power and willingness to the U.S. The communist threat was another factor that impacted Turkish-American relations during the war. This thesis argued that communism was the common enemy of Turkey and the U.S. Therefore, they followed a common policy during the war. Given the isolation Turkey suffered as a result of its neutrality during the Second World War, it wanted to pick a side in this conflict. Hence, Turkey acted in accordance with the rules of the U.S. during the war in order to avoid the adverse outcomes of impartiality. Membership in NATO was the last factor that impacted Turkish-American relations during the war. Turkey's participation in the Korean War was a means of gaining membership in NATO. By participating in the war, Turkey showed its ambition for membership and its bravery. This also facilitated close relations between Turkey and the United States.

The second cluster was the economic needs. There were two main issues that affected the relations between Turkey and the U.S. in terms of economic needs which were the desire for an increase in American economic aid and the desire for rise in American investment in Turkey. These issues can also be associated with the bandwagoning theory as explained. When the data were analyzed, it could be concluded that American economic aid and investment increased perceptibly.

Finally, this thesis argues that the impact Turkey's involvement in the Korean War on Turkish-American relations during the Korean War can be explained within the bandwagoning theoretical framework. The impact was most apparent in two domains: security and economy. In the first domain there were four main factors which were the desire for increase in American military aid, the desire for UN

Security Council Membership, the desire to defeat the communist threat, and lastly the desire for NATO membership. In the second domain, on the other hand, the impact was quite observable given the continuity of American economic aid and the increase in American investment in Turkey.

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
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APPENDICES

A. ATASE, Kore Harbi Kataloğu, 95/109/109-1, 1950





C. ATASE, Kore Harbi Kataloğu, 2/41/41-2, 26 September 1950



Birleşmiş Milletler Komutanlığı
Genel Karargahı

YASIN DİŞİ

BİRLİKLERİN, BİRLEŞMİŞ MİLLETLER KOMUTANLIĞI ALTINDA BİRLEŞTİRİLMESİ
VEYHESİ

1. Genel:

24-Temmuz-1950 tarih ve 1 No.lu genel emirle Birleşmiş Milletler K.K. lığı (B.M.K.) teşekkül etmiş ve komutanlığı General MacARTHUR deruhte etmiştir. Müteakip B.M.K. genel emirleriyle genel karargahın, B.M.K.'nın, ve komutanlığın muhtelif bölümlerinin teşkilat ve personeli bildirilmiştir. Bu talimatın gayesi B.M.K.'lığının teşkil edecek olan muhtelif birliklerin birleştirme metodunu göstermektir.

2. Genel Vezhe:

a. Birleşmiş Milletlerin Kore hakkında aldığı kararları destekleyen bütün Birleşmiş Milletler asalarının esaslı direkt iştirakleri (yardımları) teşvik edilecektir. Amerika Birleşik Devletleri (A.B.D.) "X" hükümeti bütün yardımları kabul etmek niyetindedir. Yalnız dikkatli bir tetkik yapılan yardımın kullanılmasının imkansız olduğunu ortaya koyabilir.

b. Birleşmiş Milletler Baş Komutanlığı Koredeki askeri gayret için lüzumlu olan askeri birlikler di ve diğer tip yardımlar hakkında Amerika Birleşik Genel Kurmaylar Başkanını malumatlar kılacaktır.

c. Kullanılmıyacak yardımlar kabul edildiği zaman bu yardımların işe yarayacak ve kullanılabilecek bir şekilde değiştirilmesi teklif edilir. Vaziyet değişmediği takdirde belki bu yardımların istenmesine hiç lüzum kalmıyacaktır.

d. Aşa milletler tarafından gönderilecek askeri birliklerin asgari 1000 kişiden mürekkep takviyeli bir taburdan daha az olmaması B.M. Baş Komutanlığının prensibidir. Bu birlikler esas olarak topçu ile takviye edilmiş piyade birlikleri olacaktır. İstihkam, Ordu Donatısı, Muhabare, Sıkhiye V.S. gibi birlikler kendi başlarına iş görebilecek büyüklükte olmalıdırlar.

3. Biri Komuta ve Birliklerin Kullanılması:


a. B.M. Emniyet Konseyinin 7-Temmuz-1950 tarihli kararına cevap olarak A.B.D. Cumhurbaşkanı, General MacARTHUR'u Kore Cumhuriyetine yardım eden askeri birliklerin Baş Komutanlığına tayin etmiştir.

b. Yukarıdaki birinci paragrafta sitedilmiş olan B.M.K.'lının genel emirleriyle, muhtelif ana A.B.D. Kara, Deniz ve Hava Kuvvetleri B.M.K.'lının birlikleri olarak tanınmıştır. Genel bir prensip olarak Kore Cumhuriyetine yardım etmek üzere Birleşmiş Milletlerin ana milletleri tarafından gönderilmiş olan askeri birlikler görev almak üzere B.M. Baş Komutanlığına müracaat edecekler ve bilahare, B.M.K.'lının teşkil eden ana A.B.D. Kara, Deniz veya hava kuvvetlerinden birine bağlanacaklardır. Kara, Deniz ve Hava Kuvvetlerinin (Karada ve uçak gemilerinde salmış uçaklar dahil) askeri kontrollü B.M. Baş Komutanlığı tarafından bildirilmiş olan prensipler dahilinde olacaktır.

"X" Burada yapılan açıklamaya göre (A.B.D.) tabiri Birleşmiş Milletler Komutanlığı şeklinde düzeltilenektir.

173

4022
424
6240
b: 40-2



Refakatinde Türk Donanması Muhriplerinden GELİBOLU olduğu halde JOHNSON, 29-Eylül-1950 günü saat 1200 de Türk sularından ayrıldı.

30-Eylül-1950 günü sabahın erken saatlarında Port Said önle-
rine gelindiği zaman GELİBOLU muhribinden şöyle bir mesaj alındı:

" GELİBOLU PERSONELİ CEPHEYE GİDEN KARDEŞLERİNE CANDAN YOL AÇIKLIĞI, SAĞLIK VE BAŞARILAR DİLER. KILIÇLARINIZI KESKİN MERMİLERİNİZİ İSABETLİ KILMASINI TANRIDAN NİYAZ EDERLER."

Buna cevaben Top.Kemutani tarafından gönderilen teşekkür me-
sajını müteakip GELİBOLU Şanlı Türk Bayrağını hamilen JOHNSON'u ve
yolcularını selâmladıktan sonra Akdenizin mavi sularında Anavatanı
doğru ayrıldı.

JOHNSON'un bir müddet için nisafiri olacak TÜRK TOPÇULARI, geminin teknil subay ve mürettebatı tarafından samimi bir hava içinde karşılandı. Bu arada kaptan ve gemi komutanı ile Türk Top. Komutanı arasında karşılıklı mesajlar teati olundu.

F. ATASE, Kore Harbi Kataloğu, 4/40/40-6, 1950

TASNİF DIŞI

Vatan topraklarımızı geride, sulh sükûn ve huzur içinde barınarak şu anın denizlerde seyreden siz askerler, Ne için ve nereye gittiğinizi biliyormusunuz?

Aziz vatanımızdan onbinlerce kilometre uzaklıkta, dünyanın diğer bir ucunda girişeceğimiz bu savaş hareketinin şeref ve sorumluluğunu kavrayabiliyormusunuz?

Sen ey kahraman TÜRK ASKERİ, sen yalnız bir cemaat, bir cemiyet bir millet değil, fakat bütün bir dünya efkârınca tasvip edilen beşeriyete hürriyet, adalet ve saadet getirecek olan bir davayı kazanmaya gidiyorsun.

İnsani akli düsturlar kullanarak beşeriyete esaret boyunduruğunu vurmaya çalışan şeytanı, Komünizm şeytanını yok etmeye gidiyorsun.

Gölecek nesillere, bütün bir dünya nesline harikalar yaratan o ceddin gibi hamasetin örneğini veriyse, onlar için vesilei iftihar olmaya gidiyorsun.

Kendi adını, TÜRK adını beşer tarihinin mutena sayfalarında obodiyete intikal ettirmeye gidiyorsun.

Vaktile İslâmın bayrağını serhatlerde senin kahraman ataların taşıması. Şimdi de sen adaletin, akli salının semasına götürüyorsun. Cittiğin yerde yaratacağın eser, hürriyet ve uhuvvetin obedi abidesi olacaktır.


Kahraman asker, omuzunda taşıdığın ay yıldızlı sembol sana tevdi edilen millî şeref ve haysiyetin timsalidir. Göklere nazire teşkil eden bu ulvî timsali vatan toprakları dahilinde de, haricinde de senin inanın, sabrın, azmin ve kuvvetli disiplin mesiyetlerin payidar edecektir.

ALLAHIN SANA EN BÜYÜK YARDIMCI OLDUĞUNU UNUTMA.

R.S.



G. ATASE, Kore Harbi Kataloğu, 152/82/82-2, 3 October 1973



H. ATASE, Kore Harbi Kataloğu, 2/5/5-1, 22 September 1950

T. C. 24
M. S. B.
Dz. Kuvvetleri K.
Harekât Başkanlığı
Plân ve Harekât Ş. Ks. ANKARA
Sayı : 312418 22. Eylül 1950

ATASE
ARŞİN

Kara Kuvvetleri K.

ATASE: 5060-636-10/950-1950
GÜZLÜK DEĞERİ
GÜZLÜK DEĞERİNDEN
DEĞERİNDEN

KİŞİYE ÖZEL

1) İkinci Muhrip filotilası , içinde Koreye gidecek Türk ordusu personeli bulunan 63 Amerikan nakliye gemisine, İskenderon'dan Söveyşe kadar refakat edecektir .

2) Amerikan gemilerinden GENERAL Mc.Pha ve GENERAL HAAN 26/9/1950 günü , PRIVATE JOHNSON 28/9/1950 günü İskenderon'dan hareket edeceklerdir . Kat'ı hareket saatleri İskenderon'da ilgili komutanlıklar la temas edilmek suretiyle öğrenilecektir .

3) Filotillanın sularımızdan hareketle görevin hitamında tekrar Gase avdetine kadar yapılacak seyir ve refakata ait talimat, telsis haberleşme planı , ve lüzum görüldüğü takdirde İskenderon'da yapılacak ikmal hususlarına ait talimat ve emirler Donanma komutanlığınca düzenlenecek ve bunların birer benzeri 26/9/1950 tarihinden evvel Dz. K . Komutanlığında bulundurulacaktır .

4) Bu görev için özel bir gifre tertiplenecek ve bunun bir benzeri zamanında Dz. K . K . lığına gönderilecektir .

5) Filotillanın hareketi iktisadi suretle seyir edilmek ve 25/9/1950 günü zevalinde İskenderon'da bulunmak üzere Donanma komutanlığınca düzenlenecek ve bildirilecektir .

6) Filotila gemileri Mısır hükümeti kara sularına girmeyecek , ve kara suları dışında refakatten ayrılarak Gase'ne avdet edecektir .

7) Refakat edilecek Amerikan gemileri ile yapılacak seyir ve muhabere hususları ile her hangi bir alarıdaki hareket tarzı , 25/9/1950 günü Amerikan nakliye gemileri kıdemli komutanı ile yapılacak temas sonunda tesbit edilecektir .

Filotila komodoru İskenderon'a muvafakatla , Tuğgeneral Tahsin yazıcıya elmiş olduğu görev ve yapacağı temaslar hakkında izahat verecek ve Amerikan nakliye gemileri kıdemli komutanı ile tesbit edeceği mukarrefatı hareketten evvel ayrıca kendisine bildirecektir .

8) Genelkurmay Başkanlığına ve K . K . K . lığına arz edilmiş Donanma K . ve İskenderon ileri 63 K . lığına yazılmıştır .

Dz . Kuvvetleri K . V .
Tümamiral
S. Altın
II. S. 22. Eylül
H.A. komutanın
bilg.

190299
1. Ks.
27-9-1950
22- Eylül-1950
I. Ks.
27-11
Olunur

Cevaplarda Ş . nin ismi, tarih ve No . nın yazılması lazımdır.

YASNI F DİŞİ



II. Muhrip Filotilasının İskenderon ile Söveç arasında yapacağı refakat(Accompany) görevi hakkında muhtıra

- 1) Bu refakat görevinin Gukur . Bşk . lığına Filotilamız için bir açık deniz eğitim mahiyetini taşıması ve Amerikan nakliye gemileri komutanları ile yapılacak temas ve anlaşmalarda da bu hususun göz önünde bulundurulması gerekli görülmektedir .
- 2) İskenderon'dan personeli hamil olarak 26/9/930 günü kalkacak iki Amerikan nakliye gemisi birinci grubu , 28/9/930 günü kalkacak bir nakliye gemisi ikinci grubu teşkil edecektir . Buna göre birinci grubu iki , ikinci grubu bir muhrip ile refakat edilmesi uygun mütalea edilmektedir .
- 3) Gazeteciler Filotila gemilerine alınmayacak , Fotograf çekmelerine müsaade edilmeyecek , hareket seati , Görevin şekli , mahiyeti ve Filotila'nın evdeti hakkında kendilerine hiç bir bilgi verilmeyecektir .
- 4) Seyirde ,her hangi bir suretle yabancı uçaklar tarafından hava tehditlerinin filen bağlanması ve silah kullanmaları taktirinde , ve kesin denizaltı tehdit hareketi karşısında silah ve su bombası ile mukabele edilecektir .

ATASE: 5060-434-10/ATASE ARSIVI
GEMUR DİŞİ
YASNI F DİŞİ

Not :

Bu muhtıra İskenderon Dz. İlari
Us K . in emrine bağlanmamıştır.
bunun komutanlığı ilgilleyen (3).
reddesi Flt.Kmd. tarafından sözü
edilen komutanlığa bildirilecektir .

I. ATASE, Kore Harbi Kataloğu, 3/127/127-1, 13 September 1950

Tarih		Bulunduğu yer	VAKALAR	MÜLAHAZAT
Saat	Dak.			
10-9-950		Etimsut	<i>1- bu gün çamaşır ve beden temizliği yapıldı.</i> <i>Erata 0/030 nisbetinde Ankara'ya izin verildi.</i> <i>2- Çadırda Ordugah yeri hazırlandı ve kışla Favyonlarından erata çadırda Ordugaha çıktı.</i> <i>3-Sıkı emniyet tertibatı alınmasına rağmen</i> <i>Tb.dan izin vesikası erler Ankara'ya getmişlerdir.</i> <i>1- bu gün Tb.ra yeni verilmiş olan Amerikan AŞ.mt.,Mf.mt.,Otomatik tüfekleriyle eğitime devam edildi.</i> <i>2-Tb.da mevcut kadro fazla erat(çvş, onb ve er)Tugayın depoBL.nü teşkil için depo k.namı teslim edildi.</i> <i>3-bu gün Tb.aa3,5 inçlik bazooka ve 81.m.m.lik Havan.Topu ve gisleme ağıları ayrıca Tomsan makineli tabancaları verildi.</i> <i>4-Uyuz tedavisine devam edilmiş bisyat Tb.K.nın nezaretinde altında BL.K.ları önünde ilaçları sürdükten uyuz tedavisine devam edilmiştir.</i> <i>5-bu gün A.Komutanı saat 20,00de Tb.k.nın çadırı önündeTb. Sb.larını ve alayın tekmil Sb. larını Toplayarak iç hizmet ve eğitimdeki kusurlar üzerinde durarak gerekli emirleri verdi ve yerimli çalışmanın ne şekilde yapılacağını izah etti.</i>	<i>10 Ağustos 1950 - 30 Eylül 1951</i> <i>1- bu gün Tb.ra yeni verilmiş olan Amerikan AŞ.mt.,Mf.mt.,Otomatik tüfekleriyle eğitime devam edildi.</i> <i>2-Tb.da mevcut kadro fazla erat(çvş, onb ve er)Tugayın depoBL.nü teşkil için depo k.namı teslim edildi.</i> <i>3-bu gün Tb.aa3,5 inçlik bazooka ve 81.m.m.lik Havan.Topu ve gisleme ağıları ayrıca Tomsan makineli tabancaları verildi.</i> <i>4-Uyuz tedavisine devam edilmiş bisyat Tb.K.nın nezaretinde altında BL.K.ları önünde ilaçları sürdükten uyuz tedavisine devam edilmiştir.</i> <i>5-bu gün A.Komutanı saat 20,00de Tb.k.nın çadırı önündeTb. Sb.larını ve alayın tekmil Sb. larını Toplayarak iç hizmet ve eğitimdeki kusurlar üzerinde durarak gerekli emirleri verdi ve yerimli çalışmanın ne şekilde yapılacağını izah etti.</i>
11-9-950		Etimsut	<i>1-Tb.a bu gün Kh.ne bir 4.BL.ğe iki Şoförverildi</i> <i>2-Alaydan Dini ve Ahlakî kitap blar verilerek BL.lere Mİ temviyen dağıtıldı.</i> <i>3-Uyuz erlerin tedavilerine bisyat BL.K.,-ları nezaretinde devam edildi.</i> <i>4-İskenderunda depo edilmekte olan araç ve malmemenin muafazası için I.BL.den Sb.ve Gd.13 ile birlikte bir Tk.Ankaradan trenle İskenderuna sevk edildi.</i> <i>5-bu gün Garnison sinamasında erata Kore Savaşlarına ait askeri bir film gösterildi.</i> <i>6-Ankaradan gelen Motor Tb.Sb.larının ve Gd.lerinin Türkiyedeki Mağalarını almaya iç. Banmasını mütemet yaptıklarına dair Motor senetlerini tansim ettiler.</i> <i>7-Tb.Sb.ve Gd.lilerinin Ankara'ya İskenderun yolluklarını almak için Tb.Hs.me. Çzalp'ı Tb. mütemeti tayin edilmiş olup muameleleri tamamlamak için 28. tünden ödenacak Pam ları almaya Gönderildi.</i>	<i>1- bu gün Tb.ra yeni verilmiş olan Amerikan AŞ.mt.,Mf.mt.,Otomatik tüfekleriyle eğitime devam edildi.</i> <i>2-Tb.da mevcut kadro fazla erat(çvş, onb ve er)Tugayın depoBL.nü teşkil için depo k.namı teslim edildi.</i> <i>3-bu gün Tb.aa3,5 inçlik bazooka ve 81.m.m.lik Havan.Topu ve gisleme ağıları ayrıca Tomsan makineli tabancaları verildi.</i> <i>4-Uyuz tedavisine devam edilmiş bisyat Tb.K.nın nezaretinde altında BL.K.ları önünde ilaçları sürdükten uyuz tedavisine devam edilmiştir.</i> <i>5-bu gün A.Komutanı saat 20,00de Tb.k.nın çadırı önündeTb. Sb.larını ve alayın tekmil Sb. larını Toplayarak iç hizmet ve eğitimdeki kusurlar üzerinde durarak gerekli emirleri verdi ve yerimli çalışmanın ne şekilde yapılacağını izah etti.</i>
12-9-950		Etimsut	<i>1-Tb.a bu gün Kh.ne bir 4.BL.ğe iki Şoförverildi</i> <i>2-Alaydan Dini ve Ahlakî kitap blar verilerek BL.lere Mİ temviyen dağıtıldı.</i> <i>3-Uyuz erlerin tedavilerine bisyat BL.K.,-ları nezaretinde devam edildi.</i> <i>4-İskenderunda depo edilmekte olan araç ve malmemenin muafazası için I.BL.den Sb.ve Gd.13 ile birlikte bir Tk.Ankaradan trenle İskenderuna sevk edildi.</i> <i>5-bu gün Garnison sinamasında erata Kore Savaşlarına ait askeri bir film gösterildi.</i> <i>6-Ankaradan gelen Motor Tb.Sb.larının ve Gd.lerinin Türkiyedeki Mağalarını almaya iç. Banmasını mütemet yaptıklarına dair Motor senetlerini tansim ettiler.</i> <i>7-Tb.Sb.ve Gd.lilerinin Ankara'ya İskenderun yolluklarını almak için Tb.Hs.me. Çzalp'ı Tb. mütemeti tayin edilmiş olup muameleleri tamamlamak için 28. tünden ödenacak Pam ları almaya Gönderildi.</i>	<i>1- bu gün Tb.ra yeni verilmiş olan Amerikan AŞ.mt.,Mf.mt.,Otomatik tüfekleriyle eğitime devam edildi.</i> <i>2-Tb.da mevcut kadro fazla erat(çvş, onb ve er)Tugayın depoBL.nü teşkil için depo k.namı teslim edildi.</i> <i>3-bu gün Tb.aa3,5 inçlik bazooka ve 81.m.m.lik Havan.Topu ve gisleme ağıları ayrıca Tomsan makineli tabancaları verildi.</i> <i>4-Uyuz tedavisine devam edilmiş bisyat Tb.K.nın nezaretinde altında BL.K.ları önünde ilaçları sürdükten uyuz tedavisine devam edilmiştir.</i> <i>5-bu gün A.Komutanı saat 20,00de Tb.k.nın çadırı önündeTb. Sb.larını ve alayın tekmil Sb. larını Toplayarak iç hizmet ve eğitimdeki kusurlar üzerinde durarak gerekli emirleri verdi ve yerimli çalışmanın ne şekilde yapılacağını izah etti.</i>

J. ATASE, Kore Harbi Kataloğu, 3/127/127-2,3, 18-21 September 1950

Kore
K:3
G:127
G:127.2

Kita 241.P.A. I.Tb. Harp Ceridesi 3

Tarih Saat Dek.	Bulunduğu yer	VAKALAR	MÜLAHAZAT
18-9-50 Pasartesi	Etimesgut	teker,teker görüşlerini arz etti.Müteakiben Başbakan,M.S.B.nı ve Gn.Kur.Bşk.Hoparlör vasıtası ile tekmil birlik Sb.Gd.ve erlerine hitaben iyi yolculuklar ve şerefli muvaffakiyetler temenni etti. 3-Birliçler beraberlerinde götürmeyecekleri eşyaları kamyonlarla bu günden Etimesguta naklederek yük vagonlarına yerleştirdiler. 4-Bu akşam saat 20.00 ye doğru Kora yolculuğu harcırahına mahsuben Sb.ve Gd.lilere bir miktar Türk lirası verildi.	
19-9-50 Salı	Etimesgut	1. Tb. K. Bnb. 1-Gece saat 03.30 da kalk borusu çaldı ve 04.00 de sabah yemeği dağıtıldı. 2-Birinci katarı teşkil edecek olan I.Tb. Hav.Bl.ve İk.Bl.ğü 06.40 da Etimesguttan hareket edecek trene binmek için ordugahtan saat 06.00 da hareket ettiler. 3-İkinci katarı teşkil edecek olan II.Tb.A.Kh. Bl.ve A.Shh.Tk.Etimesguttan Trenle 10.30 da hareket etmek için saat 03.30 da kalkarak yemeğini yedi ve çadırlar düdüldü.Tb. 07.00 de Etimesguta hareket etti.Tren ancak 10.20 geçte Etimesguta geldiğinden Tb.un trene binmesi ve ikinci katarla beraber gelecek olan birliklerin yerleşmesi ancak 10.50 geçeye kadar mümkün olabilmektedir. I.II.Katarları uğurlamak için istasyona bir merasim Bl.ğü bandosu gelmişlerdir. Sayın Tugay K.nı Gn.Tahşin Yazıcı da istasyonda idi.Halkta istasyona dolmuştu.II.Katar K.nı Sayın Alay K.nı Alb.Celal Dora'dır.Yardımcısı II.Tb.K.Bnb.Miktat Uludüldür. 4-Saat 10.50 de 47.Sb.46.Gd.ve 948 Erele Ankara -Kayseri yolu ile Iskenderuna alkışlar arasında trenimiz ayrılarak Ankaraya hareket etti.Ankarada tren 15 dak.kaldı.Tahmin edeceğimiz kadar halk yoktur.Gelecekte Sb.ların tadıkları eşleri ve dostları idi.İstasyona gelen mahdut bir yolcu kitlesi tarafından uğurlanarak Kırıkkale istikaletinde trenimiz hareket etti.Katar 16.45 de Kırıkkalaya geldi.İstasyonda bulunan 4500 kadar halk ve işçiler alkışlarla karşıladılar ve uğurladılar.20.15 de Yerköye gelindi.Bütün halk istasyona dolmuştu.Binlerce kişi bisi davul zurnalar ile karşıladılar Erat ve Sb.lara ayrı ve su ikram edi ldi.Halk askerlerimize coşkun tezahürat yaptı.Burada 20 dakika kadar kaldık.Kırşehir Millet Vekillerinden Osman Bülkbaşının kardeşi olduğumu öğrendiğimiz bir zat güzel bir söylev ile hayırlı,uğurlu ve yüzümüzün aklı ile sağlıklı yurda dönmemizi diledi.Alay K.nı buna güzel cevap vererek teşekkürlerini bildirdi.	

Kıta 241. p. A. I. 76. Harp Ceridesi 5

Tarih	Bulunduğu yer	VAKALAR	MÜLAHAZAT
19-9-50 Sa 11	Etimesgut	20.35 de Yerköyden binlerce halkın davul, zurna- larla ve coşkun alkışları arasında halka arzu- veda ederek Kayseri istikametinde yol almaya başladık. Kayseriye saat 02.00 de vardık. Burada 2 saat kaldıktan sonra ayrıldık. İstasyonda Sb. aileleri ve tanıdıkları vardı. Birazda halk bir- rikmmişti. <i>Emniyet yolu.</i>	
20-9-50 Garçamba	Kayseri	1. Tb. K. Bnb. <i>2. Kuvvet</i> İstasyon çok kala alıkmış ama tren çok geç ge- diğinden halk dağılmış. Ulukışlaya saat 10.50 de vardık. Kumanyalardan yumurta kokmuştu. Eti- erat yemedi. Çirkin bir mangara arz ediyordu, bo- zulmuştu. Doktor müteaddit defalar kompartümanları dolaştı. Eratı sağlıkları ile bilhassa doktorlar ve Tb. K. nı Alay. K. nı tarafından bilhassa alaka gösterildi. 15.50 de Adanaya geldik. Garnizon K. nı hoşgeldiniz dedi ve uğurlu hayırlı yolculuk- lar diledi. (Tuğ. Gn. Aziz Avman) İstasyonda kimse yoktu. 15.45 de 20.30 da demiryolu amelesinin alkışları arasında İskenderuna hareket ettik. Saat 18.00 de Toprakaleye gelindi. Topkaleli- lerde Yerköylüler gibi yüzlerce halk tarafından alkışlarla karşıladılar. Gazoz ve bakraçlarla Sb. ve Eratı buzlu şerbetler ve soğuk sular ikram edildi. Halkın coşkun alkışları arasında 18.15 de İskenderun istikametinde yolculuğa devam edildi. 19.30 da İskenderuna geldik. Ve erat neş'e için- de temen ilimaye <i>başladı</i> . İstasyonda bizi evvel- ce eşya ve araç <i>emniyet</i> <i>hizmeti</i> <i>ile</i> <i>Tb. K. Kuvvet</i> üzere götürecek <i>gözetim</i> <i>gözetim</i> <i>Bnb.</i> <i>Kuvvet</i> ile	
20-9-50 Garçamba	İskenderun	Sb. ları pek az halk karşıladı. Sb. ların ve Gd. li erbağların ve eratın savaş torbaları kamyon- larla İskenderundeki Alaya nakledildi. Tb. 2. saat rötarla İskenderuna gelmiş olup şehir içinden yürüyüşe geçerek hazırlanmış olan kışlada geceyi geçirdik. 5- Yerin 04.00 de kalkılacak. Ve 06.00 da yürüyüşe geçilerek Antakya yolunun 18. Km. mesa- fesinde Atik Yaylasındaki Ordugaha gidilecek. <i>Emniyet yolu.</i>	1. Tb. K. Bnb. <i>2. Kuvvet</i>
21-9-50 Perşembe	Atik Yaylası	1- Bugün saat 06.00 da Tb. umuz bir <i>15. ve</i> Alay bağlı birlikleri ile beraber İskenderundan Atik Yaylasına gitmek maksadı ile yürüyüş geçtiler. Sb. Gd. ve eratın savaş torbaları kamyonlarla nakledildi. 2- Ordugaha yakın olan Belen nahiyesine Emniyet bakımından bir Sb. Komutasında bir Mangaa inzibati işler için memur edildi. 3- Tb. un Sb. ve Gd. lilerinden Nö. olmayanlar için vasıtalarla ihtiyaclarını karşılamak maç- sadı ile Şehre izinli bırakıldı.	

K. ATASE, Kore Harbi Kataloğu, 3/127/127-3,4, 21-24 September 1950

Kore
K:3
G:127
C:127-3

Kita 241 P.A. I Tb. Harp Ceridesi 6

Tarih Saat Dak.	Bulunduğu yer	VAKALAR	MULHAZAT
21-9-50 Perşembe	Atik Yaylası	Şehirden saat 19.00 da kalkan vasıta ile orduya avdet edildi. 4-Atik yaylasında hava serin su iyi ve bol olduğundan erat geceyi istirahatle geçirdi. 1. Tb. K. Bnb.	
22-9-50 Cuma	Atik Yaylası	1-III.Tb.ve İk.Bl.de bugün gelerek orduya yerleştiler. 2-Sb.lardan toplanan para ile Alay için iki kara ve iki beyaz koç alınarak yarın kurban için kesilecektir. 3-Bayram namazını kılmak maksadı ile bir na- maz kılma yeri seçildi. 4-Vapura kafileler halinde binecek Sb.,Gd. ve eratin isim çizelgeleri istendi. 5-III.Tb.ve Tugay depo Bl.ü Tnk.savar ta- kımı bayramın ikinci günü MAKRAY gemisine binecek- lerdir.Bu gurubun komutanı Yb.Natik Poyrazoğ- ludur. 6-İkinci gurup Tb.umuz ile Alayın II.Tb.ü ve diğer kısımlarıdır.Tb.umuzu götürecek Ame- rikan gemisinin adı (W.G.HAAN) 7-Tb.a şoförler verildi ve birliğimizin şo- für kadrosu tamamlandı. 1. Tb. K. Bnb.	
23-9-50 C.İrtesi	Atik Yaylası	1-Bugün saat 05.30 dan namazgahta Alay İma- mı Muhsin Örtülü erata Bayram namazının kılın- ması hakkında ders verdi.Bayram namazı kılındı. Namaz kılındıktan sonra Alay K.nı güzel bir hitabede bulundu.Yurdun bir kapısı eşliğinden meçhul diyarlara ayak atan Türk evlatlarının Alay İmamının gerisine toplanıp tek iman ve tek emelle çarpan kalplerini Kibleye çevirip san- cak ve Kur'an gerisinde Allaha yalvarışları gö- rülecek manzaralardandı.Amin dedikleri saman ağaçlarından bin amin çıkıyor.Şeytanlar kaçıyor melekler göklerden kanat açmış arza iniyordu. Hey'et heyecan ve imanla ürperen vücutlar hak- kın önünde bir divar gibi eğilir.Dalgalar gibi şahlanıyordu.Tek ümit geriye dönmek ümidi Ce- nabı hak cümlemise nasip eyleye.Sb.lar Gd.liler ve erat birbirleriyle bayramlaştılar ve bundan so- sonra hazırlanan Sb.lar tarafından alınan koç- lar kurban namazından sonra namazgahın yanında kesildiler. 2-Bu gece saat 21.00 de Kore Türk Komutanlığı emrindeki birliklerin Sb.ve As.Me.na ziyafet verildi.Ve saat 24.00 de hep birlikte halk evinin sinema salonuna gidilerek birliğin Eti- mesgutta çekilmiş olan filimi gösterildi. 1. Tb. K. Bnb.	

TASNİF DIŞI

Kıta

241-P.A.I.T.O.

Harp Ceridesi 7

Tarih Saat Dek.	Bulunduğu yer	VAKALAR	MOLAHAZAT
24-9-50 Pazar	Atik Yaylası	1-Bugün saat 07.00 de Ordugahta hareket ve Amerikan nakliye gemisi (MAKRAY) gemisine III. Tb.bindi. 2-Tugaydan alınan emir üzerine ikinci kafilenin vapurda görevlendirilecek personelleri seçildi.Tb.ve diğer birlikler 26-Eyl-950 günü (General W.G.Haan) gemisine bineceği öğrenildi. İkinci kafile K.A.K.Alb.Celal Dora, muavini II.Tb.K.nı Bnb.Miktat Uluñlıdır. 3-Alaya 1.Tb.K.M.Kd.Yzb.İrfan Tuna iltihak etti.Alay K.nı adı geçen Tb.K.M.ni II.Tb.da iltihdamı için emir verdi.Esasen ikinci Tb.K.M.Kd.Yzb.Ahmet Tuncerde Alaya iltihakından beri 1.Tb.K.M. liğinde çalışmaktadır. 4-Bugün Bayram olmasına rağmen Iskenderun kaza Kaymakamının emri ile postahane çalışmaya açılmış ve üzerinde Türk parası bulunan Sb.Gd. ve erattan para göndermek isteyenler paralarını memleketlerine göndermişlerdir. 5-Tugaydan alınan emir üzerine birliklerimizin Sb.Gd.ve eratımızdan gemiye bineceklerin isimleri baba adları doğumları ile As.Şb.lerini belirten isim çizelgeleri iki nüsha olarak tanzim edilip Alaya sunuldu.	
25-9-50 P.İrtesi	Atik Yaylası	1. Tb. K. Bnb. <i>K. K. K.</i> 1-1.Tb.K.nı ile birlikte iki kafile K.nı (General W.G.Haan) gemisine bindiler.(Yardımcı personel ile birlikte) 2-Tb.un anbara nakledilmesi icap eden eşya ve ağırlıkları kamyonlarla Iskenderun rıhtımına taşındı. 3-Dün 5n hey'et personeli binmiş olan III. Tb.ile gidecek birlikler Yb.Natık Poyrasoğlunun emri Komutasında yerleşme binme işi son bularak Türk donanmasından bir muhrip refakatinde saat 23.10 da (MAKRAY) gemisi ile hareket etti.	
26-9-50 Salı	Atik ve Haan ge.	1. Tb. K. Bnb. <i>K. K. K.</i> 1-Vapura binmek için hazırlık başladı.25-9-950 günü Sayın Gn.Kur.Bşk.geldi.Son hazırlıklarında gördükten sonra tayyare ile Ankaraya hareket etti. 2- Ordugahtaki erata saat 05.00 de yemek yedirildi.Birlikler 06.30 da iltihama ettiler.Saat 07.00 de yürüyüş geçildi.Tb.Saat 11.00 de rıhtımda gösterilen yerde istirahatata geçti. 3-Erata 8'le yemeği komonya olarak verildi.(Zeytin,kavurma,soğan,patates,domates,sarımsak) <u>Binme:</u> Saat 14.00 de gemiye binmeye başladı.Evvale Tugay Kh.Ve Gd.liler binmeye başladı.Eratl.Tb.Önde savaş torbaları sol omuzlarına asılı Tf.leri	

L. ATASE, Kore Harbi Kataloğu, 1/22/22-23, 26 August 1950

A	1-2
D	1
F	2

T. C.
M. S. B.
Genelkurmay Başkanlığı
Harekât Bşk.
Eğitim Daire Bşk.
V.M. Ş. 3. Ks.
Sayı 194897

ANKARA
26. Ağu. 1950

ONKUR
ATASE
ARŞİVİ

Öz: Koreye gidecek Türk silahlı kuvvetleri eğitimi U.

Onkur? İsmâ: ATASE: 1560-434-40/ATASE ARŞİV

Ek: 19-Ağu.-950 tarih ve 194897 sayılı emre.

1- Daireler ve Amerikalı Uzmanlarca hazırlanan eğitim programları incelenmiş, Amerikalı uzmanların tavsiye ettikleri programlar uygun görülerek tatbiki emredilmiştir. Bunların bir örneği K.K.K.lığına ve ilgili Dairelere verilecektir.

2- Koreye gidecek Savak birliğinin eğitimlerine Pazartesi ve Pazar günleri de devam edilecek, yalnız 30-Ağu. günü tatil yapılacaktır.

3- Sabah talimlerine normal olarak Saat:08,00 de başlanacak, 12,00 de 14,00 e kadar istirahat verilecek, 14,00:17,00 talime devam olunacaktır.

Gece talimlerine sık,sık gıkılacak ve erlerin gece muharebeleri için melekeleri arttırılacaktır.

4- I.Safha programları 25-Ağu.-950: 15-Eyl.-950 arasında tatbik edilecek; 16:25-Eyl. arasında da,tatbik edilen programların noksan kısımlarına takviye edilecektir.

5- Her hafta Pazartesi günleri,bir hafta içinde tatbik edilen programlarda görülen güçlükler ve noksan kısımlar,buna ait teklifler,bir rapor halinde K.K.K.lığından Onkur.a bildirilecektir.

6- Programların tatbikinde ve eğitimin yürütülmesinde Amerikalı uzmanlar asama dereceye yardım edeceklerdir. Birlik K.larınca kendilerine bütün kolaylıkların gösterilmesini rica ederim.

7- Kara Kuv.K.ına ve bilgi için Da.,Hava Kuv.K.larına arz edilmiş ve Onkur. İsmâ Bşk.lığına,Harekât,İs.,Ma.,Ulaştırma,Ordonat ve Sağlık D. Bşk.liklerine benzer verilmiştir.

Genelkurmay Başkanı Y.
Korgeneral
Zekâi O'kan

Aslı gibidir.

Gen'ut. Cag.	16. B. Or.
S. N.	166 846
T. Y.	28. 8. 950
K. N.	2. 11. 11. 5

Cevaplarda Ş. nin ismi, tarih ve No. nun yazılması lazımdır.

M. ATASE, Kore Harbi Kataloğu, 1/22/22-24, 26 August 1950

T. C.
Kara Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı
Harekât Başkanlığı

Ankara

26 - Ağs. - 1950

Öz: Kore'ye gidecek Türk
silahlı Kuvvetleri eğitimi

Öz. İVEDİ

III. Ş. 1. Ka
Sayı: 205977

II. Ş. Md.10ğüne

1- Daireler ve Amerikalı Uzmanlarca hazırlanan eğitim pro-
gramları incelenmiş, Amerikalı Uzmanların tavsiye ettikleri programlar
uygun görülerek tatbiki emredilmiştir. Bunların bir örneği, ilgili bir-
lik, Daire ve Gr.lara verilecektir.

2- Kore'ye gidecek savaş birliğinin eğitimlerine Cumartesi ve
Pazar günleri de devam edilecek, yalnız 30-Ağustos günü tatil yapıla-
caktır.

3- Sabah talimlerine normal olarak 08:00, 00 de bağlanacak,
12,00 den 14,00 e kadar istirahat verilecek, 14,00 : 17,00 talime de-
vam olmaktadır.
Gece talimlerine sık sık çıkılacak ve erlerin gece muharebele-
ri için melekeleri arttırılacaktır.

4- I. Sefha programları 25-Ağs.-1950 : 15-Eyl.-1950 arasında
tatbik edilecek, 16 : 23-Eyl.-1950 arasında da, tatbik edilen program-
ların noksan kalan kısımları takviye edilecektir.

5- Her hafta Cumartesi günleri saat 09,00 da, bir hafta için
de tatbik edilen programlarda görülen güçlükler ve noksan kalan kısım-
lar, buna ait teklifler bir rapor halinde K. K. K. ligüne bildirile-
cektir.

6- Programların tatbikinde ve eğitimin yürütülmesinde Ameri-
kalı Uzmanlar azami derecede yardım edeceklerdir. Birlik K. larında
kendilerine bütün kolaylıkların gösterilmesine emirlerini arz ederim.

7- Bilgi için 38. Tüm. K.ligüne, gereği için B.M. Türk Si-
lahlı Kuvvetler K., P., Top. D. Bşk.lıklarına arz edilmiş ve bir suret
II. Ş. Md.10ğüne verilmiştir.

K. K. Harekât Başkanı V.
Kur.Alb.
(Hüseyin Ataman)

190273
1. KT
28. Ağu 1950

TASNİF DİZİ
GİRİŞ 27.09.1010

ATASE: 5060-44/10/ATASE ALKIN

ÖZETİ

ÖZETİ

N. BCA, 30-1-0-0 / 102- 630 – 8, 5 August 1950

DEVLET ARŞİVLERİ GENEL MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ
CUMHURİYET ARŞİVİ

T. C.
BAŞBAKANLIK

Basın - Yayın ve Turizm Genel Md.

Büro Müdürlüğü

Sayı : 558/4926

Ankara: 5/8/1950

F 11

Sayın Bay
Basri Aktaş
Başbakanlık
Hususi Kalem Müdürü

Hükümetimizin Kore'ye askerî yardım kararının Birleşik Amerika'daki akisleri ve Birleşmiş Milletler Konseyine girmek hususundaki teşebbüslerimizden bahseden neşriyat hakkında New York Haberler Bürosu Müdürlüğünden alınan 28 temmuz 1950 tarih ve 5778 sayılı yazı sureti leffen takdim edilmiştir.

Sayın Başbakan'a ve Başbakan Yardımcısı Sayın Samet Ağaoğlu'na arzına delaletinizi rica ederim.

Cumhurbaşkanlığına, Millî Savunma Bakanlığına ve Dışişleri Bakanlığına yazılmıştır.

Genel Müdür -.

Dr. Halim Alyot

(Dr. Halim Alyot)

5.08.50
F/11

Verilen cevaplarda : Daire ve Şube adının yazılması

030	01			102	630	8
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Tarih: 28 temmuz 1950
Sayı: 5778

Basın-Yayın ve Turizm Genel Müdürlüğüne

Takdir buyrulacağı üzere, Hükümetimizin Kore'ye askeri yardım göndermek hususundaki kararı, burada son derece müspet akisler uyan-dırmıştır. New York'taki büyük gazeteler, haberi birinci sayfelerinde yayınladıkları gibi, New York Herald Tribune gazetesi, 27 Temmuz 1950 tarihli sayısında İngiliz Hükümetinin yardım kararını yayınlarken, "Türkiye'den sonra İngiltere, Avustralya ve Yeni Zelanda da Kore'ye asker gönderecekler" başlığını kullanmıştır.

Yardım kararımız, radyolarda bir iki defa tekrarlanmıştır. Bu konudaki tefsirlere bir misal teşkil etmek üzere, Mr. Fulton Lewis'in 26 Temmuz Çarşamba günü saat 19.00 da New York'ta WGR radyosundaki konuşmasının Türkiye hakkındaki kısmını arz ediyorum.

"Bilhassa Türkiye'nin askeri yardım teklifi çok manalıdır. Çünkü, bu küçük memleket, dünya harbinin hitamındanberi Sovyet namusunun ağzında oturmakta, Rusya'nın ve peyklerinin daimi tazyiki altında bulunmaktadır.

Komünistler, Yunanistan'la birlikte Türkiye'ye de hakim olmağa çalıştıkları zaman biz Türkiye'ye silah yardımında bulunmuştuk. Doğu Avrupa'daki komünist tehdidini hakikaten Amerika önlemişti. Fakat, dünyanın diğer kısımları ile olan münasebetlerimizde yapılan yardımdan dolayı takdir görmek ender tesadüf edilen bir meta olduğundan, bu günkü durumda ve bilhassa şu şartlar içinde Türkiye'nin yardım teklifi son derece ferahlatıcıdır."

NBC ve WPIX televizyon istasyonlarında ordumuzun manevralarını gösteren eski filimlerimizden parçalar yayınlanmıştır.

Güvenlik Konseyine iştirakimiz hakkında WLIB istasyonunda Mr. Estelle M. Sternberger tarafından Güvenlik Konseyine seçilmemiz hakkında yayınlanan konuşmada şöyle denilmektedir :

"Birleşmiş Milletler, Arap Devletlerinin Kore, meselesi karşısındaki çekingen durumunu müzahede ederken, Güvenlik Konseyine Orta Doğudan seçilecek üyeyi düşünmektedir. Türkiye Kongreye girmek için açık ve agresif bir kampanyaya başlamıştır. Türkiye, Orta Doğu için umumiyetle bir Arap Devletine verilen konsey azalığının yalnız Arap Birliği Üyelerine inhisar ettirilmemesini belirtmektedir. Aynı zamanda, Orta Doğuda en kuvvetli devlet olduğunu ileri sürmekte ve Genel Kurul tarafından seçilmeye layık olduğunu ilham etmektedir. Arap Birliğinin azaları ise, üyeliğin Lübnan, Irak veya Suriye'ye isabet edeceğini tahmin etmektedirler.

Bugünkü buhran muvacehesinde, Arapların, değişen ve mütereddit durumları karşısında, Konsey Üyeliğine demokrat bir hükümet idaresine giren Türkiye'ye vermek daha emin olacaktır."

Keyfiyeti yüksek bilgilerine sunarken, Büromuzun listesinde

Verilen cevaplarda : Daire ve Şube adının yazılması

030	04			102	630	8
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2

DEVLET ARŞİVLERİ GENEL MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ
CUMHURİYET ARŞİVİ
T. C.

B A Ş B A K A N L I K
BASIN ve YAYIN GENEL MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ
Büro Müdürlüğü
Sayı :

- 2 -

bulunan mezkûr tefsircilerle memleketimiz hakkındaki müspet yayınları münasebetile tekrar temas edildiğini ve ilgilerini takviye maksadile kendilerine teşekkür edildiğini ayrıca saygılarımla arz ederim.

Nuri Eren
Haberler Bürosu Müdürü



Verilen cevaplarda : Daire ve şube adının yazılması.

039 54 102 620 8

3

O. BCA, 30-1-0-0 / 17- 98 – 49, 21 August 1950

DEVLET ARŞİVLERİ GENEL MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ
CUMHURİYET ARŞİVİ

21.8.1950

M.K.P.Başkanı,
Bergama.

Y,

Vatanpervarane hissiyatınızın açık bir ifadesi olan 15.8.1950 tarihli mektubunuzu memnurlukla okudum .

Teşekkürlerimi sunarken Vatan ve Millet uğrunda ki çalışmalarınızın muvaffakiyetli olmasını dilerim . Saygılarımla .

030	01			17	98	49
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MİLLİ KALKINMA PARTİSİ
BERGAMA KURULU
SAYI
202

DEVLET ARŞİVLERİ GENEL MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ
CUMHURİYET ARŞİVİ

Sayın Başbakan Adnan Menderes

A n k a r a

Milli Kalkınma Partisi Bergama kurulunun aşağıdaki
görevlerini arz eder yurtdağlarımıza Radyo ile duyurulmasını rica ederim.

1- İktidarı temsil eden hükümetimiz dünya sulhunu tehdit
eden Komünist tecavüzünü önlemek için cenup Korelilerin yardım isteği-
ne yer vermekle Birleşmiş Milletler Anlaşmalarına uygun olarak hareket
etmiştir.

2- Birleşmiş Milletlerin mevcudiyeti anlaşmalarına sadakat
gösteren milletlerin sözleriyle birleşmesi gereken hareketlerine bağlı-
dır.

3- Kanaatımızca muhaliflere düşen vazife dahilde hakkı gö-
zetmektir. Yardım nisbeti üzerinde durarak Beşinci kola gedik açmak de-
ğil, Milli vahdetimizi bütün mevcudiyetimizle muhafaza ettirmektir.

4- Dünyâ kstü zihniyetlerle muhalif olanların dahilde soy-
lentilerile, neşriyatta kalemlerile efkârı umumiyeyi bulandırmak isteyen-
ler göze carpacaktır. Yersiz ismâatlarını has bir Türk olarak hammetme-
ye imkan olmadığını arz eder, bu gibileri nefretlerimizle karşılarız.

5- Dahilde türemek istediği sezilen yılançıkların üremesi-
ne meydan vermeden kanun yolu ile başı ezilmelidir. Hakkı korumakta as-
li vazifemiz Milli beraberliğimizi yaknesak mevcudiyetimizle korumaktır.

Hükümetimizin yerinde olan hareketini tasvip eder, dahilde
huzurun muhafazasını bekleriz. Hormetler.

Sözcü : Cetin

M. K. P.
Başkanı
Halit Aksoy

030	01			17	98	49
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2

P. BCA, 30-1-0-0 / 5- 26 - 29, 1954

[1954]

BASBAKANLIK
HUSUSI KALEM MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ
DEVLET ARŞİVLERİ GENEL MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ
CUMHURİYET ARŞİVİ

Sayın Kingsbury Smith,
Amerikan International News Service'in
Avrupa Genel Müdürü

1- Türkiye, Birleşmiş Milletler Şartına bağlılığını her zaman ilân etmiştir. Hükümetimizin kanaatine, bir bütün teşkil eden barışın korunmasının en kuvvetli teminatı, mezkûr Şartın sadakatle yerine getirilmesinde mündemiçtir. Bunun içindir ki Birleşmiş Milletlere üye her devletin vecibelerini tereddütsüz icra mevkiine koymasını zaruri sayarız.

2- Nereden gelirse gelsin tecavüze uğramış herhangi bir memleketin yardım talebine icabet, bütün üye devletlerin vazifesidir. Şart mucibince ilk defa vukubulan bu yardım talebi karşısında, Üyelerin büyük ekseriyetinin müsbet cevap vermiş olmalarının umumî barışı korumak ve yeni tecavüslere önlemek bakımalarından ehemmiyetli ve ımt verici olduğu aşikârdır. Diğer yandan, Şartın derpiş ettiği vechile, Dünya emniyetini ve barışını korumakla mükellef bir Milletlerarası askerî teşkilâtın biran evvel kurulmasındaki zaruret bu hadise ile de belirmiş bulunduğundan, bu konunun ciddiyetle ele alınması hususunun daha fazla geciktirilmesi cais olmayacağı düşüncesindedir.

3- Birleşmiş Milletlerin, nerede vukubulursa bulsun bir tecavüs karşısında harekete geçmemesi yeni tecavüslere yol açar ve nevama tecavüze prim teşkil ederdi.

4- Birleşmiş Milletler arasında dayanışma mevcut oldukça, hakkın ve barışın tecavüze galebe çalacağından şüphe edilmemelidir.

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030	01			5	26	23
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BASBAKANLIK
HUSUSI KALEM MODORLOGU

-2-

DEVLET ARŞİVLERİ GENEL MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ
CUMHURİYET ARŞİVİ

5- Türkiye, her barış sever memleket gibi, bundan böyle karşılıklı anlayış zihniyetinin hakim olmasını ve barışa ulaşılmasını samimiyetle arzu ve ümit etmektedir.

Saygılarımla,

Türkiye Başbakanı
Adnan Menderes

030	01			5	26	29
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2

BAŞBAKANLIK
MUSUSİ KALEM MODORLOGO

DEVLET ARŞİVLERİ GENEL MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ
CUMHURİYET ARŞİVİ

Sayın Adnan Menderes,
Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanı,
Ankara-Türkiye

Ekselans,

Kore'deki tecavüze karşı konulmasına yardım için Türk kıtalarının Birleşmiş Milletler emrine verileceği haberi ile ilgili olarak aşağıdaki sualleri zâti âlilerine arz etmek cür'etinde bulunuyorum.

1- Hangi amiller, Türk Hükûmetini, Kore'de sulhun yeniden teessüsüne yardım gayesiyle Birleşmiş Milletler tarafından vukubulan silahlı kuvvetler gönderilmesi talebine icabet etmeğe sevkettir?

2- Birleşmiş Milletlerin Kore'deki tecavüze karşı koyma kararının sair bölgelerde tecavüze girişme cesaretini kırabileceğine inanıyormusunuz?

3- Kanaatinizce Birleşmiş Milletler Kore'de filen harekete geçmemiş olsalardı, netice ne olurdu?

4- Birleşmiş Milletler kuvvetlerinin Kore'de ergeç muzaffer olacaklarından eminmisiniz?

5- Birleşmiş Milletlerin Kore'de kazanacağı bir zaferin Dünya Sulhunun korunması bahsinde Büyük Doğu ve Batı Devletleri arasında mustakbel bir anlaşmayı kolaylaştıracağına inanıyormusunuz?

Kingsbury Smith,
Amerikan International News
Service'in Avrupa
Genel Müdürü

030	01			5	26	29
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3

Q. TURKISH SUMMARY/TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Bu tez Kore Savaşı sırasında Türkiye ile ABD arasındaki ilişkiyi incelemiştir. Tezin sorusu Türkiye'nin Kore Savaşı'na katılımının ikili ilişkileri nasıl etkilediği olmuştur. Bu doğrultuda, bu tez Türkiye'nin Kore Savaşı'na katılımı ile Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerine etkisinin, peşine takılma teorisi çerçevesinde açıklanabileceği savunmuştur. Bu noktadan yola çıkarak çalışmada birincil kaynaklar temel alınıp teorik bir çerçeve uygulanarak ikili ilişkiler incelenmiştir. Çalışma sırasında özetle, öncelikle 1945-1950 arasındaki Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri ele alınarak Kore Savaşı'na odaklanılmıştır. Ardından Türkiye ile ABD'nin Kore Savaşı'na katılımı değerlendirilerek Türkiye'nin Kore Savaşı'na katılımının Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri üzerindeki etkisi incelenmiştir. Sonuç olarak; Türkiye'nin Kore Savaşı'na katılımı ile Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerine etkisinin, peşine takılma teorisi çerçevesinde açıklanabileceği savunulan bu tezde etki; güvenlik ve ekonomi olmak üzere iki alanda belirginlik göstermektedir. Güvenlik alanında; Amerikan askeri yardımında artış, BM Güvenlik Konseyi Üyeliği, komünist tehdidini yenme isteği ve son olarak NATO üyeliği isteği olmak üzere dört ana faktör vardır. Ekonomik alanda ise Amerikan ekonomik yardımının sürekliliği ve Türkiye'deki Amerikan yatırımındaki artışı olmak üzere iki ana etken oldukça göze çarpmaktadır.

Bu tez giriş ve sonuç bölümleri dışında beş bölümden oluşmaktadır. Giriş bölümünden sonra literatür taraması ve teorik çerçevenin açıklandığı bölüm yer almaktadır. Daha önce bu konu hakkında yapılmış çalışmalar genel olarak üç ana

tartışma çerçevesinde açıklanabilir. Bunlardan ilki Türkiye- Amerika ilişkilerini inceleyen çalışmalar, ikincisi Türkiye'nin Kore Savaşı'na dahil olması üzerine yapılan çalışmalar ve üçüncüsü ise Amerika'nın Kore Savaşı'na katılması hakkında yapılan çalışmalardır. Tüm bu üç kategorideki çalışmalar göz önüne alındığında, yapılan araştırmalar beş ana başlık altında toplandıkları söylenebilir: a) yakın Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri üzerinde etkili olan faktörlere odaklanan çalışmalar, b) Kore Savaşı'nda Türk dış politikası, c) Kore Savaşı'nda Amerikan dış politikası, d) hem Türk hem de Amerikan basınının her iki devletin politikaları üzerindeki etkisi ve son olarak, e) Türk birliklerinin Kore Savaşı'ndaki başarısı. Bu başlıklar üzerine çok sayıda makale, kitap ve tez yazılmış olup, Türkiye-Amerika ilişkileri irdelenmiştir. Bu bölümün ikinci kısmında tezde uygulanacak teorik çerçeve anlatılmıştır. O dönemin Türk hükümeti Sovyetleri kendilerine karşı Sovyetlerin Türkiye'ye karşı tutumu ve Türkiye'ye olan yakınlığından dolayı tehdit olarak algıladığı için, teorik açıklamada da belirtildiği üzere, Peşine Takılma Teorisi Türkiye durumuna uygulanabilir. Ayrıca, teorik çerçeveye göre güçsüz devletler zayıf kurumlarından dolayı, güçlü devletlerin yanında yer alarak onlarla birlikte zafer kazanmayı hedefliyorlar. Dolayısıyla, Türkiye'de “zayıf kurumları” nedeniyle “zafer kazanma” gibi bir ihtiyacı sahipti. Bu ihtiyacını karşılamak, Türkiye'nin Kore Savaşı'na dahil olma sebeplerinden biri oldu. Bunlara ek olarak, Türkiye İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra tek başına kalmış bir konuma sahip olduğundan, “potansiyel müttefiklerin yokluğu” söz konusuydu ve “gelecek korkusu” nedeniyle Türkiye müttefikler arıyordu. Bir başka biçimde ifade etmek gerekirse, Türkiye İkinci Dünya Savaşı'na katılmama kararı alarak, herhangi bir tarafta yer almak yerine, tarafsız olmayı

seçmişti. Fakat bu tarafsızlık, Türkiye'yi yalnızlığa itmiş ve diğer devletler tarafından düşman olarak görülmüştür. Bu sebeplerden dolayı da Türkiye bir tarafın yanında yer almak istemiş ve müttefik arayışına girmiştir. Daha öncede belirtildiği üzere Sovyetleri tehdit olarak gördüğünden dolayı batı dünyasının yanında yer almayı tercih etmiştir. O dönemlerde ABD'nin diğer Batılı devletlere kıyasla daha üstün bir güce sahip olması, ABD batıyı temsil etmekteydi. Bu nedenle o dönemde Türkiye'nin batının yanında yer alma isteğinden dolayı, Türkiye ABD'ye yanaşmaya karar vermiştir.

Bu tezin üçüncü bölümünde ise 1945 ve 1950 yılları arasındaki Türkiye ve ABD ilişkisi incelenmiştir. Kore Savaşı sırasındaki ikili ilişkinin incelenebilmesi için öncelikle İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonraki dönemdeki Türkiye ABD ilişkisinin analiz edilmesi gerekmektedir. Bu şekilde ikili ilişkinin geçmişten geleceğe nasıl geliştiği gözlemlenebilmiştir. Bu ikili ilişki her iki ülkenin de dış politikalarının oluşmasında temel olmuştur. Bu bölümün ilk kısmında Yalta Konferansı ve Boğazlar Sorununa ışık tutulmuştur. İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra, yeni bölgelerin kontrolü konusunda bir ihtilaf vardı ve dolayısıyla, yeni dünya sınırlarına karar verilmesi gerekiyordu. Bu nedenle, bu sorunlara bir çözüm bulmak amacı ile, üç önde gelen cumhurbaşkanı 4 -11 Şubat 1945 tarihleri arasında Kırım'da Yalta'da bir araya geldi. Bu üç önder; Amerikan Cumhurbaşkanı Roosevelt, İngiltere Başbakanı Churchill ve Sovyet Rusya Lideri Stalin'di. Her üç lider de barış terimlerini ve Avrupa ülkelerinin durumunu tartışmıştır. Konferansın oturumlarında genellikle Almanya konusu tartışılmış ve Birleşmiş Milletler Örgütü'nün kurulması için önemli adımlar atılması gerektiğine ve San Francisco'da bu örgüt ile ilgili ayrı bir toplantı

yapılması gerektiğine karar verilmiştir. Konferansın son oturumunda ise, her üç devlet başkanı da herhangi bir soruna karşı ortak eylemde bulunmaya karar verdi. Ayrıca, barışı ve güvenliği sağlama sözü verdiler. Tüm bunlara ek olarak, herhangi bir acil durumda birlikte hareket etmeyi kabul ettiler. Boğazlar Sorunu ise Yalta Konferansı sırasında tartışılan bir diğer konudur. Bu konu Türkiye'yi yakından ilgilendirmekte ve çok büyük bir öneme sahiptir. Konferansın 10 Şubat 1945 tarihinde yapılan oturumunda Stalin, Boğazlar Sorununun kaynaklandığı Montrö Sözleşmesi'nin değiştirilmesini önermiştir. Bu öneriye hem Roosevelt hem de Churchill olumlu yaklaşmıştır. Bunun sebebi Türkiye'nin İkinci Dünya Savaşı sırasında izlemiş olduğu tarafsızlık politikasıdır. Her iki devlet her ne kadar Stalin'in önerisini kabul etse bile, Boğazlar Meselesinin ayrı bir zamanda farklı bir platformda uluslararası bir ortamda tartışılması gerektiğini belirtmişlerdir. Ayrıca, Boğazlar meselesiyle ilgili alınan her kararın Türkiye'ye bildirilmesi gerektiği ve Türkiye'nin de güvenliğinin göz önüne alınması gerektiğini belirtmişlerdir. Kısacası Yalta Konferansı, Türkiye için çok önemli olan bölgenin sınırları konusunda müzakerelere yer verirken, Boğazlar Sorunu doğrudan Türkiye'nin güvenlik kaygıları ile ilgiliydi.

Türk dış politikası bu bölümde tartışılan bir başka meseledir. Bu kısım İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra Türk dış politikası ve Türkiye'nin ABD'ye yönelik dış politikasının evrimini gözden geçirmektedir. Türk dış politikasının temel amaçları, Batı'yla olan ilişkilerini ittifaklar yoluyla güçlendirmek, NATO'ya üye olmak ve Sovyet tehdidi nedeniyle Doğu Bloğu ile etkileşimini sınırlandırmaktır. İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra, Türkiye batı ile ilişkisini sürdürdü. Ancak Türkiye için kendi

bağımsızlığı en önemli önceliğe sahip olduğu için batı devletlerinin içişlerine karışmasına izin vermedi. Türkiye'nin hedefi, nihayetinde Türk hükümetine baskı uygulayan SSCB'ye gücünü göstermek için ekonomik, sosyal ve teknolojik önlemler açısından Batı ile yakın ilişki içinde olmaktı. İki kutuplu sistem ayrıca, Türkiye'nin ABD ile iyi ilişkiler sürdürme vurgusuna katkıda bulundu. Türkiye ile ABD arasındaki ilişki, 1945'ten bu yana Türkiye'nin dış politikasında öncelik kazanmıştı. Ayrıca, NATO üyeliği uğruna, Türk hükümeti, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin onayını beklemeden, Kore Savaşı'nda ABD ve Güney Kore'yi desteklemek için Kore'ye yaklaşık olarak 4500 asker gönderdi. Özetle, 1945-1950 arasındaki dönemde, Türk hükümeti güvenlik endişelerine, yani Türkiye'ye karşı Sovyet tehdidine odaklandı. Kısacası, Sovyet tehdidinden kendisini korumak için, Türk dış politikası ABD ile daha yakın ilişkiler kurmaya ve desteğini kazanmaya odaklanmıştı.

Amerikan dış politikası bu bölümde tartışılan başka bir kısımdır. İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra ABD dış politikasının Türkiye'ye yönelik iki önemli nokta dikkat çekmektedir. Bunlar; ABD'nin Boğazların kontrolü ve güvenliği konusundaki tutumu ve ABD'nin kasım ayında Türkiye'ye gönderdiği 2 Kasım 1945 tarihli notadır. İlk konuyla başlamak gerekirse; başlangıçta ABD'nin Türkiye'ye yönelik dış politikası çoğunlukla İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra Boğazların güvenliği ve geleceği üzerinde odaklanmaktaydı. Daha önceden de bahsedildiği üzere, Türkiye'nin İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda izlemiş olduğu tarafsızlık politikasından dolayı Türkiye yalnız kalmıştır. Bu sebeple Amerika Türkiye'nin güvenliğinden önce Boğazların güvenliğini ön planda tutmuştur. Fakat Amerika'nın bu tutumu

zamanla deęiřmiř ve sadece Boęazların gvenlięinden ziyade Trkiye'nin kendi gvenlięini de n plana koymuřtur. Bu doęrultuda, bu blgelerin gvenlięini saęlamak iin ABD, Trkiye'ye zel nem verdi. Amerika'nın fikrinde deęiřiklięinin temelinde ise Sovyet Rusya'nın ticaret ve savunma kolaylıęı iin Akdeniz blgesine sızmanın yollarını bulmaya alıřmasıydı. Amerika eęer Trkiye'nin gvenlięini korumak iin gerekli adımları atmaz ise, Sovyet Rusya Trkiye'yi kolay bir řekilde hakimiyet altına alabilirdi. Amerika bu durumdan ekindięi iin de fikrini deęiřtirip Trkiye'nin gvenlięini korumak iin gerekli politikaları izledi. ABD'nin Trkiye'ye ynelik tutumundaki bu deęiřme ve Truman'ın Trkiye'nin blge gvenlięinin korunmasına dair gerekli adımların atılmasına dair sarf ettięi szleri ABD'nin Trk hkmetini daha destekleyici hale getirdięini aıka ortaya koymaktadır. ABD'nin Trkiye'yi destekleme taahhd, ABD'nin 2 Kasım 1945'te Trkiye'ye gnderdięi notada aıka gsterildi. Nota, Boęazların kontrolne iliřkin Montr Szleřmesindeki hkmlerin gncellenmesi amacıyla 1946'da uluslararası bir konferans yapılması nerisinde bulundu. Bu konferansın uluslararası bir konferans olması gerektięi ve her iki taraf devletinde katılımının olması gerektięi de notada belirtildi. Nota Amerikan Bykelisi, Edwin Wilson tarafından Trkiye Cumhuriyeti Dıřıřleri Bakanlığı'na gnderildi. Nota, beř temel istek iin aęrıda bulunmuřtur. Bunlar; ticari gemilerin tm lkelerden serbest geiři, Boęazların zerinden Karadeniz Devletlerine ait savař gemilerinin serbest geiři, barıř veya Birleřmiř Milletlerin izninin olduęu dnemler hari Karadeniz Devletleri dıřındaki lkelerin geiřinin kısıtlanması, BM'nin kuruluřu ve son olarak, Japonya'nın yelięinden ıkarılması. zetle, ABD dıř politikası bařlangıta

Boğazların güvenliğine odaklanmıştı, ancak zamanla Sovyet Rusya'nın Türkiye'yi kontrolü altına alma isteğinden dolayı Türkiye'nin güvenliğini öncelik sırasına koymak için değişiklik gösterdi.

Amerikan dış politikasının altında Amerika'nın İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra yapmış olduğu ekonomik yardımlar ve NATO'nun kuruluşu detaylı bir biçimde incelendi. Ekonomik yardımlarla başlamak gerekirse, ilk yardım Truman Doktriniydi. 4 Mart 1947'de imzalanan Truman Doktrini, ABD Başkanı Harry S. Truman'ın Yunanistan ve Türkiye'ye askeri yardım sağlama vaadidir. İngiliz hükümeti daha öncesinde her iki ülkeye de hem ekonomik hem de askeri yardımda bulunuyordu. Fakat daha fazla bu yardımı yapamayacağını belirterek, İngiliz hükümeti Amerika'nın ekonomik olarak güçlü olduğunu düşünerek yardıma ABD hükümetinin devam etmesi konusunda çağrıda bulundu. ABD bu çağrıyı cevapsız bırakmadı ve yardıma devam etmeyi kabul etti. Yardımı da Truman Doktrini adı altında yapacağını duyurdu. Dolayısıyla, ABD harekete geçti ve komünizme karşı savaşmak için Truman Doktrinini uyguladı. Bu kararı vermesindeki temel sebep, eğer Türkiye'ye ve Yunanistan'a yapılan yardım kesilirse, her iki ülkede Sovyet Rusya'nın kontrolü altına girme tehlikesiydi, çünkü ne Türkiye ne de Yunanistan yardım olmadan kendi ekonomik ve askeri bağımsızlığa sahip olacak güçte değildi. Dolayısıyla, her iki ülkede dış tehditlere karşı savunmasız ve güçsüzdü. Ayrıca, Truman Doktrini için bir başka motivasyon ABD'nin Doğu Akdeniz'in güvenliğine olan ilgisiydi. ABD'nin amacı bu ilgiyi teşvik etmektir. Türkiye'ye ve Yunanistan'a yapacağı yardımlarla sadece iki ülkeyi değil Doğu Akdeniz ülkelerini de güvence altına almaktaydı. Truman Doktrini hem Sovyet Rusya'nın bölgedeki hakimiyet

isteğini engellemiş hem de Doğu Akdeniz ülkelerinin güvenliğini sağlamıştı. Özetle, ABD hükümetinin Truman Doktrini adı altındaki mali yardımı, Türkiye ile ABD arasındaki ilişkide kilit bir rol oynamıştır. ABD hükümetinin bir diğer ekonomik yardımı ise Marshall Planıydı. Marshall Planı sadece Avrupa devletlerinin değil Türkiye'nin ekonomisinin de güçlenmesine katkıda bulunmuştur. İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra, Avrupa devletleri askeri ve ekonomik güç kaybı yüzünden kaos halindeydi. Bu, savaşın yol açtığı yıkımla birlikte, Sovyetler Birliği ve komünizmin yükselişine de yol açmıştı. ABD bu tehdide karşı koymak için Avrupa ülkelerine ekonomik destek sağlama fikrini destekleyerek hem bağımsızlıklarını hem ekonomik hem de politik olarak koruyabilmişti. Ayrıca, devletlerin Sovyet tehdidine karşı koyabilmelerini de sağladı. Bu nedenle, ABD'nin amacı, Avrupa'da komünizme ve ekonomik bunalımla mücadele etmek için Avrupa ülkeleri arasında siyasi ve ekonomik işbirliğini sağlamaktır. Amerikan toplumu, Avrupa devletlerine yardım etmenin gerekli olduğuna inanmasına rağmen, önerilen yardımın kapsamını eleştirdiler. Özellikle, muhafazakâr kesim Marshall Planını eleştirdi. Bunun sebebi ise ABD'nin Batı ekonomisine çok fazla müdahale etmesine izin vermesiydi. Bu da bilinmeyen sonuçlar doğuracaktı. Türkiye, 8 Temmuz 1948 tarihinde Marshall Planına dahil edildi. 1948 ve 1959 yılları arasında Marshall Planı çerçevesinde, Türkiye toplamda 1.887.434.000 ABD Doları dolaylı olarak, 988.076.000 ABD Doları doğrudan kullanıldı. Türkiye bu yardımı ağırlıklı olarak tarım sektöründe kullandı. Ayrıca hem doğrudan hem de dolaylı olarak toplam 103.602.000 ABD Dolarını ordusunun gelişimi için kullandı. ABD hükümeti 1963'e kadar Marshall Planı adı altında yardım sağlamaya devam etti. Bunun sonucunda da Türkiye, birçok

dış meselede ABD ile yakın ilişkiler kurdu. Böylece ikili ilişkilerin ekonomik temelleri giderek sağlamlaştı. Amerikan dış politikasının son kısmında Kuzey Atlantik Antlaşması Örgütü'nün kuruluşu hakkında bilgi verildi. NATO'nun kökenleri, Brüksel Antlaşması olarak da bilinen Beş Güç Paktı'na dayanmaktadır. Bu beş güç; Belçika, Fransa, Lüksemburg, Hollanda ve Birleşik Krallıktı. Bu beş devlet, 17 Mart 1948'de Brüksel Antlaşmasını ortak bir savunma ittifakı olarak imzaladı. Bu antlaşmanın asıl amacı, Avrupa devletlerinin güvenlik konusunda birbirleriyle işbirliği yapabildiklerini göstermekti. İlgili tarafların bir diğer amacı ise, ortak bir savunma sistemi oluşturmak, ekonomik ve kültürel ilişkileri güçlendirmek ve uzun vadeli işbirliği için bir plan oluşturmaktı. Bu amaç doğrultusunda NATO toplam 12 üye devlet ile 4 Nisan 1949'da kuruldu. Bu 12 devlet; ABD, Kanada, Belçika, Danimarka, Fransa, İtalya, İzlanda, Lüksemburg, Hollanda, Norveç, Portekiz ve Birleşik Krallık. NATO 1952'de Türkiye ve Yunanistan, 1955'te Batı Almanya ve 1982'de İspanya'nın eklenmesiyle 16 üye ülkesi olmuştur. NATO'nun kuruluş amaçları bir kenara bırakıldığında tartışılması gereken bir diğer mesele Türkiye'nin NATO'ya üye olma isteğinin temel sebepleridir. Türkiye'nin NATO'ya katılmak için dört temel nedene sahipti. Birincisi Sovyet tehdidi idi. Türkiye'nin NATO üyeliğinin ikinci nedeni ise, Türkiye'nin Avrupa Konseyi'ne katılımıydı. Türkiye'nin NATO'ya katılma arzusunun üçüncü nedeni, ABD'deki mali yardımda olası bir düşüş konusunda endişeleriydi. Türkiye'nin NATO'ya katılma arzusunun son nedeni ise, demokratik düzenin korunmasıydı. Tüm sebepler göz önüne alındığında, Türkiye NATO üyeliği konusunda ABD hükümetini ikna ederek, NATO'ya 1952 yılında üye olmuştur.

Özetle, NATO'nun kurulması, İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra Türkiye ile ABD arasındaki ilişkilerde çok önemli bir faktör olmuştur. 1949 yılında Brüksel Antlaşması taraflarının talebi üzerine kurulmuştur. ABD, Sovyet tehdidi nedeniyle NATO'nun kuruluşunda yer almaya karar vermiş ve Türkiye, güvenlik ve mali yardım kaygıları nedeniyle NATO'ya üye olmayı istemiştir. Sonuçta, Türkiye'nin NATO üyeliği ABD ile olan ilişkileri üzerinde güçlü bir etkiye sahip olmuştur.

İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında ikili ilişkilerin incelemesinden sonra tezin dördüncü bölümünde Kore Savaşı'nın tarihsel sebebi, gelişimi ve sonuçları açıklanmıştır. Kore Savaşı'nın çıkış sebepleriyle başlamak gerekirse, savaşın başlaması için dört ana sebep vardı. Bunlar Kore'deki başarısız müzakereler, Birleşmiş Milletler'de Kore sorununun tartışılması, Kore'de iki devlet kurulması ve son olarak da ABD'nin komünist etkiden korkması ve Sovyetler Birliği'nin genişleme politikası idi. Savaşın başlangıcı ise 25 Haziran 1950 tarihinde Kuzey Kore'nin Güney Kore'ye saldırısı ile oldu. Kore Savaşı'nın süreci dört ana aşamada sınıflandırılabilir. İlk aşama, savaşın ilk aşamalarını, başka bir deyişle, savaşın başlangıcı ve Birleşmiş Milletlerin katılımını içermektedir. İkinci aşama, Kuzey Kore'nin Yalu ve Inchon'a müdahalesiyle ilgilidir. Üçüncü aşama, Çin'in savaşa katılımı ile belirlendi. Dördüncü aşama, savunma savaşı olan Ateş Savaşını ve ateşkes dönemini içermektedir. Ateşkes yapılmasına rağmen, Kuzey ve Güney Kore arasındaki tutarsızlık 1955'e kadar devam etti. Etkili bir şekilde, ateşkes anlaşmasının ardından Kore savaşı 1955'te sona erdi. Kore Savaşı'nın sonuçlarını değerlendirmek gerekirse, savaştan sonra siyasi manzara değişmedi. Kore'nin Güney

Kore ve Kuzey Kore'ye bölünmesi, her iki tarafın da sınırın 38. paralelini kabul etmesiyle son buldu.

Kore Savaşı'nın değerlendirilmesinden sonraki beşinci bölümde Kore Savaşı'na Türkiye ve ABD'nin katılımı değerlendirildi. Her iki devletinde Kore Savaşı'na giriş amaçları detaylıca incelendi. ABD hükümetinin giriş sebepleriyle başlamak gerekirse; ABD'nin katılımının, komünist tehdidini ve Sovyet'in genişlemesini önleme, BM Şartı'nın ihlal edilmesini önleme ve Amerikan prestijini ve politik ekonomisini koruma arzusu olmak üzere üç ana nedene sahipti. Türkiye'nin savaşa katılım sebeplerine değinilecek olursa; NATO'ya üye olmak ve bununla ilgili olarak komünizm ve Sovyet tehdidine karşı mücadele etmek için müttefik bulmak olmak üzere iki nedenden kaynaklanmaktadır. Türkiye için o sırada ABD, esas olarak Batı'yı temsil etmekteydi. Nitekim Türkiye, ABD'yi dev bir güç olarak görmekte haklı çıkmıştı. ABD, yüksek Gayrı Safi Yurtiçi Hasıla (GSYİH) ve askeri harcamalarının kanıtladığı gibi, önemli gücü nedeniyle İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra Batı Dünyasının temsilcisi haline gelmişti. Diğer devletler ile karşılaştırıldığında GSYİH seviyelerindeki çeşitlilik, ABD'nin GSYİH'nın açıkça arttığını ve ABD'nin diğer devletlerle karşılaştırıldığında dev bir güç olduğunu göstermiştir. Çok kısa bir sürede ABD'nin GSYİH'ı yüksek bir artış göstermiş ve GSYİH açısından en güçlü devlet olmuştu. ABD'nin yüksek askeri harcaması, askeriyeğe olan yatırımı muazzam ülkenin gücünün kanıtıydı. Bu doğrultuda o dönemdeki Türk hükümeti olumlu sonuçlarından dolayı ABD'nin peşime takılmayı tercih etmişti.

Son bölüm ise aslında bu tezin temel sorunsalını tartışmaktadır. Daha öncede belirtildiği gibi bu tezin amacı Türkiye'nin Kore Savaşı'na katılımının Türkiye-ABD ilişkilerini nasıl etkilediğini araştırmaktır. Bu doğrultuda, tez ikili ilişkilerin peşine takılma teorisi çerçevesinde incelenebileceğini savunmuş ve etkilerini incelemiştir. Bu bölümde bu etkileri değerlendirilmiştir. Bu çerçevede, Türkiye'nin savaşa dahil oluşunun iki taraflı ilişkileri esas olarak iki alanda etkilediği tespit edilmiştir. Savaş, iki ülke arasında ittifak bağlarının oluşmasına katkıda bulunduğundan, temel olarak güvenlik ve ekonomi alanlarında etkilediği çıkarımında bulunulmuştur. Güvenlik alanıyla başlamak gerekirse; Türkiye'nin savaşa katılımıyla, ikili ilişkiler güvenlik açısından dört ana faktörden etkilendi. Bunlar askeri yardım, BM Güvenlik Konseyi üyeliği, komünizmin önlenmesi ve Sovyet tehdidi ve son olarak da NATO üyeliği idi. Peşine Takılma Teorisi çerçevesinde, ABD'nin askeri yardım açısından üstünlüğü kazanımlarla eşleştirilebilir. Türkiye, askeri teçhizat desteği, askeri eğitim ve Türk birliklerinin nakliyesi anlamında askeri yardım yoluyla, ordusunu geliştirmeye ve kazancını artırmaya çalışmıştır. Türkiye, Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyine Orta Doğu devleti adı altında üye olarak seçilmek istedi. Böylece, BM'yi ve özellikle de ABD'yi ikna etmek için, Türkiye, Güney Kore'ye birlikler gönderdi. Bu doğrultuda BM üye devletlerine ilham vermek için çaba gösterdi. Bu üyelik, Peşine Takılma Teorisi çerçevesinde, artan kazanç ve kar elde etme olarak da açıklanabilir. Üçüncü faktöre geçmek gerekirse; Türkiye'nin savaşa dahil olmasıyla birlikte Türkiye ve ABD, komünizm ve Sovyet tehdidine karşı mücadele etmek için sıkı ilişkiler kurdu. Bu, tehlikeli dış tehditleri dengeleme iradesi ve gelecek korkusu, zayıf devletlerin

Peşine Takılma Teorisinin sebepleriyle ilişkilendirilebilir. Son etki göz önüne alındığında; Türkiye, ABD hükümetinin NATO üyeliği konusundaki kararını değiştirme aracı olarak Kore Savaşı'na katılımını kullandı. Bu üyelik, Peşine Takılma Teorisi çerçevesinde kazancı arttırma ve kar elde etme isteği ile de ilişkilendirilebilir. Türkiye savaşa katılarak NATO üyeliği konusunda ne kadar istekli ve kararlı olduğunu gösterdi ve NATO üyesi olmayı başardı. Kısacası güvenlik alanında askeri yardımlardaki artış, BM Güvenlik Konseyi üyeliği, Batı ile, özellikle ABD ile müttefiklik kurarak Sovyet tehdidini engellemek ve NATO üyeliği Türkiye'nin savaşa katılımının ikili ilişkiler üzerindeki olumlu etkileridir. Ekonomik alandaki etkileri göz önüne alındığında temel olarak iki etki bulunmuştur. Bunlar Amerikan ekonomik yardımlarının sürekliliği ve Türkiye'de yabancı yatırımın, özellikle Amerikan yardımlarının artışı. Türkiye, Marshall Plan ve Truman Doktrini de dahil olmak üzere ekonomik yardımın sürekliliğini güvence altına almak ve Türkiye'deki yabancı yatırımların sayısını ve hacmini artırmak için savaşa katıldı. Sonuç olarak, Türkiye'nin savaşa katılımıyla, Amerikan ekonomik yardımı ve Türkiye'deki yabancı yatırımların oranı büyük ölçüde artmıştır. Dolayısıyla, Türkiye'nin Kore Savaşı'na katılımı ile Türkiye'ye Amerikan ekonomik yardımının miktarı arasında bir ilişki bulunmaktadır. Türkiye'nin yardımı kullandığı alanlara geçtiğimizde, Amerikan ekonomik yardımının, Türkiye'nin ihtiyaç duyduğu alanlardan ziyade ABD'nin istediği alanlarda kullanıldığı iddia edilebilir. ABD yardımların çoğu, Demokrat Partisi yöneticileri tarafından tarım makineleri ve yol yapım ekipmanı satın almak için harcandı. Amerikan ekonomik yardımından dolayı ekonomik toparlanmanın meydana geldiği gözlenlenmiştir. Bu nedenle Amerikalı

giriřimcilere Trkiye'de yatırım iin bir fırsat verilmesi gerektiėi dnemin hkmeti tarafından belirtilmiřtir, nk bunun Trkiye'ye ekonomik yardımda artıřa yol aacaėı dřnlmřtr. Bu ama iin DP hkmeti bir dizi yasa ıkarmıřtır. rneėin, Yabancı Yatırım Kanunu (1 Aėustos 1951), Yabancı Sermayenin Teřvik Kanunu (18 Ocak 1954) ve son olarak Petrol Kanunu (7 Mart 1954). Bu yasaların yrrlėe girmesiyle birlikte Amerikalı yatırımcıların yatırım yapma arzusu artmıřtır. rneėin, 1954-1965 arasındaki dnemde yatırım iin lkeye giren yabancı sermayenin %30,5'i Amerikalı giriřimcilere aitti. Kısacası, ekonomik alan baėlamındaki nedenler, iki aıdan bakıldıėında, Peřine Takılma Teorisi ile ilgilidir, bunlar; kazancı artırmak ve zayıf devlet kurumlarıdır.

Sonuç olarak, bu tez, Trkiye'nin Kore Savařı'na katılımlarının Trkiye ile ABD arasındaki iliřki zerindeki etkisini analiz etmiřtir. Bu dnemde iliřkiler glenmiř ve ortak dıř politikaları takip edilmiřtir. Savařa katılımla Trkiye, Batı Bloėuna ye olma ve Batı dnyasına katılma řansını elde etmiřtir. Bu tezde iliřkilerinde ABD'nin egemen g olduėu, Trkiye'nin zayıf olduėu iddia edilmiřtir. Bu nedenle, bu tez, Trkiye ile ABD arasındaki iliřkinin, Peřine Takılma Teorik erevesi uygulanarak aıklanabileceėi fikrini savunmuřtur. Ayrıca, Trkiye'nin Kore Savařı'na neden katıldıėı ve bu katılım sonucunda Trkiye ile ABD arasındaki iliřkilerin nasıl geliřtiėi ile ilgili sorular ayrıntılı olarak tartıřılmıřtır. Bu tezde, Trkiye'nin zayıf devlet olan ABD ile hkim iktidarla iřbirliėi yapma nedenleri de incelenmiřtir. Kısacası, alıřma sırasında, tezde ncelikle 1945-1950 arasındaki Trk-Amerikan iliřkileri ele alınarak Kore Savařı'na odaklanılmıřtır. Ardından Trkiye ile ABD'nin Kore Savařı'na katılımı deėerlendirilerek Trkiye'nin Kore

Savaşı'na katılımının Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri üzerindeki etkisi incelenmiştir. Sonuç olarak; Türkiye'nin Kore Savaşı'na katılımı ile Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerine etkisinin, peşine takılma teorisi çerçevesinde açıklanabileceği savunulan bu tezde etki; güvenlik ve ekonomi olmak üzere iki alanda belirginlik göstermektedir. Güvenlik alanında; Amerikan askeri yardımında artış, BM Güvenlik Konseyi Üyeliği, komünist tehdidini yenme isteği ve son olarak NATO üyeliği isteği olmak üzere dört ana faktör vardır. Ekonomik alanda ise Amerikan ekonomik yardımının sürekliliği ve Türkiye'deki Amerikan yatırımındaki artışı olmak üzere iki ana etken oldukça göze çarpmaktadır.

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